Washington’s Divided Power: What The Democratic Takeover Of Congress Means For India

The Democratic victory in the US midterm elections has changed the balance of power in Washington, leaving President Donald Trump facing an opposition-controlled Congress for the final two years of his presidency. For India, the result raises questions about tariffs, the proposed bilateral trade agreement, Russian oil sanctions and immigration restrictions affecting Indian professionals and students.

Indian-American Congressman Shri Thanedar has already linked the election outcome to Trump's trade policies, saying Democrats should send a clear message that the President cannot govern unilaterally. He specifically criticised the tariffs imposed on India and other countries, and suggested that impeachment should remain an option if Trump continued making decisions without adequate scrutiny.

His remarks reflect one strand of Democratic opposition to the administration, rather than an agreed party position. The wider question for New Delhi is whether a Democratic Congress can turn that criticism into changes in US policy, or whether the underlying disagreements between the two countries will continue.

The distinction matters because Congress has considerable powers over legislation, spending and oversight, but the President retains substantial authority over diplomacy, executive action and national security.

What Has Changed In Washington?

On Wednesday, Democrats won control of both chambers, flipping at least seven Senate seats and more than two dozen House districts. The result gives the party control of congressional committees and greater authority to investigate the administration, block legislation and scrutinise presidential appointments.

The transition, however, will not take place immediately. The existing 119th Congress, in which Republicans hold 53 Senate seats against 45 Democrats and two independents who caucus with them, continues until January 3, 2027. The new 120th Congress will then convene, giving Democrats control of the legislative agenda for the next two years.

A Democratic House can use committee investigations, hearings and subpoenas to examine the administration's decisions. In the Senate, the party will have greater influence over confirmations of ambassadors, senior officials and federal judges. Both chambers also have a say in government appropriations, giving them leverage over how executive policies are funded.

Impeachment is another possibility, although it should not be confused with an automatic consequence of the election. The House can impeach a president by a simple majority, but conviction and removal require the support of two-thirds of senators present. Democrats would therefore need substantial Republican support to remove Trump.

Thanedar's suggestion that impeachment should remain on the table is a political demand, not an announcement of a Democratic leadership strategy. The more immediate constraint on Trump is likely to come through investigations, funding negotiations, legislative resistance and scrutiny of executive decisions.

Can Democrats Rein In Trump's Tariffs On India?

Trade is likely to be the most immediate area of friction for New Delhi. Trump's tariff policy has disrupted negotiations and created uncertainty for Indian exporters across textiles, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, agriculture and other sectors.

In February 2026, India and the US announced a framework for an Interim Agreement on reciprocal trade, while continuing negotiations for a broader Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). The framework proposed an 18% US reciprocal tariff rate on specified Indian goods, alongside Indian tariff reductions on US industrial and agricultural products. It also included India's intention to purchase US energy, aircraft, technology products and other goods worth $500 billion over five years, as well as expanded cooperation on GPUs and data-centre products.

However, the 18% figure should not be treated as the current blanket tariff on Indian goods. On February 20, the US Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) did not authorise the President to impose tariffs. The Trump administration subsequently issued Executive Order 14389, ending additional duties imposed under IEEPA while preserving measures under other laws, including Sections 301 and 232.

Other tariff pressures remain. In July, the Office of the US Trade Representative announced a 10% Section 301 duty rate for India among a group of economies investigated over their failure to effectively prohibit imports produced using forced labour. The action includes product exemptions, and should not be confused with a uniform tariff on every Indian export.

The scale of the relationship makes the dispute significant. USTR estimates that US goods and services trade with India totalled $239.6 billion in 2025, including a US goods trade deficit of $58.4 billion.

India's own parliamentary assessment reflects the concern. The Rajya Sabha's Standing Committee on Commerce, in its August report on India-US trade relations, recommended concluding the BTA while protecting Indian interests. It also called for more predictable market access and measures to support exporters affected by tariff volatility.

A Democratic Congress could hold hearings on the administration's tariff decisions, examine their impact on American businesses and consumers, and introduce legislation to restrict or clarify the President's delegated trade powers. But it cannot simply cancel every tariff through a congressional resolution. Legislation must pass both chambers and secure the President's approval, or a veto override.

Nor does Democratic control guarantee a more liberal trade policy. Protection of American industries and scrutiny of foreign market access have support across party lines. India may gain another channel to challenge Trump's approach, but it should not assume that the Democrats will endorse all of New Delhi's trade demands.

Will Russian Oil Become A Bigger Flashpoint?

India's purchases of Russian energy remain a sensitive issue because they intersect with its energy security, relationship with Moscow and Washington's sanctions policy.

The Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, signed by Trump in September, created a framework for additional sanctions and duties involving Russia and countries purchasing Russian-origin oil or facilitating sanctions evasion. It provided for potential additional duties of 100% on goods from the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude and natural gas if they knowingly made new purchases after October 18.

But the administration's October 16 implementation order also invoked the law's waiver provision, suspending the application of the specified duties and sanctions at that time. Trump submitted a national-interest certification to Congress to justify the waiver.

This creates an important distinction between the pressure available under the law and measures currently being applied. India has not automatically become subject to a new 100% tariff under the legislation.

A Democratic Congress could investigate the administration's use of the waiver, seek details from the Treasury Department and USTR, and debate whether the sanctions framework should be amended. It could also question the criteria used to assess countries purchasing Russian energy.

However, a change in congressional control does not necessarily mean a softer US position on Moscow. Opposition to Russia and the use of sanctions have support across both parties. For India, the concern is whether Washington uses that pressure selectively or applies it in ways that directly affect its energy choices and economic interests.

What Happens To H-1B Visas And Indian Students?

Immigration is another area where congressional scrutiny could become more important. Indian professionals account for a significant share of the high-skilled workforce entering the US through the H-1B programme, while Indian students and families are also affected by changes in visa screening and entry rules.

In September, Trump extended restrictions on certain H-1B workers for another 12 months, until September 21, 2027. Under the proclamation, employers seeking to bring certain workers from outside the US must make a $100,000 payment, subject to exceptions.

The requirement has faced legal challenges. On September 30, a federal district court in California vacated agency policies used to implement the payment and barred their enforcement until the relevant rulemaking and regulatory procedures were completed. Other courts have reached different conclusions, however, and the underlying presidential proclamation has not simply disappeared. The dispute remains legally contested.

The State Department has also expanded online-presence screening. Its existing vetting framework covers H-1B and F-1 applicants, among other categories. A September announcement added I, TN and TD visa applicants to the screening requirement and instructed applicants in those newly added categories to make their social-media profiles public. It would be inaccurate to suggest that this latest instruction imposed the same new public-profile requirement on every H-1B or student visa applicant.

Democrats could use committee hearings to examine the effect of these restrictions on US employers, universities, hospitals and technology companies that depend on skilled foreign workers. They could also introduce legislative changes to immigration rules.

But individual visa decisions and screening practices remain largely within the administration's executive and agency framework. Congressional oversight may increase pressure for changes, but it will not automatically reverse the President's proclamations or determine the outcome of pending litigation.

Will Defence And Technology Cooperation Remain Strong?

Defence ties are less directly exposed to the political dispute over tariffs and immigration because they rest on long-term agreements, military relationships and shared strategic interests.

On October 28, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Cebu, Philippines. The two sides reviewed progress under the 10-year India-US Defence Framework and discussed military technology, information-sharing, operational readiness, maritime security and defence-industrial integration.

The fifth edition of the India-US tri-service exercise Tiger Triumph also began at Visakhapatnam on Monday. The exercise focuses on coordination and interoperability during large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

These developments indicate that military engagement is continuing despite differences in other areas. A Democratic Congress could influence defence appropriations, arms-transfer oversight, export controls and funding for Indo-Pacific programmes. It could also examine specific defence transactions or the administration's regional strategy.

Technology partnerships provide another area of continuity. The February trade framework identified GPUs, data-centre products, semiconductor supply chains and digital trade as areas for cooperation. India's parliamentary commerce committee has also argued that US supply-chain diversification could create opportunities for Indian electronics, semiconductor and clean-energy manufacturing.

The $500 billion purchase intention announced in February is not the same as completed contracts or actual expenditure. Its significance lies in the scale of the commercial relationship the two governments sought to develop. Whether these ambitions survive the tariff dispute will depend on the progress of negotiations and the terms eventually agreed.

Could US Policy Towards Pakistan And Iran Change?

Congressional scrutiny could also affect how Washington approaches South Asia and West Asia, both of which have direct consequences for India's security and energy interests.

Pakistan's engagement with Trump has been an important part of Islamabad's diplomatic outreach. India's concerns have centred partly on Trump's repeated claims that he helped facilitate the May 2025 ceasefire after the military confrontation between the two countries.

India's official account, however, says Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations contacted his Indian counterpart on May 10, followed by formal discussions between the two military officials on May 12, when they agreed to halt military operations. The difference in accounts has remained politically significant in New Delhi.

A Democratic Congress could examine the administration's dealings with Pakistan, including counterterrorism cooperation, military assistance and its handling of India-Pakistan tensions. But there is no automatic reason to expect Washington to end its engagement with Islamabad. US interests involving Afghanistan, counterterrorism, China and regional stability will continue to shape that relationship.

Iran presents a different set of concerns for India. Any escalation involving Washington and Tehran could affect oil prices, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Indian nationals in the Gulf and New Delhi's connectivity interests, including the Chabahar port.

The War Powers Resolution provides Congress with a framework for receiving information and influencing the use of American military force. Democrats could hold hearings, demand greater scrutiny of military operations and use funding legislation to pressure the administration. They cannot, however, automatically take over the President's role as commander-in-chief or end every military operation through a change in congressional leadership.

For India, the outcome will depend less on a wholesale change in US regional policy than on how the new Congress scrutinises individual decisions involving Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf.

Can Indian-American Lawmakers Influence The Relationship?

The election also gives Indian-American Democratic lawmakers an opportunity to shape debate in Congress, particularly on tariffs, immigration and the administration's approach towards New Delhi.

Thanedar's comments on November 4 are an immediate example. The Michigan Democrat criticised Trump's tariff decisions towards India and other countries, arguing that the President should not be able to govern through unpredictable unilateral measures. He also suggested that Democrats consider impeachment if Trump continued along that path.

Thanedar sits on the House Committees on Agriculture and Homeland Security, including the latter's Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Accountability. His positions give him opportunities to raise questions about trade and executive accountability, but his remarks do not constitute an official Democratic policy announcement.

Representative Ro Khanna has also criticised Trump's handling of India-US ties. In June, he described the relationship as being at its lowest point in 30 years, citing concerns over Iran policy, immigration and declining diplomatic trust. That assessment was his political judgement, not an official evaluation by the US government.

Indian-American lawmakers are not a single political bloc. Their positions differ on trade, immigration, Iran, Israel and foreign policy. They can influence hearings, legislation and public debate, but their individual views do not automatically become the Democratic Party's position.

Will The Relationship Actually Change?

The Democratic victory gives Congress greater capacity to challenge Trump's policies, but the consequences for India will vary across different areas of the relationship.

Trade negotiations and tariffs are likely to face greater scrutiny, although bipartisan support for protecting US industries could limit the scope for a major change. Russian oil will remain a difficult issue because sanctions policy is not confined to one party. Immigration restrictions could face stronger congressional opposition, but reversing executive measures will require more than hearings or statements.

Defence and technology cooperation have stronger institutional foundations and are likely to continue, even as disagreements persist elsewhere. Washington's engagement with Pakistan and its approach towards Iran may also attract more oversight without necessarily undergoing a strategic reversal.

For New Delhi, the midterm result creates additional political and institutional channels in Washington, but not an automatic improvement in ties. The direction of the relationship will depend on whether the two governments can resolve their trade and energy disagreements while preserving cooperation in defence, technology and the Indo-Pacific.