Two To Tango: Rivalry and Resolve in India–China Relations

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, designed to reset India-China relations after the five-year Galwan hiatus, became the most talked about international event of the day. The two countries had initiated the process a year earlier when Modi met with Xi Jinping in Kazan at a BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) meeting. But coming as it did in the midst of India-US trade tensions and Xi’s grandiose talk of a new global order, it sparked unusual interest. Donald Trump’s sanctions on India were seen as the provocation for Modi’s visit, and the bonhomie between him, Xi and Vladimir Putin a public rebuff to him.

While the summit produced an unprecedented turnout, the extraordinary global attention cannot be attributed to any new dynamism in the organisation. It drew world attention because it came on the heels of the spectacular failure of Trump’s Alaska initiative and Putin’s rebuff. Trump’s tense meeting with European leaders was in sharp contrast to the warmth carefully orchestrated by the leaders in Tianjin.

Modi’s meeting with Xi was the pièce de resistance for the media. Xi played the statesman, his statements replete with platitudes counselling both countries to be partners not rivals, inviting the dragon and the elephant to tango and cautioning against letting the border dispute define the overall relationship. He delighted the Indian delegation by including a strong condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack, whose exclusion had led Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to refuse to endorse the joint statement of the SCO defence ministers meeting in June.

For Modi, it was a gratifying reassurance that he was not isolated, sending a message to Trump that India has options. Trump faced questions at home about the wisdom of undoing a quarter century of American diplomacy to wean India away from China and Russia. Modi’s nimble diplomacy was well received in India as assertion of strategic autonomy.

However, after the hugs and photo ops, India will have to do the math on its pivot to China. Xi sees it as India coming to its fold after being spurned by Trump. He is rebuilding the SCO as one of the pillars of his new international order and India’s presence was a signal success for him. He used the platform to expound his fourth global initiative, on global governance, following up on his global development, security and civilisation initiatives. He expounded several profound principles, such as adherence to sovereign equality and international rule of law, opposition to hegemonism and power politics, and the need for greater democracy in international relations.

Xi cleverly synchronised the summit with a gala military parade to celebrate the 80th anniversary of ‘China’s’ victory over Japan in World War II. This juxtaposition ensured the presence of over two dozen world leaders, demonstrating China’s clout. Xi declared that the history of World War II needs to be correctly written, but the underlying message was lost on no one—asserting China’s right to rebuild the world order demolished by Trump.

In such an international gathering, bilateral issues could not be expected to receive detailed attention. Both India and China tried to present a picture of congeniality and progress, but differences were discernible. India countered China by asserting that the situation on the border would affect relations in other fields. Trade and terrorism did not find direct mention in China’s readout. India evidently did not raise the non-tariff barriers faced by its exporters, letting China off the hook on the rising trade imbalance. China’s stock answer to its $100 billion trade surplus has been to demand easing of restrictions on its companies investing in India. So, instead of buying more Indian goods, China wants to buy Indian assets, as it has been doing in other countries which have fallen in its debt trap. India was the odd country out at the SCO on China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

India has also been hit, like other countries, by China’s disruption of supply chains and weaponisation of exports. China’s abrupt restrictions on the export of rare earths imposed globally in April this year, on top of the ban on tunnel boring machines and fertilisers, were a jolt to the Indian economy.

India has other concerns as well. China has just started building the world’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Brahmaputra in India) practically on India’s border. China has not shared any information on the dam, only an assurance of sharing hydrological data in case of an emergency. This despite one of its leading political commentators, Victor Gao, advising India not to weaponise the Indus waters with Pakistan.

India also avoided raising other sensitive issues like the Dalai Lama’s succession, for fear of riling China. But it is impossible to wish away issues related to Tibet, which are central to India’s security concerns with China. China cannot brush aside the problems of Tibetan refugees and the people of Tibet, unless human rights and civil and political rights are to have no place in Xi’s brave new world order. Xi declared in the victory parade that he does not want the law of the jungle in the world, where the strong prey on the weak. But he must begin at home by respecting the aspirations of Tibetans to live in freedom and dignity.

Xi’s military display is being seen as heralding a tectonic shift in the global balance of power. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in disarray, Europe bumbling, globalisation in reverse gear, and Trump on the rampage are all visible signs of the decline of the West. However, Xi’s internal and regional position are no better. China’s sluggish economy, Xi’s unending campaign against political opponents, predatory foreign trade practices and aggrandisement against neighbours do not inspire trust in him as a global leader.

China’s key neighbours—India, Japan and the Philippines—avoided the victory parade, while South Korea attended at the parliamentary level. For Taiwan, it was a warning that China is determined to finish their hundred-year-old civil war quickly. Japan infuriated China by informally advising countries not to participate in it. China’s display of military muscle before a coterie of fawning world leaders was a throwback to the imperial days of the Qing dynasty.

Modi did well to depart quietly before the parade, firmly setting the limits of the tango with Xi. Keeping relations on an even keel with China is important for India’s economic growth, but joining a world order led by it would be suicidal. India turned to China on the rebound of the breakup with Trump, but their bilateral relations can be reset to stable only when underlying issues are resolved fairly. Such resets have had a short shelf life in the past for good reason.

Peace and stability in Asia can only be secured through regional balance of power, free and open Indo-Pacific, and adherence to the rule of law by all countries. Instead of looking to hegemonistic super powers to guarantee this, India should mobilise collective security in the region with like-minded Asian countries. Some statements from Trump indicate that he could be in a conciliatory mood, but while responding positively, India should reduce dependence on all three big powers in imports or exports and work towards self-sufficiency in defence production.

(Views expressed are personal)

Dilip Sinha is an author and former diplomat