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Flavour Of The Day

The new theme of excitement for the TV channels is what Israel is doing in Lebanon--should India emulate Israel? Where are the analysts discussing the progress of the investigation and posing inconvenient questions to the police and our national secu

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Flavour Of The Day
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The apparent lack of progress in the investigation into the Mumbai-11/7blasts by as yet unidentified elements is understandable. Investigation intoterrorism-related cases is a time-consuming process--particularly when theterrorists are adept in covering up their tracks as they seem to have done inthis case. It would, therefore, be unfair to find fault with the Mumbai Policefor the lack of any break-through so far.

Having said that, one has to underline some disturbing indicators relating toour counter-terrorism capability,  prevention and investigation. It isapparent now that the suburban railway system in Mumbai had very little physicalsecurity. The terrorists had noticed this, but not our national securitymanagers at the central and state levels.

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What are the reported facts?  

  • On an average, generally, each railway station had four constables to ensure its security. There were days when due to sickness and other reasons, even these four constables were not posted and the stations had no security cover.

  • There was no closed circuit TV and no anti-explosive check through door-frame metal detectors and sniffer dogs.

  • The Railway Protection Force (RPF) in Mumbai has four trained dog squads. These are employed for anti-explosive checks in long-distance trains only.

  • Whatever little physical security was there seemed to have been based on the assumption that the terrorists were more likely to attack long-distance trains than suburban trains. One does not know on what basis the security of the commuters by suburban trains was neglected.

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The second disturbing indicator relates to forensicexamination of the scenes of the terrorist attacks, particularly the railwaycompartments in which the explosions took place. Normally, in any investigationdone in a professional manner, the first step is to identify the place where theexplosive device was placed, isolate it and mount a guard till forensic expertshave thoroughly examined the place and gathered all evidence of forensic value.

One has the impression that this was not done for some hours. As a result,there seemed to have been considerable disturbance of the scenes of the blastsby police and railway staff, humanitarian workers and other curious on-lookers.The disturbance was apparently so bad that experts in explosives could not evenget adequate samples from the blown up compartments by examining which theycould have determined the nature of the explosive.

As a result, there has been some delay and avoidable confusion in determiningthe nature of the explosive used. Initially, RDX was suspected. Subsequently,dynamite. Then, ammonium nitrate. Finally, a mixture of RDX, ammonium nitrateand fuel oil. Even now, differences are being voiced through the electronicmedia by different forensic experts on the nature of the explosive.

The latest indicator--not yet conclusive--is that the terrorists used amixture of RDX, ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, triggered by a mechanical timerwith a Chinese-made battery. It has been reported that similar improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs) had been used in the past by jihadi terroristsbelonging to the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) based in Bangladesh.

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The President, Dr. Abdul Kalam, and the people of Mumbai and the rest ofIndia showed a tremendous gesture by paying homage to those killed by theterrorists on the evening of July 18, marking the completion of one week sincethe tragedy struck. It was a moving scene, but was it necessary to hold it inthe railway premises? The President himself led the ceremony at Mahim railwaystation. In honour of the President, the whole place was reportedly spruced upand the walls white-washed.

Nobody seems to have realised the importance of ensuring that no evidence offorensic value was lost, till the forensic examination was completed. Sometimes,even days after a terrorist strike, one finds bits and pieces of evidentiaryvalue here and there--residues of the explosive on a wall, a bit of a timerhere, of the battery there etc. By disturbing the railway premises, we areunwittingly  damaging, if not destroying, evidence of forensic value.

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Was it not possible to hold these functions elsewhere far away from thescenes of the blasts? Did anyone brief the President about the inadvisability ofholding them in the railway premises?

The third disturbing indicator is about  the investigation into the caserelating to the discovery of over 40 kilos of RDX explosive by the Police inMay, 2006, in the Aurangabad area. Some local Muslims were arrested by the police in this connection, kept in police custody and then sent to judicialcustody after interrogation. The police are naturally having a second look atthis investigation in order to see whether they might have contained clues aboutthe explosions of 11/7, which they might have missed at that time.  Goingback into past cases in order to look for missed clues is part of theinvestigation process

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One gets the impression that despite questioning about 12 persons allegedlyinvolved in the transport of the explosives in May, 2006, the police could notestablish where from they brought the explosives, in which quantity, were thereother quantities stored elsewhere, by whom etc. It has been reported in themedia that the police are trying to seek fresh police custody of these suspectsin order to question them further regarding the origin of those explosives.This, if true, does not speak well of the thoroughness of the earlierinvestigation.

We have been having acts of jihadi terrorism at regular intervals since July5, 2005, when they resumed after a lull of nearly two years since September,2003. How thorough has been the investigation into those cases? Have we beenable to establish who fired the shot, which killed the scientist at Bangalore inDecember?

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One sees a certain disturbing pattern being repeated after every jihaditerrorist strike--excitement all round, names of alleged suspects beingdisseminated through the kindness of willing journalists, a plethora oftheories--some plausible, some fanciful-- raids into the houses of likelysuspects here and there, claims of major break-through and then silence, withnothing more said or apparently done about the investigation.

A similar thing is already happening in respect of Mumbai--11/7. In thenewspapers which I read, it has already disappeared from the front pages. Thenew theme of excitement for the TV channels is what Israel is doing inLebanon--should India emulate Israel? Less and less analysts are discussing theprogress of the investigation and posing inconvenient questions to the policeand our national security managers.

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We are back to our normal state of excitement--with more time, column spaceand prime time being spent on the progress in the Congressional approval of theIndia-US nuclear deal than in the investigation of the Mumbai blasts. We aremore preoccupied with the nuclear  and other so-called strategic issues anddiscussing animatedly how should India play its role as an emerging globalpower, without worrying about our chronic inability to ensure effective internalsecurity.

The political leaders are back to their basics--calling each other names,accusing each other of incompetence, blaming each other for being soft. Potscontinue to call the kettles black. In the meanwhile, the terrorists continue tostrike at regular intervals here, there and everywhere.  They continue tohave the last laugh.

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It is time the Central government starts exercising a vigorous leadershiprole in strengthening our counter-terrorism capabilities--prevention throughtimely intelligence and effective physical security, deterrence through thoroughinvestigation and prosecution leading to convictions and mobilising the peoplethrough a national consensus. How can our political leaders mobilise the peopleand motivate them to join hands in the fight against terrorism when they cannotmobilise and motivate themselves to join hands?

Whether we admit it or not, Al Qaeda has arrived in India--not as anorganisation, but as an ideology, as a source of inspiration and sophisticatedmodus operandi, as the puller of the jihadi strings from its bases in Waziristanin Pakistan. Jihad in India has started becoming part of the global jihad. More Mumbais are likely if we do not draw the right lessons and start actingvigorously against the new jihadi terrorism.

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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
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