What are the threats to India's national security in the short, medium and long-terms? How has the Government of India been meeting them? Have there been any conceptual and qualitative changes in the National Security Management (NSM) since the present Government came to power in New Delhi in 1998? To what extent the changes have been beneficial to national interest and to what extent have they fallen short of the expectations and requirements?
Before attempting answers to these questions, the following general observations regarding the evolution of the concept of national security since the First World War need to be made:
First, till the First World War, national security was viewed largely in military and political terms. The commonly held perception was that threats to national security would mainly arise from the armed forces of State adversaries and their attempts to cause political destabilisation.
After the triumph of communism in the USSR and other countries and the increasingly active role of International Communism in promoting ideological subversion and extra-territorial loyalty in the name of ideological solidarity, there was increasing realisation that the threats need not necessarily be only of an overt military nature, but could also be covert and para-military operating through surrogates and that such covert threats could come from State as well as non-State adversaries.
Second, the attempts of International Communism to promote economic disruption in non-Communist States/societies through strikes etc and of the allied powers during the Second World War to cause a collapse of the economy of Nazi Germany through covert methods such as printing and circulation of German currency notes in large numbers led to greater attention being given to likely threats to the economic security and well-being of a nation, which could undermine its capability to ward off military threats and prevent political destabilisation and ideological subversion.
In recent years, the globalisation and the networking of the world through information infrastructure have multiplied and magnified likely threats to the economic security and well-being of a nation. Globalisation, networking and easy and affordable access to modern information technologies have placed in the hands of non-State actors awesome powers of economic disruption and destruction.
Third, the encouragement of Islamic fanaticism by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1980s to use it in its covert war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and against International Communism in the Islamic World did set in motion the beginning of the collapse of Communism as an ideological force, but it replaced International Communism with an even more pernicious subversive and destructive force called International Islamism, which like International Communism, encourages extra-territorial loyalty -- not in the name of ideological , but religious solidarity -- and justifies the use of suicide terrorism in the name of jehad against non-Muslims.
International Islamism recognises no national frontiers and justifies the right of Muslims to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction to protect their religion. Whereas in the past, nuclear weapons were seen by States merely as a weapon of deterrence to deter the use of similar weapons by their adversaries against them, the mushrooming non-State actors inspired and brain-washed by International Islamism view them as weapons of intimidation to weaken the will of non-Islamic States/societies to resist the advance of Islamic fundamentalism.
Fourth, non-State actors posing threats to national security have arisen not only from International Communism and International Islamism, but also from democratic societies such as those of the USA and the European Union countries. The mushrooming non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks, liberally funded from abroad, mainly from the USA, play as active a role in promoting US/Western national interests and in undermining nations which are not subservient to the USA as the front organisations of International Communism did before the collapse of the USSR in 1991 to promote the national interests of the USSR and the ideological interests of communism.
The USA, which rightly prides itself as the most healthy democracy in the world, does not hesitate to back the most undemocratic States and rulers for promoting its national interests. Its backing for the Shah of Iran before 1979, its role in keeping former President Suharto of Indonesia sustained in power for nearly three decades and its current backing for Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, are typical examples of such US actions.
In India, any perceptible observer would have noticed how since the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, the USA, while overtly expanding its co-operation with India in various fields, has been covertly funding and encouraging elements which are prepared to create doubts in public mind about the national security policies and objectives of the present Government. Such covert actions were previously confined to malleable elements in the North, particularly in New Delhi, but in recent months these have been extended to the South too.The above observations are not exhaustive. They are cited mainly to illustrate how NSM has become increasingly complex, requiring knowledge, expertise and organisational infrastructure of a kind totally different from what has been available hitherto. In India, the problem has become even more complex than in other countries because of the external origins of most of the threats to out internal security.
Amongst the external factors endangering India's internal security, one could cite the following:
- Pakistan's post-1981 use of terrorism as a weapon to achieve its strategic objectives against
India and its post-September 11, 2001, emergence as the new hub for the activities of religious
terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden.
- The failure of the Nepalese Government to deal effectively with the activities of the ISI
from its territory and to counter the Maoist insurgency.
- The inability of the Bhutanese and Myanmarese Governments to stop the use of their
territory by Indian insurgent groups.
- The suspected complicity of the military-intelligence establishment of Bangladesh with its
Pakistani counterpart in assisting Indian insurgent and terrorist groups.
- T he future policies and tactics of the LTTE.
- The reported spread of pan-Islamic ideas by bin Laden's Al Qaeda and its associates to the South-East Asian countries as brought out by the recent arrests of Al Qaeda cadres/sympathisers in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Since South-East Asia has a large number of Muslim migrants of South Indian, essentially Tamil Nadu, origin, the emergence of pro-bin Laden networks in this region and their likely contacts with and assistance to Islamic extremist elements in South India such as the Al Ummah of Tamil Nadu and Kerala should receive close attention.
Musharraf, who is regarded by many as a good tactician, but a poor strategist, personifies the quintessence of the Pakistani military mindset characterized by an inbred hostility to India, partly due to a feeling of insecurity and partly due to a continuing rankling caused by memories of the 1971 defeat at the hands of the Indian Army in the then East Pakistan. Even the feeling of psychological parity with India consequent upon its acquiring a nuclear and missile capability has not enabled it to get over this hang-up. This mindset sees in Kashmir a means of catharsis.
For it, Kashmir is important for four reasons -- religious, territorial, economic (the source of the rivers irrigating Pakistan) and psychological ( to avenge the perceived humiliations of the past). In the military's perception, through its sustained proxy war waged in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since 1989 through the surrogates of the pan-Islamic Pakistani jehadi organisations, it is, for the first time since 1947, nearing the position of being able to change the status quo in J&K in Pakistan's favour without having to wage a full-scale war and if it misses this opportunity by succumbing to outside pressure to give up the use of terrorism as a weapon against India, another opportunity like this may not come its way again.
Hence, Musharraf's present determination to continue supporting and using the jehadi outfits whatever be the external consequences. Like past Pakistani political leaders, he too is banking on the continued ambivalence of the West's counter-terrorism policies---- namely, if he continues his co-operation against terrorists posing a threat to the West in general and the US in particular, their pressure on him with regard to terrorism against India will not go beyond a certain point and his resisting or evading that pressure will not entail punitive consequences for Pakistan from the rest of the world. There is, therefore, unlikely to be any qualitative change in the military's use of terrorism against India in the future unless India itself imposes punitive consequences on Pakistan, either through overt or covert actions or a mix of both.
Certain other aspects relating to the post September 11, 2001, situation in Pakistan have to be highlighted. The first is the increase in cash flow due to the resumption of multilateral assistance by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB); generous bilateral assistance by the West and other countries; US cash payments for the logistic support extended to the US troops in Afghanistan (US $ 220 million so far); generous rescheduling of bilateral debts (US $ 32.5 billion) with long grace periods and the increase in remittances by non-resident Pakistanis (NRP) through legal banking channels.
Fears that the continued use of the hawala channel for remittances could attract the suspicion of the counter-terrorism agencies of the West have contributed to a doubling of the remittances through the legal banking channels. In addition, in order to maintain a comfortable level of reserves, the State Bank of Pakistan continues to buy US dollars from the kerb market at the same high level as before October 7, 2001. As a result of this increased cash flow, the foreign exchange reserves have tripled to nearly US $ Six billion. Thus, Pakistan has now the required hard cash for fresh military purchases.
While the spectre of an economic collapse no longer haunts the country, despite this increased cash flow, the economic fundamentals have not changed for the better. Tax collection continues to be below the target; foreign trade has been affected by lack of demand due to the recession in the West, the imposition of a war risk insurance by many shipping companies and the resistance in the US from the textile industry and its supporters in the Congress to any significant reduction in the duty on Pakistani textiles; and foreign investors continue to shy away from Pakistan due to the nervousness caused by the war in Afghanistan and the bad law and order situation in Pakistan itself.
10. The law and order situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate despite the Army being in power due to the following factors:
- Continuing incidents of anti-Shia and anti-Christian violence in Sindh and Punjab
despite Musharraf's ban on the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the militant wing of the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the Shia extremist Sipah Mohammed (SM), the militant wing of
the Tehrik Jaffria Pakistan (TJP), on August 14,2001, and on the SSP and the TJP on January 15,
- Sporadic incidents of violence in Balochistan by elements, which are unidentified, but
suspected to be the followers of Khair Bux Marri, the Balochi nationalist leader.
- The activities of the remnants of the Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and the
various Pakistani jehadi organisations, which survived the war in Afghanistan and have taken sanctuary in
Pakistan. They initially entered the tribal areas in Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and are since reported to have spread out to Punjab, Sindh
and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including the Northern Areas (NA--Gilgit and Baltistan). These
remnants are suspected to have been responsible for the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist,
on January 23, 2002, and his subsequent murder, the grenade attack inside an Islamabad church on March 17,
2002, which killed five worshippers, two of them US nationals, the suicide explosion outside a Karachi hotel
on May 8, 2002, which killed 11 French experts working in the project for the assembly and eventual
construction of the Agosta Class submarine, the suicide explosion outside the US Consulate in Karachi on June
14, 2002, the grenade attack on a group of German and other tourists on the Karakoram Highway in July, 2002
and the recent attacks on Christian establishments in Murree and Taxila.
- Unrest in the tribal belt, particularly in the FATA, due to the joint combing operations for the survivors of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban by Pakistani security forces, assisted by US communication experts and counter- terrorism professionals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Despite signs of disquiet over Musharraf's hesitation to act against their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory lest he thereby damage or even lose a valuable ( in his perception) asset in his proxy war on India, the USA and other Western powers continue to look upon Musharraf as their best bet in Pakistan for the time being. They do not as yet share India's perception that he is untrustworthy, despite his failure to carry out his commitments for determined action against the jehadis made by him in his televised address of January 12,2002, and his evasive response to their repeated requests for co-operation in smoking out the remnants of the Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other anti-Western jehadi groups from their sanctuaries in Pakistan.
In the USA's perception, Musharraf is modern in his outlook as indicated by his oft-repeated, though not yet implemented, determination to control and modernise the curricula of the madrasas; his restoration of the joint electorate system; and his plans to give technocrats and women a greater role in the governance of the country and to dilute the role of the feudal aristocracy in the electoral process by prescribing university graduation as a minimum qualification for contesting the elections.
They do not share India's perception of his proximity to the religious fundamentalist parties and look upon him as the only leader, political or military, capable of preventing Pakistan's nuclear and missile assets from falling into the hands of anti-Western terrorists. His manipulation of the referendum and doubts about the sincerity of his repeated promises to hold free and fair elections as scheduled in October, 2002, have caused unease in the European Union countries, but not, to the same extent, in the USA.
The USA's short-term objective in the region is to eliminate the terrorists who pose a threat to American lives and interests and to ensure the durability and stability in Afghanistan of a regime friendly to the West and malleable by Washington DC. Its medium and long-term objective is to develop the Afghanistan-Pakistan route as their favoured exit for the oil and gas resources of Turkmenistan and the other Central Asian Republics (CARs) in order to avoid the Russian and Iranian routes. The importance of Pakistan, from this perspective, gets enhanced. Already 30 per cent of the oil and gas industries in Pakistan are estimated to be controlled by US companies and their interest in oil and gas pipelines from the CARs to the rest of the world through Afghanistan and Pakistan would have an important influence on the policies of the US Administration towards Pakistan.
The set-back suffered by Pakistan in Afghanistan due to Musharraf's volte face in abandoning the Taliban is unlikely to be permanent. There is likely to be an erosion in the influence of the Tadjik and Uzbeck dominated Northern Alliance in the governance of the country in the months to come as the USA and other Western countries show greater sensitivity to the demand for increased representation to the Pashtuns in the governance. This could also redound to the advantage of Pakistan, enabling it to recover at least part of its lost influence in Kabul to the detriment of India.