The significance of jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 is described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as follows:
"most important Article without which this Constitution would be nullity"
Further, it has been described as "the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it".
Reference may also be made to the opinion of Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [1952 SCR 597] to the following effect :
"This is especially true as regards the "fundamental rights" as to which the Supreme Court has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive. While the Court naturally attaches great weight to the legislative judgment, it cannot desert its own duty to determine finally the constitutionality of an impugned statute."
The jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India and no act of Parliament can abrogate it or take it away except by way of impermissible erosion of fundamental principles of the constitutional scheme are settled propositions of Indian jurisprudence [see Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.[(1981) 1 SCC 568], State of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Ors. [(1977) 3 SCC 592], M. Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors. [(1992) 4 SCC 605], Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors. [(1962) 1 SCR 574] and L. Chandra Kumar (supra).
In S.R. Bommai & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1994) 3 SCC 1] it was reiterated that the judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and that the power of judicial review is a constituent power that cannot be abrogated by judicial process of interpretation. It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution and that its actions are within the confines of the powers given by the Constitution.
It is the duty of this Court to uphold the constitutional values and enforce constitutional limitations as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Principles of Construction
The Constitution is a living document. The constitutional provisions have to be construed having regard to the march of time and the development of law. It is, therefore, necessary that while construing the doctrine of basic structure due regard be had to various decisions which led to expansion and development of the law.
The principle of constitutionalism is now a legal principle which requires control over the exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it does not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic principles include the protection of fundamental rights. The principle of constitutionalism advocates a check and balance model of the separation of powers, it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent centers of decision making. The principle of constitutionalism underpins the principle of legality which requires the Courts to interpret legislation on the assumption that Parliament would not wish to legislate contrary to fundamental rights. The Legislature can restrict fundamental rights but it is impossible for laws protecting fundamental rights to be impliedly repealed by future statutes.
Common Law Constitutionalism
The protection of fundamental constitutional rights through the common law is main feature of common law constitutionalism.
According to Dr. Amartya Sen, the justification for protecting fundamental rights is not on the assumption that they are higher rights, but that protection is the best way to promote a just and tolerant society.
According to Lord Steyn, judiciary is the best institution to protect fundamental rights, given its independent nature and also because it involves interpretation based on the assessment of values besides textual interpretation. It enables application of the principles of justice and law.
Under the controlled Constitution, the principles of checks and balances have an important role to play. Even in England where Parliament is sovereign, Lord Steyn has observed that in certain circumstances, Courts may be forced to modify the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, for example, in cases where judicial review is sought to be abolished. By this the judiciary is protecting a limited form of constitutionalism, ensuring that their institutional role in the Government is maintained.
Principles of Constitutionality
There is a difference between Parliamentary and constitutional sovereignty. Our Constitution is framed by a Constituent Assembly which was not the Parliament. It is in the exercise of law making power by the Constituent Assembly that we have a controlled Constitution. Articles 14, 19, 21 represent the foundational values which form the basis of the rule of law. These are the principles of constitutionality which form the basis of judicial review apart from the rule of law and separation of powers. If in future, judicial review was to be abolished by a constituent amendment, as Lord Steyn says, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty even in England would require a relook. This is how law has developed in England over the years. It is in such cases that doctrine of basic structure as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati's case has to apply.
Granville Austin has been extensively quoted and relied on in Minerva Mills. Chief Justice Chandrachud observed that to destroy the guarantees given by Part III in order to purportedly achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives of civilized societies and have been described in judgments as "transcendental", "inalienable" and "primordial". They constitute the ark of the Constitution. (Kesavananda Bharati P.991, P.999). The learned Chief Justice held that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution. It is to be traced for a deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian Constitution. The goals set out in Part IV have, therefore, to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Part III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy the essential element of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Emphasis supplied] (Para 57). Further observes the learned Chief Justice, that the matters have to be decided not by metaphysical subtlety, nor as a matter of semantics, but by a broad and liberal approach. We must not miss the wood for the trees. A total deprivation of fundamental rights, even in a limited area, can amount to abrogation of a fundamental right just as partial deprivation in every area can. The observations made in the context of Article 31C have equal and full force for deciding the questions in these matters.
Again the observations made in Para 70 are very relevant for our purposes. It has been observed that if by a Constitutional Amendment, the application of Articles 14 and 19 is withdrawn from a defined field of legislative activity, which is reasonably in public interest, the basic framework of the Constitution may remain unimpaired. But if the protection of those Articles is withdrawn in respect of an uncatalogued variety of laws, fundamental freedoms will become a 'parchment in a glass case' to be viewed as a matter of historical curiosity. These observations are very apt for deciding the extent and scope of judicial review in cases wherein entire Part III, including Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and 32, stand excluded without any yardstick.
The developments made in the field of interpretation and expansion of judicial review shall have to be kept in view while deciding the applicability of the basic structure doctrine to find out whether there has been violation of any fundamental right, the extent of violation, does it destroy the balance or it maintains the reasonable balance.
The observations of Justice Bhagwati in Minerva Mills case show how clause (4) of Article 368 would result in enlarging the amending power of the Parliament contrary to dictum in Kesavananda Bharati's case. The learned Judge has said in Paragraph 85 that :
"So long as clause (4) stands, an amendment of the Constitution though unconstitutional and void as transgressing the limitation on the amending power of Parliament as laid down in Kesavananda Bharati's case, would be unchallengeable in a court of law. The consequence of this exclusion of the power of judicial review would be that, in effect and substance, the limitation on the amending power of Parliament would, from a practical point of view, become non-existent and it would not be incorrect to say that, covertly and indirectly, by the exclusion of judicial review, the amending power of Parliament would stand enlarged, contrary to the decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati case. This would undoubtedly damage the basic structure of the Constitution, because there are two essential features of the basic structure which would be violated, namely, the limited amending power of Parliament and the power of judicial review with a view to examining whether any authority under the Constitution has exceeded the limits of its powers."
In Minerva Mills while striking down the enlargement of Article 31C through 42nd Amendemnt which had replaced the words "of or any of the principles laid down in Part IV" with "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) and Article 39", Justice Chandrachud said :
"Section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act is beyond the amending power of the Parliament and is void since it damages the basic or essential features of the Constitution and destroys its basic structure by a total exclusion of challenge to any law on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution, if the law is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV of the Constitution."
In Indira Gandhi's case, for the first time the challenge to the constitutional amendment was not in respect of the rights to property or social welfare, the challenge was with reference to an electoral law. Analysing this decision, H.M. Seervai in Constitutional Law of India (Fourth Edition) says that "the judgment in the election case break new ground, which has important effects on Kesavananda Bharati's case itself (Para 30.18). Further the author says that "No one can now write on the amending power, without taking into account the effect of the Election case". (Para 30.19). The author then goes on to clarify the meaning of certain concepts — 'constituent power', 'Rigid' (controlled), or 'flexible' (uncontrolled) constitution, 'primary power', and 'derivative power'.
The distinction is drawn by the author between making of a Constitution by a Constituent Assembly which was not subject to restraints by any external authority as a plenary law making power and a power to amend the Constitution, a derivative power —derived from the Constitution and subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. No provision of the Constitution framed in exercise of plenary law making power can be ultra vires because there is no touch-stone outside the Constitution by which the validity of provision of the Constitution can be adjudged. The power for amendment cannot be equated with such power of framing the Constitution. The amending power has to be within the Constitution and not outside it.
For determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is part of its basic structure, one has per force to examine in each individual case the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument of the country's governance (Chief Justice Chandrachud in Indira Gandhi's case).
The fundamentalness of fundamental rights has thus to be examined having regard to the enlightened point of view as a result of development of fundamental rights over the years. It is, therefore, imperative to understand the nature of guarantees under fundamental rights as understood in the years that immediately followed after the Constitution was enforced when fundamental rights were viewed by this Court as distinct and separate rights. In early years, the scope of the guarantee provided by these rights was considered to be very narrow. Individuals could only claim limited protection against the State. This position has changed since long. Over the years, the jurisprudence and development around fundamental rights has made it clear that they are not limited, narrow rights but provide a broad check against the violations or excesses by the State authorities. The fundamental rights have in fact proved to be the most significant constitutional control on the Government, particularly legislative power. This transition from a set of independent, narrow rights to broad checks on state power is demonstrated by a series of cases that have been decided by this Court.
In The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & Anr. [(1955) 1 SCR 777] relying on the ratio of Gopalan it was held that Article 31 was independent of Article 19(1)(f). However, it was in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCR 530] (popularly known as Bank Nationalization case) the view point of Gopalan was seriously disapproved. While rendering this decision, the focus of the Court was on the actual impairment caused by the law, rather than the literal validity of the law. This view was reflective of the decision taken in the case of Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The Union of India [(1962) 3 SCR 842] where the court was faced with the validity of certain legislative measures regarding the control of newspapers and whether it amounted to infringement of Article 19(1)(a). While examining this question the Court stated that the actual effect of the law on the right guaranteed must be taken into account. This ratio was applied in Bank Nationalization case. The Court examined the relation between Article 19(1)(f) and Article 13 and held that they were not mutually exclusive. The ratio of Gopalan was not approved.
Views taken in Bank Nationalization case has been reiterated in number of cases (see Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCR 1], Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [(1975) 1 SCR 778] and Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [(1975) 2 SCR 832] and finally the landmark judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra). Relying upon Cooper's case it was said that Article 19(1) and 21 are not mutually exclusive. The Court observed in Maneka Gandhi's case:
"The law, must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article. This proposition can no longer be disputed after the decisions in R. C. Cooper's case, Shambhu Nath Sarkar's case and Haradhan Saha's case. Now, if a law depriving a person of ''personal liberty' and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given, situation, ex hypothesi it must also' be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. This was in fact not disputed by the learned Attorney General and indeed he could not do so in view of the clear and categorical statement made by Mukherjea, J., in A. K. Gopalan's case that Article 21 "presupposes that the law is a valid and binding law under the provisions of the Constitution having regard to the competence of the legislature and the subject it "relates to and does not infringe any of the fundamental rights which the Constitution provides for", including Article 14. This Court also applied Article 14 in two of its earlier decisions, namely, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar  S.C.R. 284 and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra  S.C.R. 435]"
The decision also stressed on the application of Article 14 to a law under Article 21 and stated that even principles of natural justice be incorporated in such a test. It was held:
"In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14". Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.
Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the requirement of Article 21".
The above position was also reiterated by Krishna Iyer J., as follows :
"The Gopalan (supra) verdict, with the cocooning of Article 22 into a self contained code, has suffered supersession at the hands of R.
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