Ethiopia’s New Rebel Alliance: Why Fears Of Another Civil War Are Rising

Seven Ethiopian armed groups have announced a new coalition called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, or Alliance for Survival, saying they intend to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party-led government and establish an inclusive transitional government.

The alliance includes the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Fano National Movement, Oromo Liberation Army, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement.

In its September 20 founding statement, the alliance accused the government of dictatorship, war, political exclusion and state failure, and called for a transitional government guided by a transitional charter. Those are the alliance’s claims, not independent findings.

The immediate significance is that the coalition includes groups that have recently been enemies. The TPLF and Fano fought on opposite sides of the 2020–2022 Tigray war, while Fano later took up arms against the federal government in Amhara. Reuters reported that the new alliance spans several regions but that its members continue to have territorial and political differences.

The question now is less whether Ethiopia has armed groups operating in several regions. It does. The question is whether those separate conflicts can begin operating as a coordinated political and military challenge to Addis Ababa.

Who Are The Seven Groups?

The alliance brings together movements rooted in different parts of Ethiopia.

The TPLF is based in Tigray in the north and was the dominant political force in the region before the Tigray war. Fano is an Amhara armed movement that fought alongside federal and regional forces against the TPLF before turning against the federal government in 2023. The Oromo Liberation Army operates in Oromia, while the Ogaden National Liberation Front is associated with Ethiopia’s Somali Region.

The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, also known as Ugugumo, is associated with Afar. The Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement are linked to Benishangul-Gumuz.

These are not equivalent organisations in size, military capacity or political influence. But together, the seven groups cover a broad geographic spread across Ethiopia. The alliance statement says they have agreed to coordinate their “popular and organisational capacities” to remove the Prosperity Party government.

The groups remain divided over territorial and political issues, while their geographical separation and differing capabilities could make sustained coordination difficult.

The membership therefore establishes the breadth of the coalition. It does not by itself establish a unified command structure.

Why Would Former Rivals Unite?

The most striking feature of the alliance is the presence of former enemies.

The TPLF and Fano fought on opposite sides during the Tigray war. The EHRC-OHCHR investigation into that conflict documented violations by Ethiopian federal forces, Eritrean forces, Tigray forces, Amhara and Afar special forces, allied militias and Fano, with some violations potentially amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Their decision to join the same coalition therefore reflects a narrower point of convergence: opposition to the federal government.

The Alliance for Survival says its members have agreed to coordinate against the Prosperity Party government and establish an inclusive transitional government. It also says differences between the groups will be resolved peacefully through political and constitutional dialogue.

That makes the coalition’s common purpose clearer than its common end-state. The groups agree on opposing the current government, but the founding statement does not resolve how their different regional interests, territorial disputes and political demands would fit into a future federal arrangement.

A common adversary has therefore created space for cooperation that did not exist during the Tigray war. It has not erased the disputes that contributed to Ethiopia’s regional conflicts.

What Did The Tigray War Change?

The Tigray war is essential to understanding why the new alliance matters.

The conflict began on November 3, 2020, between the TPLF and the federal government. The EHRC says the fighting became a two-year conflict involving Ethiopian federal forces, Eritrean forces, Tigray forces, Amhara and Afar special forces, allied militias and Fano. Its joint work with the UN documented violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by parties to the conflict.

The war also transformed relations between the federal government and regional political forces. Territorial disputes, the status of contested areas, the integration of armed forces and the political relationship between Addis Ababa and Tigray remained important issues after the fighting ended.

For the present story, that history makes the TPLF-Fano relationship particularly significant. Forces that once fought on opposite sides of the same war are now presenting a common challenge to the federal government.

Did Pretoria End The Conflict?

The November 2, 2022 Pretoria Agreement ended the Tigray conflict as a full-scale war. The Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement established an end to hostilities and included provisions on disarmament, humanitarian access and the political process. The EHRC describes the agreement as ending the two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia.

But ending the war did not resolve every dispute created by it.

The African Union has repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving what it calls the “hard-won gains” of the Pretoria agreement. In January 2026, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf expressed concern over developments in Tigray, called for maximum restraint and urged the parties to resolve outstanding issues through dialogue and in accordance with the agreement.

The UN issued a similar warning days later. It said renewed tensions and reported clashes in Tigray were worsening the security environment and raised concerns about the possibility of a return to wider conflict.

The significance of Pretoria, therefore, is that it stopped the large-scale war and created a framework for peace. It did not eliminate every political, territorial and security dispute that followed it.

Why Is Tigray Tense Again?

The new alliance comes amid renewed tensions in northern Ethiopia.

The AU said in January that developments in parts of Tigray risked undermining confidence in the Pretoria process and urged all sides to exercise restraint. EHRC separately reported conflict and military movements in areas bordering Tigray, Amhara and Afar, warning of serious risks to civilians and displacement.

In September the tensions had escalated further, including renewed skirmishes and drone strikes involving Tigrayan forces. It also reported that the TPLF had reasserted control over Tigray’s political administration in May, in a development the agency said contravened the 2022 peace agreement.

The important point is that Ethiopia has not simply returned to the 2020–2022 war. The AU and UN continue to frame the Pretoria agreement as the basis for resolving outstanding issues. But renewed military and political tensions show how fragile the settlement remains.

That creates the northern component of the new alliance at a time when armed conflicts also persist elsewhere.

How Do Amhara And Oromia Fit In?

The alliance would matter less if Tigray were Ethiopia’s only unresolved conflict.

Fano has been fighting the federal government in Amhara since 2023. EHRC continues to monitor human-rights concerns in the region, while the wider national conflict environment remains unsettled.

Oromia has its own prolonged conflict involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In March 2026, EHRC said renewed attacks attributed to the armed group in parts of Arsi Zone had resulted in deaths, injuries, destruction of property and displacement. In June, the commission reported further attacks in Aseko Woreda that it attributed to the group.

These conflicts have different causes and local dynamics. They should not be treated as one war simply because organisations from the regions have joined the same alliance.

Their significance is that they create multiple centres of armed opposition to the federal government at the same time. The new coalition is attempting to turn that geographic fragmentation into political coordination.

What Does The Alliance Want?

The alliance’s stated goal is broader than a military campaign against Addis Ababa.

It says it wants to remove the Prosperity Party government and establish an inclusive transitional government under a transitional charter. It also calls for all wars to stop, human and democratic rights to be guaranteed, the economic and social crisis to be stabilised and a participatory constitutional dialogue to address what it describes as Ethiopia’s decisive political questions.

The alliance also accuses Abiy’s government of dictatorship, genocide, state failure and pushing Ethiopia towards disintegration. Those are allegations made by the alliance and should be distinguished from independently documented evidence of conflict and human-rights violations.

There is evidence of a serious security and humanitarian crisis in parts of Ethiopia. UNHCR’s current country data covers displacement and refugee movements across regions including Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz. Its country operation also identifies continued internal conflict and insecurity as major drivers of displacement.

What remains unclear is how the seven groups would translate their shared opposition to Addis Ababa into a common governing arrangement. The founding statement promises an inclusive transition, but it does not settle how competing regional interests or territorial disputes would be reconciled after the government is removed.

How Is Abiy’s Government Responding?

Addis Ababa has presented the new coalition as part of a longer pattern of cooperation among armed groups.

Reuters reported that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s spokesperson, Billene Seyoum, said the groups had been collaborating for some time and alleged that their coordination had received financial backing from Eritrea. Eritrea has denied such allegations. The claim therefore remains disputed rather than an established fact.

The government has also taken action over how the alliance’s statement was disseminated. The founding statement was broadcast by TPLF-controlled Tigrai TV and that the Ethiopian Media Authority subsequently banned media outlets from using Tigrai TV as a source.

That response reflects the government's broader position that armed opposition should not be allowed to replace Ethiopia’s political institutions. But the current confrontation is unfolding alongside conflicts that the federal government has not fully resolved in Tigray, Amhara or Oromia.

How Dangerous Is The New Alliance?

The alliance’s existence is established. Its ability to function as a single military and political force is not.

The members are geographically dispersed and have different political objectives. Some have fought each other. Their relative military capabilities also vary. Reuters cited analysts who warned that internal weaknesses, distance and political differences could limit their ability to coordinate effectively.

At the same time, the federal government is already dealing with several active or recently renewed conflicts. EHRC continues to document violence and displacement in Oromia, while its January 2026 reporting highlighted the risks created by military movements and renewed fighting around the Tigray-Amhara-Afar borders.

That means the significance of the alliance does not depend on every member becoming a fully integrated fighting force. Even limited coordination could connect conflicts that have so far remained geographically and politically distinct.

But there is a difference between coordinating against a common government and agreeing on what comes after it. The alliance has articulated the first objective more clearly than the second.

A Coalition Against Addis Ababa, But For What Next?

The Alliance for Survival brings together armed movements from several major regions of Ethiopia, including former enemies from the Tigray war.

That makes the coalition significant at a moment when the Pretoria peace process remains under strain and conflicts continue in Amhara and Oromia. The AU and UN have both warned in 2026 about renewed tensions in Tigray and the risk of a wider return to conflict.

But Ethiopia has not simply returned to the Tigray war of 2020–2022. The new development is the attempt to connect separate regional armed movements under one anti-government umbrella.

Whether that alliance can sustain political and military coordination across such a geographically dispersed country remains uncertain. Its members have agreed on the government they want to remove. What comes after that is far less settled.