Tragedy, drama, farce: it is almost as if the peace process in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is being authoredby someone who has a day job scripting television soap opera.
On August 1, the Jamaat-e-Islami readmitted hardline Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani to its ranks, andannounced its intention to revive its Political Affairs Committee, a body it had shut down last year as partof a long-running moderate initiative to extricate the organisation from secessionist politics in J&K. Thedecision was announced at the end of a two-day meeting of the Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora [CentralConsultative Council], the Jamaat's 25-member executive. A Jamaat spokesperson announced that Geelani would befree both to hold membership of the organisation as well as his newly-launched party, the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat.Most important of all, the Jamaat decisively broke ranks with the centrist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)faction, until recently led by the Shia cleric, Maulvi Abbas Ansari.
Geelani's return to the Jamaat marked a humiliating defeat for the centrists. Days earlier, Geelani hadannounced that he planned to hold a meeting of the Arakeen Ijtimaa, or convention of empanelledmembers, at the Jamaat's offices on August 8. Nasir Ahmad Kashani, the Amir or chief of the Jamaat, hadclaimed the move violated the Jamaat constitution, arguing that, as the Amir, calling such a convention washis exclusive prerogative. An electoral college of about 2,000 empanelled members had elected Kashani as Amirfor a three-year term in 2003, along with the 25 delegates to the Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora. Kashani had,at the time, beaten off a tough challenge from Geelani's political protégé, Mohammad Ashraf Sehrai. He thenrefused to help Geelani's campaign against the centrists in the Hurriyat, and secured the hardliner's removalfrom the frontlines of the Jamaat - braving direct threats to his life from the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM)leadership.
What explains the turn-around in the Jamaat? Kashani isn't talking, but one explanation is that the JamaatAmir feared a vertical split in the organisation. Five of the six district presidents of the Jamaat in theKashmir Valley threw their weight behind Geelani, support perhaps linked to none-to-discreet lobbying by thePakistan-based leadership of the HM. Although Geelani did not have the backing of the bulk of the Jamaat'sbasic membership, he did appear to command a majority in the district of Baramulla, and a solid following inSrinagar and Kupwara. By contrast, the moderates in the Jamaat were unable to carry the fight to theirrank-and-file, afraid of terrorist attacks. Kashani was unable to safely travel even in the moderatestrongholds of Pulwama and Kulgam. He could also have been concerned about the chaos among the Hurriyatmoderates, and fearful of being caught, so to speak, on the wrong end of a rotting bough.
Outside J&K, the full import of these events has been little understood - most notably the enormoussignificance of the reversal within the Jamaat. In 1997, G.M. Bhat, the then-Amir of the Jamaat, came out ofjail, gave an interview calling for an end to the "gun culture", and set about distancing theorganisation from the HM. Geelani was incensed, but the tide was against him. In the spring of 1999, formerHurriyat chairman Abdul Gani Bhat called for a dialogue between mainstream political parties andsecessionists, a marked departure from the organisation's demand for a three-way dialogue between itself,India and Pakistan. Both the leaders' initiatives laid the ground for dissident HM commander Abdul Majid Dardeclaring a unilateral ceasefire in July 2000 - which the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee promptlyreciprocated.
Vajpayee's ceasefire fell apart six months later: Islamist groups simply had no interest in participating in adialogue that would lead to their marginalisation, and Pakistan was, predictably, uninterested in a peaceprocess whose structure it did not have a role in shaping. Terror, then as now, was the instrument chosen tosilence the doves. Bhat's enthusiasm for dialogue dulled considerably after a near-successful February 22,2001, attempt on his life. The General Council of the Hurriyat, in turn, rejected the Centrists' calls fordirect dialogue after a grenade went off during the meeting called to discuss the issue. Dar, too, was shotdead by his one-time Hizb comrades on March 23, 2003. At a 2001 remembrance of the assassination of MirwaizUmar Farooq's father, Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, armed men gathered around the rostrum and shouted Bhat down.Exactly a year later to the day, key moderate leader Abdul Gani Lone was assassinated, making clear the costsof pursuing peace.
Lone's assassination - for which his son and political heir Sajjad Lone publicly held Geelani responsible -constituted a setback, but did not put an end to the peace process. Behind the scenes, the Jamaat Amir, Bhat,also worked quietly to strengthen the HM dissidents. Shortly before his arrest in the build-up to the 2002Assembly elections, Geelani found himself increasingly forced to turn to fringe extreme-right organisationsoutside the Jamaat-e-Islami, like Nayeem Khan's Kashmir Front and Shakeel Bakshi's Islamic Students' League.Matters came to a head soon after, with Geelani refusing to attend Hurriyat executive meetings unless SajjadLone was expelled for having put up proxy candidates in the Assembly elections. In May last year, the Jamaatmoderates hit back, 'retiring' Geelani as their political representative in the Hurriyat and refusing to backhis Islamist faction of the secessionist coalition.
From early this year, the Islamists began to retaliate. They clearly understood the central problem: noGovernment in New Delhi could make the kind of concessions that Pakistan would find acceptable, or that themoderates could sell - and the moderates, in turn, could not deliver the de-escalation in hostilities NewDelhi desperately needed. A string of terror attacks on individuals close to Mirwaiz Farooq were used to drivehome to the moderates the consequences of bucking the Islamist fiat. Mirwaiz Farooq's efforts to buy peacewith a section of the Islamists, by attending the last rites of slain terrorist Rafiq Ahmad Dar, provokedSajjad Lone to leave the ranks of the moderates. Ansari finally responded to the deteriorating securitysituation with panic, and abandoned his post at the bridge of the moderate APHC.
Where might events go from here? It seems unlikely that Mirwaiz Farooq, the most visible moderate Hurriyatleader, will be willing to assume a vanguard role in the near future. Apart from his political and securityconcerns, sources indicate, personal considerations have imposed considerable pressures on the religiousleader. Command of his religious organisation, the Anjuman-e-Nusrat-ul-Islam, passes from father to son, andFarooq, who married three years ago, is yet to sire an heir. The family is deeply concerned about the risk ofassassination, and wishes him to stay distant from controversy until an heir is born. Mirwaiz Farooq hasbucked this pressure in the past, but is now likely to focus his attentions on bringing about some kind ofrapprochement within the Hurriyat factions. As such, further dialogue between the moderates and New Delhiseems a distant prospect.
Kashani and his fellow moderates will closely watch the course of events in Geelani's new party. If Geelani isunable to attract a significant number of Jamaat rukuns, or rank-and-file members, the moderates couldonce again move to contain his authority. Yet, the ongoing chaos could not have come at a worse time for NewDelhi. On the edge of talks with Pakistan on the future of J&K, Indian strategists have found their ace -direct negotiations with moderate secessionists - has been stolen from the pack. It is hard to say, of course,whether the peace process is actually dead - it might just be comatose, or even just lying there with its eyesclosed, waiting for an opportunity to spring to life and surprise the villain - but signs are, the next fewepisodes will be filled with bloodshed.
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Praveen Swami is New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and also writes for its sisterpublication, The Hindu. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
