I have received many questions in response to my article on the capture ofKilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2, 2008. I will attempt toanswer some of the questions:
What will be the next move of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)?
One of the reasons for the continuing success of the SLA during the last twoyears has been its ability to deny to the LTTE an opportunity for an offensiveaction. It has consistently forced the LTTE to fight a defensive battle in onepiece of territory after another--whether in the East or the North. Successionof defensive battles with no opportunity for taking the offensive anywhere sapsthe morale. That moment has not yet come for the LTTE, but it could and it willif the SLA manages to continue to deny to the LTTE an opportunity for anoffensive action. From the reports coming out of the North, one gets animpression that the SLA is not giving itself a pause after its success atKilinochchi. It is pressing its offensive against the LTTE and has startedmoving towards Mulaithivu, which has now become the principal target of thebombings by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF). The objective of the SLA is to keepthe LTTE bleeding and not to allow it to re-group itself.
In the past against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) as well as the SLAsubsequently, the LTTE had repeatedly bounced back from seemingly hopelesssituations and recovered lost territory. Will it be able to do it again?
The LTTE's morale and motivation remain strong, but strong morale and motivationalone cannot win battles in the absence of resources--human and materialresources. In respect of both, the law of diminishing returns has already set infor the LTTE. One cannot totally rule out the kind of spectacular come-backs theLTTE had staged in the 1990s, but the objective conditions in the post-9/11world are different from those in the pre-9/11 world. There was a certain amountof acceptance of the legitimacy of terrorism/insurgency for achieving apolitical objective if left with no other option pre-9/11. Hence, the LTTE had afree run of the world collecting funds and clandestinely procuring materials.One of the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US is theacceptance by the international community that terrorism is an absolute evil andcannot be accepted whatever be the reason for it. The LTTE today is a terroristorganisation in the eyes of the international community. It no longer has a freerun. Its source of funds and equipment are being choked off one after the other.Before 9/11, another important source of replenishment of arms and ammunitionfor the LTTE was the capture from the SLA. In defensive battles this also driesup. The ground realities today are much more strongly against the LTTE than theywere pre-9/11. It will be a miracle if it is able to repeat its pre-/9/11comebacks, but one should not act on the assumption that it will not be able tostage a come-back.It particularly can if the SLA, in over-confidence orover-exuberance, creates serious tactical or strategic mistakes.
But even in the post-9/11 world, Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda forces in Iraq andthe Taliban in Afghanistan staged a come-back?
Yes, they did due to two reasons-- the availability of sanctuaries andassistance for the pro-Al Qaeda forces from Iran and Syria and the similaravailability for the Taliban from the Pakistani Army and the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI). The LTTE is a banned terrorist organisation in India and itsleader Prabakaran is a wanted assassin in India wanted for the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi. Hence, the LTTE may not be able to get sanctuaries and assistancefrom elements in Tamil Nadu. It has to fight with its back to the sea with nopossibility of escape beyond the sea.
But even under the IPKF the LTTE managed to stage a come-back despite beingdenied sanctuaries and assistance in Indian territory?
As I have already mentioned, the pre-9/11 objective conditions were differentfrom the post-9/11. Moreover, the IPKF did not indulge in a ruthless applicationof India's air power against the LTTE. If it had done so, as the SLAF has beendoing now, the LTTE might not have been able to stage a come-back.
Does it mean, the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils has become hopeless?
Their cause was not hopeless till 2003. It enjoyed a lot of internationalsupport. Prabakaran made it hopeless by a series of errors of judgement andtactical and strategic blunders. He continues to live in a make-believe world ofhis own, nursing an illusion that the international opinion might once againchange in favour of the Tamils. Yes, it might, but only if Prabakaran is removedfrom the leadership of the LTTE along with his close associates. As I have beensaying and writing for the last two years, he has become a liability for theTamil cause and should be removed by the Tamils themselves or by his associatesin the LTTE leadership who realise the damage he has caused to the Tamil cause.
How will the end of Prabakaran come?
Either in an air strike by the SLAF or through suicide or through one of his ownmen turning against him. I would not be surprised if one of these days the SLAFmanages to kill him as it managed to kill Tamilselvan, his political adviser, in2006. As I wrote in the past, he has to be lucky every time,but the SLAF has tobe lucky only once.
What are the chances of he and his cadres taking shelter in India?
The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu will not allow it. However, one has tobe alert to the possibility that the Maoists (Naxalites) in the tribal belt ofcentral India who have some territorial control in the jungles might help himand give him shelter in return for the assistance which the LTTE had allegedlygiven them in the past. If he manages to reach the Maoists controlled territory,the ability of our security forces to get at him may be limited. In the case ofthe LTTE cadres, some of them might succeed to come over to India as refugees.This would call for stricter vetting of the refugee flow in order to identifyand arrest such elements.
What would happen to the arms and ammunition and the planes at the disposalof the LTTE?
They might try to cache them in the jungles in the Northern Province or bringsome of them to India and give them to the Maoists for possible use or safecustody. We have to be alert enough to prevent this.
If the SLA ultimately manages to defeat the LTTE, will there be peace in SriLanka?
Most probably not. It might be the end of classical insurgency, but it will notbe the end of terrorism till the aspiratiions of the Tamils are addressedwithout weakening the unity of Sri Lanka.
India has been accused of double standards--taking a strong line againstterrorism as seen after Mumbai, but at the same time critical of the strongmeasures taken by the SL Government?
There are no double standards. We take a strong line against the ISI-sponsoredPakistani terrorists, who have no business to be in our territory. We follow ano-holds-barred policy towards them to eradicate them. Our policy towards ourown people--separatists, ideological terrorists or jihadi terrorists-- is morenuanced. Our policy towards them is graduated with a mix of political and thelaw and order components. We have never hesitated to talk to them. We look uponindigenous movements not as a conflict between one community and another, but asa conflict between the Government and aggrieved elements in a community. Some ofthe strongest supporters of the human rights of the aggrieved communities havecome from the majority Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, there are no foreignterrorists operating. All the insurgents and terrorists are their own people.The counter-terrorism strategy of the Mahinda Rajapakse Government lacks thekind of sophistication and nuances we have. It treats the Sri Lankan Tamils asif they are foreigners while paying lip service to their being citizens withequal rights. This has made the conflict in Sri Lanka not only between theGovernment and aggrieved sections of the Tamils, but also between the majoritySinhalese and the minority Tamil communities. How many Sinhalese moulders ofpublic opinion have come forward to support the human rights of the Tamils? Howmany of them have criticised the use of the Air Force against the civilian Tamilpopulation? Even if the SLA is able to defeat the LTTE, it will take years forthe SL society to heal the divide between the Sinhalese and the Tamils caused bythe policies of the Rajapakse Government and the intemperate pronouncements ofLt.Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the Commander of the SLA.
Advertisement
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.
