In an apparent last-minute, late-night climb-down, President Asif Ali Zardariof Pakistan agreed on March 16, 2009, to reinstate as the Chief Justice of thePakistan Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury who was twice removed fromoffice by the then President Pervez Musharraf in March and November, 2007. Hisreinstatement will take effect after the present Pervez Musharraf-appointedChief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar reaches the age of superannuation on March 21,2009.
There were earlier reports that Zardari was contemplating to give Dogar anextension. The unprecedented support for Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury not onlyfrom the community of lawyers, but also from large sections of the peoplemobilized by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), has forced him to accept thedemand for his reinstatement. Pressure from the Army and the US to avoid aviolent street confrontation on the issue has also forced his climb-down.
The events leading to this climb-down would strengthen the misgivings not onlyin Pakistan, but also in the US about Zardari’s leadership qualities. Hebrought this humiliation upon himself by his ill-advised attempts to underminethe political position of Nawaz, his brother Shahbaz Sharif and their PML (N) inPunjab. For this purpose, he allegedly manipulated a ruling by a bench of theSupreme Court consisting of judges appointed by Musharraf disqualifying Nawazand Shahbaz from holding any elected office. The bench gave the ruling on theground that Nawaz was a convict in a case filed against him by Musharraf afterseizing power in October,1999, and that Shahbaz was a co-accused in a caserelating to the death of a person at the hands of the police when he was theChief Minister of Punjab before the 1999 coup.
Allegedly acting on the wrong advice of his cronies, Zardari tried to takeadvantage of the ruling to have the PML (N) removed from power in Punjab and tohave an engineered coalition consisting of his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)and the PML (Qaid-e Azam) created by Musharraf in 2002 to defeat the PPP and thePML (N) inducted into power. His attempts, made through Salman Taseer, theGovernor of Punjab, who is a crony of Zardari as well as Musharraf, boomeranged.
The fresh agitation by the lawyers for the reinstatement of Chaudhury, the datefor which had been announced by them long before the events in Punjab, might nothave assumed the dimensions of a people’s revolt against Zardari but for hisfailed attempt to capture power for his party in the Punjab through engineereddefections from the ranks of the PML (N) and back-room manipulations with thecomplicity of some sections of the Musharraf-appointed judiciary.
The last elections to the National Assembly held in February, 2008, two monthsafter the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, surprisingly showed that the sympathywave for her was confined to the rural constituencies of Sindh. The PPP failedto do well even in its traditional support bases in southern Punjab, largelyinhabited by the Seraikis. The sympathy wave in Punjab was more for Nawazbecause of the way he was sought to be humiliated by Musharraf after the coup.The PML (N) won many more seats in Punjab than the PPP. Even the Rawalpindiarea, where Benazir was assassinated, voted for the PML (N).
The resulting polarization between Sindh, dominated by Altaf Hussain’sMuttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the PPP, and Punjab dominated by the PML (N),set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to the humiliation ofZardari. The action of Zardari in going back on his pre-election commitmentsmade to the PML (N) in matters relating to the reinstatement of the sacked ChiefJustice and abolishing, through a constitutional amendment, the powers of thePresident to dismiss an elected Prime Minister and dissolve the NationalAssembly exacerbated his personal differences with Nawaz.
The old Bhutto loyalists in the PPP, including Yousef Raza Gilani, the PrimeMinister, who is a Seraiki, were uncomfortable about the erratic decisions ofZardari on the advice of a small coterie of persons such as Rehman Malik, theAdviser for Internal Security, Salman Taseer and Farook H.Naek, his formerlawyer in the corruption cases, whom Zardari made the Minister for Law and thenhad him elected as the Chairman of the Senate, the upper House of Parliament.The Bhutto loyalists were shocked by his action in choosing Naek for election asthe Senate Chairman, overlooking the claims of Raza Rabbani, an old Bhuttoloyalist, who was held in great respect in the party. Rabbani resigned inprotest from his post of Minister For Inter-Provincial Co-ordination.
The people’s uprising on the issue of the reinstatement of the sacked ChiefJustice and the growing discontent in his own party over the way he sought tomarginalize old Bhutto loyalists created a situation, where he found himselfisolated. The erosion of whatever little support he had in his party and in thecountry as a whole and the growing unease in the Army and the US over theimplications of his policies and actions for the stability of Pakistan and thefight against terrorism created a situation where his humiliating climb-downbecame inevitable.
Unfortunately, Zardari is not known to be a man who learns from his mistakes.He tends to repeat them. Comments by persons close to him show that he and hiscronies look upon the concessions made by him not as a climb-down, but as atactical retreat to avoid a street confrontation, which might have triggered offan intervention by the Army. While he may have no other option but to restorethe PML (N) to power in Punjab, he is likely to resist the demand of the PML (N)and others for a constitutional amendment to abolish his powers to dismiss thePrime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. As he did in the past, hewould create an impression as if he is keen to abolish these powers, but isprevented from doing so by the lack of two-thirds support for a constitutionalamendment in the National Assembly. What one saw on March 16 was only the end ofAct I of the political drama in Pakistan. Act II could start over the issue ofthe abolition of the special powers of the President.
Pakistan is in for a spell of weak and manipulative leadership by a leaderwithout much public support, but trying to survive through politicalmanipulations. This will aggravate the already serious security vacuum in thecountry and give fresh oxygen to the various terrorist groups operating from thePakistani territory. At a time when the Barack Obama administration is embarkedon formulating a new strategy to end the political and security vacuum inAfghanistan, it is faced with the danger of a similar vacuum in Pakistan.
If Pakistani public opinion has to have a say as to who should be its ruler, itschoice will be on Nawaz Sharif. After having seen the huge mess created byZardari within six months of taking over as the President, the Army too wouldprefer Nawaz Sharif despite his attempts in October, 1999 to humiliate PervezMusharraf, his Chief of the Army Staff, by dismissing him while he was abroadand unsuccessfully trying to prevent his return.
US thinking will have a say in influencing the Army’s position. Zardari hasgiven the US a free hand in the tribal belt to attack terrorist hide-outs withits fleet of Predator aircraft. Zardari is amenable to US advice on the fightagainst terrorism. There have even been reports that he and Gen.Ashfaq PervezKiyani, his Chief of the Army Staff, have allowed the Central IntelligenceAgency, to use bases of the Pakistan Air Force for launching the Predatorstrikes.
It is very likely that if Nawaz Sharif comes to power, he may not be as amenableto US requirements as Zardari has been. On more than one occasion, Nawaz Sharifhas expressed the view that the present terms of the co-operation with the USneed to be reconsidered without weakening the over-all fight against Al Qaeda.Zardari owes a huge debt to the US for persuading Musharraf to issue theNational Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) under which the pending cases againsthim and his wife were withdrawn.
Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, owes no such debt to the US. He is likely to bemore independent and less accommodating with the US. Would the US continue tofacilitate the continuance of Zardari in power because he is willing to do itsbidding or will it remove itself from the way of Nawaz Sharif coming to power,realizing that a stronger and more popular ruler would help US interestsstrategically than a weak and unpopular ruler who could prove to be detrimentalto US interests tactically as well as strategically?
On the answers to this question would depend what happens under Act II of thePakistani drama. A dark horse will be Prime Minister Gilani, who has emergedwith an enhanced image from the present crisis by virtue of his having distancedhimself from the decisions of Zardari relating to Punjab. If Gilani has to bebuilt up into a more assertive ruler, the special powers of the President haveto be abolished. This can be done only if the PML (N) and the Bhutto loyalistsin the PPP join hands. The prospects of this happening are rather low now.
Pakistani co-operation with India in the investigation of the 26/11 terroriststrikes in Mumbai and in acting against the anti-India terrorist infrastructurein Pakistani territory will be even more uncertain than it has been hitherto.More terrorism against India by groups taking advantage of the huge mess andpolitical and security vacuum in Pakistan is a distinct danger.
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.
