Advertisement
X

‘There Was Less Cohesiveness In The Alliance’: Shakeel Ahmad On Congress Defeat In Bihar

Congress leader Shakeel Ahmad, who lost the Kadwa seat by over 18,000 votes, attributes Bihar’s election outcome to weak alliance cohesion, BJP’s strategic caste coalition, and AIMIM leader Asaduddin Owaisi’s divisive communal rhetoric.

AICC In-charge- Bihar Krishna Allavaru (left), PCC President, Bihar Rajesh Ram (center), and CLP Leader, Bihar, Shakeel Ahmad Khan (right) at a Congress Party briefing on the Bihar election and the SIR Issue at Indira Bhawan on September 10, 2025 in New Delhi, India. (Photo by Sonu Mehta Hindustan Times) Congress Party Briefing On Bihar Election And The SIR Issue. IMAGO / Hindustan Times
Summary
  • Shakeel Ahmad highlighted weak Mahagathbandhan cohesion, friendly fights over seats, lack of coordination on the ground, and absence of a permanent Congress cadre structure in Bihar as reasons the party failed to connect with voters.

  • He stressed the need for introspection, addressing communalism, empowering EBCs and OBCs, strengthening party hierarchy with permanent committees, and improving grassroots outreach to counter BJP narratives of ‘jungle raj’ and vote manipulation.

  • Shakeel Ahmad cites BJP’s caste-based coalition, biased use of Jeevika Didis, and communal rhetoric by AIMIM’s Asaduddin Owaisi as key factors behind Congress’s poor performance in Bihar.

When the results of the Kadwa seat rolled in, Congress Legislature Party (CLP) leader in the outgoing Bihar Assembly and incumbent Shakeel Ahmad had lost by 18,368 to JD(U)’s Dulal Chandra Goswmi. He was one of the many who lost on November 14, when the Congress seats fell to six from the 19 they had previously.

Speaking to Outlook, Shakeel Ahmed Khan deliberates on what happened on his seat, what happened to the Congress and what is the way forward.

Q

You lost your seat. What happened?

A

There was complete manoeuvring by the ruling alliance. They deployed all the Jeevika Didis in the polling booths as helpers to assist voters and influence women by suggesting that another installment of ₹10,000 was forthcoming. Around 1.80 lakh Jeevika Didis were involved in this effort. In the evening, bogus voters managed by the local administration were observed.

A significant consolidation of Hindu votes occurred due to AIMIM leader Asaduddin Owaisi’s speeches, which were entirely communal and biased. Owaisi allegedly said, “the son of Muhammad, the son of Ali, and the son of Umar is going to rule now,” intentionally provoking Hindu voters. It appeared as though he was acting to benefit the BJP. Why did he use such rhetoric? Why did he say, “In front of the oppressors, the son of Muhammad, the son of Ali, and the son of Fatima will sit as Chief Minister”? This language was clearly meant to galvanise the Muslim community.

Earlier, I used to receive at least 25,000 Hindu votes. However, due to the consolidation of Hindu votes this time, my support decreased. Additionally, at least 15,000 Muslim votes that previously went to me shifted to AIMIM and a few independent Muslim candidates, who together received 17,000 votes. In total, 75 per cent of these votes went to the present MLA, while Owaisi’s candidate received 11,000 votes.

Q

Can the Jeevika didis be the main reason…

A

Jeevika didis are one of the reasons. The maneuvering and management were intense by government resources. It was completely partial. The local administration was fully engaged on behalf of the government. It is difficult to win any election under such conditions. A booth observer or polling-station observer who is not impartial can influence several things.

Q

Were there internal issues in the Mahagathbandhan, and was the alliance cohesive?

A

We must be mindful of what we say. Voters pay close attention to both tone and conduct. In a coalition, rigidity serves no one. There are also certain matters within Laluji’s family, but it would be inappropriate to comment on them. Even so, the electorate is watching.

Turning to alliance dynamics, there has to be room for compromise. They are the larger party in the state, yet candidates were announced without consultation. At the very least, they should have left us the seats we previously contested. The idea of a so-called “friendly fight” simply does not hold up.

After Rahul Gandhi and Tejashwi Yadav joined forces on the campaign trail, a few issues were resolved, but I accept that there was no clear sense of unity.

The Vikassheel Insaan Party created considerable drama, which ultimately fell flat. Until the final moment of the talks, they attempted to manoeuvre the situation, yet even their own supporters did not vote for us. They did not win a single seat. The notion of projecting a Deputy Chief Minister did not resonate either. Presenting a single Chief Ministerial face might have been more effective.

The Indian Inclusive Party managed to draw some votes, and successfully transferred some of their votes to Mahagathbandhan candidates. Their president IP Gupta secured a win. He won his Saharsa seat defeating a BJP candidate. That must be acknowledged.

Tejashwi Yadav’s ambition to become Chief Minister is clear, but that alone cannot secure votes. We need to reflect on why the alliance lacked genuine cohesiveness. Coordination on the ground was also insufficient. Before the seat-sharing talks, there was a sense of unity, but during and after the discussions, our efforts fell short. By the end, cohesion had weakened, leading to friendly contests in several constituencies.

Advertisement
Q

 Did your alliance arithmetic work?

A

We are in the process of analysing the results. We need to assess how many EBCs and OBCs voted for us. Some of the tribal communities supported us, but the BJP had a broader caste coalition — Koeri, Paswan, Kurmi, Musahar and the upper castes. That combination worked in their favour. The upper castes are influential and largely backed the NDA, as did a significant section of Dalits.

We aimed to secure the 36 per cent EBC vote, but it did not materialise.

Q

Congress highlighted SIR and vote fraud, but they didn’t resonate. Were these not real issues on the ground?

A

You are right. “Vote Chori” was, and still is, an issue, but Bihar’s problems go far beyond that. The state continues to struggle with migration, unemployment, industrial development, corruption and gunda raj. Perhaps our message and the alliance’s manifesto simply did not reach the public.

We focused on initiatives for the EBCs, yet many of them still voted for the BJP. Reservation policies and the distribution of power have influenced this. Our messaging may not have landed as intended. The issue of empowering EBCs remains important, but the message we hoped to deliver did not filter through.

Advertisement
Q

Speaking of Gunda raj, the NDA and BJP especially was able to paint a picture of the RJD rule as ‘jungle raj. You were not able to counter it. Why?

A

They have been effective in pushing the narrative of gunda raj and jungle raj. The media rarely carries our perspective. What we are witnessing now is outright lawlessness, yet both social media and the mainstream press fail to report the truth. Though the crime numbers say otherwise, they were able to paint another picture.

Q

What were the reasons for the Mahagathbandhan drubbing?

A

Rahul Gandhi worked hard, but we lack a proper cadre on the ground. I have some workers in my own constituency, but in Bihar there is no real cadre system. What exists instead is a loose base of Congress supporters — and the two are not the same. You cannot direct supporters to work for you.

We do not have functioning block presidents. The structure exists in theory, but it is not operational. There has been no Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) in place for the past seven years. Without a PCC, there is no organisational body to support candidates, no observers, and no systematic oversight. AICC observers may visit the state for a week, but you cannot win an election through temporary arrangements. There must be a Pradesh Congress Committee, District Congress Committees and Block Congress Committes. None of this is there in Bihar. We need permanent structures and not just temporary arrangements.

The secretary in charge (Krishna Allavaru) should have devoted more time to forming committees, supervising their work and assigning responsibilities. The Congress operates through hierarchy, without it, discipline is impossible. He worked hard and tried to monitor the situation, but it all remained a stopgap effort. Setting up a war room and assuming that will resolve everything simply does not work.

Advertisement
Q

So, now what?

A

Vote chori and SIR are realities. Many people were unable to vote. Even now, the authorities have not disclosed the names of those removed from the rolls or those added at the last minute. We have to understand the effect of that.

Only hard work will make a difference. There are no easy answers. We must confront communalism, both with majority and minority communities, firmly and without compromise.

Published At:
US