No Balancing Act: India–Iran Ties From Strategic Cooperation To Sanctions-Era Strains

Kuchh tarz-e-sitam bhi hai kuchh andaz-e-vafa bhi

Khulta nahin haal unki tabiat ka zara bhi —Akbar Allahabadi 

(There are postures of injustice and gestures of faithfulness

The inclination of her mind remains undiscerned)

This couplet encapsulates the India-Iran relationship: there’s always a measure of honesty, occasional friction, but the underlying intent is to remain friends.

Though a joint Israeli-US strike on Iran led to the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, India has not yet condemned it. Neither has it expressed solidarity with Iran over the breach of its territorial integrity. On February 28, 2026, when the war began, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi. Four days later, after criticism from the Congress party, the Indian government sent Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri to sign the condolence book at the Iranian embassy.

The second call to Araghchi came after his response to the sinking of frigate IRIS Dena, torpedoed by a US submarine in Sri Lanka’s Extended Economic Zone (EEZ) off Galle on March 5 while it was returning from the Milan 2026 exercises, which it had attended at India’s invitation. The Indian Navy’s statement focused solely on humanitarian search-and-rescue efforts, avoiding any mention of the US strike. We must recall that Jaishankar and Araghchi had co-chaired the 20th India-Iran Joint Commission Meeting in Delhi in May 2025.

So far, India’s response to the US-Israel war on Iran has been a statement expressing “deep concern” alongside calls for dialogue, restraint, and respect for all states’ sovereignty; and calls by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Arab leaders and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he “strongly condemned” the attacks.

It was not always this way, after all, India-Iran ties stretch back millennia.

In his Discovery of India, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote “Among the many peoples and races who have come in contact with and influenced India’s life and culture, the oldest and most persistent have been the Iranians. Indeed, the relationship precedes even the beginnings of Indo-Aryan civilisation, for it was out of some common stock, that the Indo-Aryans and the ancient Iranians diverged and took their different ways.”

Emperor Jalaluddin Akbar’s counsel to Iran’s fifth Safavid Shah, Shah Abbas, on religious tolerance still resonates today: “In internal affairs, unity takes precedence over discord, and peace is preferable to war, especially since we have always disregarded religious differences until now and regarded all people as God’s servants… We must show kindness to everyone as God’s treasures and extend mercy to all, regardless of their religion or beliefs.” A miniature painting from around 1620 captures a dream of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir, showing him embracing Shah Abbas I of Persia, with a lion and a lamb peacefully at their feet. They had never met and were, in fact, rivals fighting over Qandahar.

Former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid noted, “Iran has played a very important role in the development of Urdu literature… in many ways we remain very, very strongly connected. If you look at the rediscovery of Dastangoi in this country, where does it begin from, where does our usage of Khuda Hafiz come from?”

Notwithstanding the history, diplomatic ties began with a “friendship treaty” signed on March 15, 1950. This agreement was a part of Nehru’s foreign policy which emphasised non-alignment.

The common border between India and Iran ceased to exist with the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but the underlying geopolitical reality of the relationship continued. According to the former Vice-President and Ambassador to Iran, Mohammad Hamid Ansari, the continued importance of the relationship between the two countries was based on three main factors: Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf, its position as a major source of hydrocarbons, and its position on the western borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 1950s, Iran saw a brief interlude of nationalist government under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. After the Central Intelligence Agency and MI6-orchestrated coup saw the return of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1953, India maintained cordial relations with Pahlavi. Khurshid noted that the relations between the two countries were particularly close then. The Shah of Iran visited India in 1969, followed by a visit by Indira Gandhi to Iran in 1974.

The Shah recognised the new geopolitical realities in the region following the Bangladesh Liberation war in 1971. Iran maintained neutrality during the war, but developed good political and commercial relations with India in the 1973-78 period. Ansari said, “In the aftermath of the Bangladesh War, Iran wanted to know if India wanted to share a common border with Iran, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assured them that India had no such designs.”

Shah’s second visit to India in October 1974 was particularly significant since India had conducted its first nuclear tests in May of the same year. India also emerged as a significant market for Iranian oil at this time. In 1974, India imported 10 million tonnes of oil from Iran out of a total of 17 million tonnes of oil imported from all over the world.

The 1979 revolution, which overthrew the Shah and brought in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, transformed the region and the establishment of the Islamic Republic reshaped the state. After Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, Ali Khamenei succeeded him as Supreme Leader, solidifying the religio-political system.

Another important event of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, reflected the intricate nature of Iran’s relations with both India and Pakistan. Iran’s clerical government of Iran opposed the invasion and backed Pakistan-funded Afghan mujahideen in 1980s. In late 1990s, however, Tehran cooperated with Russia and India to curb the influence of Pakistan-backed Taliban forces.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), India imported oil from other Gulf countries but maintained a balanced position on the war. Despite the conflict, New Delhi continued to develop constructive relations with Tehran.

Relations faced strain in 1990-91 following Iranian statements on Jammu and Kashmir. As Ansari writes in By Many a Happy Accident, the outbreak of insurgency in the Kashmir Valley in 1990 created difficulties in bilateral ties. Iranian statements were sympathetic to what they viewed as an Islamic cause, and authorities signalled that the timing was not appropriate for a visit by India’s foreign minister. This raised doubts in New Delhi about Iranian intentions.

However, by October 1990, when Ansari reached Tehran, questions posed to him were on Kashmir and the complex and difficult procedure for Iranian nationals seeking visas. Soon, Ansari said that he “reverted back to normal procedures and it spread in the Tehran bazaar that Indians no longer treated Iranians as pariahs.”

Ansari noted that the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 caused sharp official and public reaction in Iran: there were demonstrations outside the chancery premises, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati summoned Ansari and remonstrated, and once he informed Delhi, he was asked to convey that “the mosque shall be rebuilt”. When this was conveyed to the foreign minister, he said, “This is satisfactory; I shall convey to the leadership.”

In September 1993, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Tehran and initiated a series of high-level visits that continued for more than a decade. This bilateral visit included discussions on two major points: the construction of a pipeline to supply Iranian gas to India, and enabling India to build transit facilities in Iran for supplying Indian goods to landlocked Central Asian countries. When Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani came to India two years later, trade accords and five bilateral agreements  led to the consolidation of ties.

Concerted efforts were made to improve the relationship, and the first results were visible in the Indo-Pak confrontation in Geneva in 1994 on the issue of human rights in Jammu & Kashmir. Both Ansari and Khurshid rejected the common perception that Iran has always taken sides with Pakistan against India, with Ansari recalling diplomatic efforts at the UN human rights forum in Geneva when P.V. Narasimha Rao was Prime Minister. Pakistan wanted to place a resolution in the UNHRC (50th session) to highlight the issue of “human rights abuses by Indian security forces in Kashmir”. India secured the support of Iran, preventing a unified Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) push.

Khurshid recalled that at one point, Iran’s geopolitical outlook even envisaged a potential strategic alignment involving India, China and Iran, although this never fully materialised, partly because of India’s complicated relationship with China.

India-Iran cooperation deepened around the turn of the millennium: Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s April 2001 visit to Iran saw the signing of the Tehran Declaration, and the return visit of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in January 2003 (when he was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade).

After former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Iran in 2012, India committed to investing $100 million in the development of the Chabahar Port in 2013. Prime Minister Narendra Modi then visited Tehran in 2016, when agreements were signed to develop and operate the Chabahar port.

Even in 2025, responding to a question by Mallikarjun Kharge in the Rajya Sabha, Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh said that India recognises Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while also acknowledging the international community’s interest in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme remains peaceful and compliant with its legal and international obligations.

India also reaffirmed its commitment to implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal. However, during the first presidential term of Donald Trump, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and reinstated sanctions on Iran. This led India to cease importing Iranian oil products since 2019.

Reflecting on the broader relationship, Khurshid said that ties between the two countries have largely remained cordial despite occasional disagreements. He pointed to India’s cooperation with Iran on humanitarian and diplomatic matters, particularly when Tehran faced sanctions from the US. India attempted to maintain economic engagement through alternative financial arrangements when regular banking channels were restricted, and Iran used funds that were parked in India for trade and investment. But those accounts had to be closed in 2018.

At the same time, Khurshid suggested that India’s more recent foreign policy choices may have influenced perceptions in Tehran, remarking that India has increasingly aligned its decisions with those of the US, which could be disappointing for Iran. However, even if the relationship has not yet deteriorated to the point of open criticism, evolving geopolitical developments could test that balance.  

Ashlin Mathew is senior associate editor, Outlook. She is based in Delhi

This article is part of Outlook 's March 21 issue Bombs Do Not Liberate Women which looks at the conflict in West Asia following US and Israel’s attacks on Iran leading to the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while the world wondered in loud silence, again, Whose War Is It Anyway?