Exclusive | ‘A Law For Death, Not Justice’, Says Lawyer Who Defended Thousands Of Palestinian Prisoners

“Three men and three verdicts,
the accusation: love of Palestine,
the ruling judgement: execution.

O Atta Al Zeir, Fouad Hejazi, O Jamjoum,
O three shining stars!
You lit up the land of my nation,
and from Akka came the funerals for three doves,
emerging from the darkness
and spreading my country with rays of light.”

The poem “From Acre Prison” (Min Sijn ʿAkka) survives today in the form of a rough English translation of what is widely understood to be a Palestinian folk composition rooted in oral history. While it is often associated with Mohammad Jamjoum, Fuad Hejazi, and Atta al-Zeir, three prisoners executed by the British in 1930, there is no definitive evidence that they authored the poem themselves. Rather, the verses are believed to have taken shape collectively after their execution, and the poem has since become part of Palestinians’ lived experiences under Israeli occupation, evolving through generations as part of Palestine’s oral tradition. It is often said that every Palestinian child grows up with this poem on the tip of their tongue, a testament to how deeply it is woven into cultural memory and narratives of resistance.

The poem stays relevant today as Israel has passed a controversial new law making the death penalty by hanging the default punishment for Palestinians in the West Bank convicted of killing Israelis in what is defined as acts of terrorism. The legislation, championed by Itamar Ben-Gvir, was approved in the Knesset by a vote of 62–48.

It applies specifically to Palestinians tried in military courts, while Israeli citizens remain subject to civilian courts. Under the law, judges can impose life imprisonment only in vaguely defined “special circumstances,” and executions must be carried out within 90 days. It also lowers the threshold for sentencing to a simple majority of judges and removes the right to appeal, raising serious concerns among critics about due process and discrimination.

Defending the law, Ben-Gvir framed it as both a deterrent and a moral necessity, repeatedly invoking security concerns after the October 7 attacks. “Whoever chooses terrorism chooses death,” he said, calling its passage “a historic move.” He also dismissed international criticism, arguing that foreign governments “did not experience October 7.” In a recent interview, he said authorities had already begun implementing the law, ordering “red uniforms” and setting up a “death row wing”, adding that “the terrorists can’t sleep at night, they are worried… the terrorists have reason to worry.” 

Critics, however, argue there is no evidence the death penalty deters ideologically motivated violence and warn the law may deepen tensions rather than reduce them. Hussein Abu Hussein, a prominent Palestinian lawyer and human rights activist who has led key rights organisations and represented thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli military and civilian courts, speaks to Zenaira Bakhsh about the evolution of the death penalty in Palestine, its legal contradictions, and its implications under international law.

Q. How has the death penalty evolved across legal systems governing Palestinians, from pre-1967 laws to today’s fragmented framework?

Regarding the evolution of the death penalty, it is essential to make a fundamental distinction to understand the process. We are dealing with two separate and distinct legal systems. The first is the Israeli legal system, governed by a sovereign and the Knesset (the legislative authority), which enacts laws applicable to Israeli citizens, residents, or anyone within Israel. The second legal system is the one existing in the Occupied Territories—namely the West Bank—territory occupied by Israel in 1967. In this area, a military regime is in place, controlled by the Israeli occupation army.

The legal system in this territory is composed of several layers: first, Jordanian laws that were in force until 1967; second, military orders issued by the Military Commander of the Israeli forces; and third, laws enacted by the Palestinian Authority since its establishment following the Oslo Accords. Military orders define security offenses and apply to all residents of the Occupied Territories, except for Israeli settlers. Military courts lack the jurisdiction to try settlers; if they are prosecuted for any offenses, they are tried in Israeli domestic courts.

Q. To what extent is the death penalty being used as a political and deterrent tool, particularly in relation to Palestinians?

In Israel, the death penalty exists by law but has been implemented only once against Adolf Eichmann, a remnant of the Nazi regime who committed crimes against humanity. The new law establishes the death penalty as the default for a Palestinian who intentionally causes the death of an Israeli, whether they are a Palestinian citizen of Israel or a Palestinian resident of the Territories. Regarding Palestinian prisoners detained during the recent war on Gaza, there is a bill that has not yet been approved proposing the death penalty for these detainees. According to statements by the law's sponsors, the law will not apply to these detainees, and one must await the special legislative process. It is clear that the death penalty is intended to achieve a political purpose; per its sponsors, it aims to deter Palestinians from such acts, despite the fact that no research was presented to the legislature showing any basis for the assumption that the death penalty deters ideologically motivated violent offenses.

Q. What legal processes do death penalty cases follow in Israeli and military courts, and do they allow for fair trials and appeals?

As noted above, there are two tracks for the death penalty: one before domestic Israeli courts and another before the military courts in the Occupied Territories. The law speaks for itself and does not allow for due process, as the death penalty is a mandatory sentence; the court has no discretion to impose it or commute it to another sentence. Furthermore, the sentence can be handed down even if the prosecution did not request it, and it can be granted by a simple majority of the presiding judges-unanimity is not required.

Moreover, the execution must be carried out within 30 days, which thwarts the possibility of correcting legal errors—and every jurist knows that legal systems are not infallible. Certainly, the imposition of the death penalty will have far-reaching social, economic, and psychological consequences on the lives of the prisoners. Since this is a new law, one must wait to examine these implications in reality.

Q. How does the application of the death penalty in this context align with international law, including the ICCPR and the Fourth Geneva Convention?

As I mentioned, no global studies were presented to the Knesset showing that the death penalty actually deters. On the contrary, international studies have shown the opposite result, especially regarding ideological offenses. Every Palestinian child knows by heart a poem written in the 1930s that glorifies three Palestinian martyrs (Mohammad Jamjoum, Ata al-Zir, and Fuad Hijazi) who were sentenced to hanging in Acre Prison by the British Mandate in 1930 for ideological offenses. The law also limits the access of those sentenced to death to lawyers and their families. The new law contradicts international treaties, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Fourth Geneva Convention, and international human rights law.

Q. How does this law fit into broader patterns of legislation and control in the Occupied Territories?

The law, as stated, was enacted by the Israeli Knesset, which lacks authority under international law to legislate in the Occupied Territories. The law stipulates that the Minister of Defense shall instruct the Military Commander to amend military orders to allow the imposition of the death penalty in military courts. This is despite the fact that under international law, the Regional Commander responsible for the Occupied Territories is the sovereign authority subject to international law, not the Knesset. This new law fits into years of legislation by the Knesset and military orders enacted by the Military Commander. For example, since the war of October 7th, the Knesset has enacted 32 racist and discriminatory laws against Palestinians—the most decisive proof that Israel views the law as a tool to achieve political goals it cannot achieve through other means.

Q. What does the broader history of detention, enforcement, and accountability reveal about the Israeli legal system’s treatment of Palestinians?

The history of the "disappearance" of Palestinian and other prisoners is long and does not reflect well on Israel. Daily, settlers carry out "field trials" and kill innocent Palestinians under the watchful eyes of the army and security authorities, without these bodies protecting the Palestinians or prosecuting the settlers responsible. Furthermore, administrative detention has existed in Israel and the Occupied Territories for decades, allowing the Minister of Defense or the army to detain Palestinians for years without a formal legal process or evidence of any offense. It is enough for the Minister of Defense or the Military Commander to sign a detention order to renew the detention of a Palestinian, minor or adult, without a proper, transparent trial or the right to a defense.

The experience of Palestinians with the Israeli legal system does not reflect well on the system. On the contrary, a "mark of Cain" exists on the forehead of an Israeli legal system that has backed an oppressive and cruel occupation lasting approximately 60 years. Israel is not a signatory to treaties that allow for international judicial review of its courts, and therefore, this channel is unavailable to them.