Bad Omens

"In an assessment on Bangladesh disseminated in January, 1997, this writer had observed as follows: 

"There are individual officers in the Bangladesh intelligence community and in its security forces, who feel positively towards Sheikh Hasina (Prime Minister) and her father, but one cannot say the same thing of these organisations as institutions. Institutionally, they may not share with her the same enthusiasm for closer relations with India and for assisting it in dealing with the insurgency (in the North-East).  It would take her and her party considerable time to understand and assess the intricacies of their working and the labyrinthine relationships which they have built up with their Pakistani counterparts during the last 21 years.  She, therefore, has to move with caution."

"The savage manner in which 15 members of India's Border Security Force (BSF) were reportedly abducted, tortured, killed and their bodies mutilated beyond recognition last week shows that even after almost five years in power, Sheikh Hasina is apparently not in total command of her military and intelligence establishment, which like its counterpart in Pakistan, has been infected by the fundamentalist virus of Afghan vintage and is probably developing an agenda of its own vis-à-vis India."

-- Extract from my article Bangladesh:A Bengali Abbasi Lurking Somewhere? dated 23-4-2001  

The current mutiny across Bangladesh by directly-recruited junior officersand other ranks  of the Bangladesh Rifles (BD) bodes ill for therecently-elected (in December,2008) government headed by Sheikh Hasina. Theirmutiny, which started in Dhaka on February 25,2009, and has since spread toother parts of the country, including Chittagong, ostensibly over long-pendinggrievances regarding pay and allowances and food rations, is directed till nownot against the political leadership but against the senior armyofficers--serving and retired--on deputation to the BDR.

The targeted Army officers occupy senior positions in the command and controlof the BDR and their pay and allowances and other perks are governed by thoseapplicable to the army officers and not by those applicable to thedirectly-recruited officers of the BDR. Resentment over what is perceived by thedirect recruits as the step-motherly treatment meted out to them by thedeputationists and re-employed officers of the Army seem to have acted as thetrigger for the mutiny. 

The spreading mutiny, during which a number of senior army officers servingon deputation in the BDR, are reported to have been either killed or heldhostage, seems to have taken the Army and political leadership by surprise. Itwas the outcome of a secret conspiracy well-planned  and well-executed bythe junior officers and other ranks. The intelligence wing of the BangladeshPolice and the Army-dominated Directorate-General of  Forces Intelligence (DGFI)seem to have been taken by surprise. If the DGFI had advance information, itwould have at least tried to alert the senior army officers so that they did notbecome targets and victims of the mutineers. The fact that it did not do so suggests that the DGFI was not aware.

The fact that the mutineers were able to plan and execute this conspiracy intotal secrecy with even the grass-roots political cadres of different partiesnot  getting scent of it, speaks of a well-organised anti-army networkinside the BDR. The identities of the ring leaders of the conspiracy remainunclear. A question of major concern both to the BD political and militaryleadership as well as to India should be--was the mutiny purely due to bread andbutter issues or is there something more to it?

As in the case of the BD Army, in the case of the BDR too, many of therecruits at the lower levels come from the villages and quite a few of them areproducts of the mushrooming madrasas across the country funded by money fromSaudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan. The rural areas of Bangladesh and themadrasas there are the main recruiting and brainwashing grounds of  theHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI-B) and other jihadi organisations. While theinternational community has paid considerable attention to monitoring theinfiltration of the Pakistani Armed Forces by fundamentalist and jihadi elementssince the days of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq, similar attention has not been paidto monitoring the presence of  fundamentalist and jihadi elements in the BDArmed Forces and the BDR.

Senior officers' relationship with the junior ranks  has always been theAchilles' heel of the BDR, which used to be known before the birth of BD in 1971as the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR). The EPR consisted largely of Bengali directrecruits officered by Punjabi and Pashtun deputationists from the Pakistan Army.Resentment over the humiliating attitude of the Pakistani Army officers towardsthe Bengali junior ranks was an important factor, which had contributed to thedesertion of large sections of the Bengali junior ranks from the EPR and theirjoining the freedom struggle under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

After the birth of Bangladesh those members of the EPR, who had deserted andjoined the freedom struggle, were reconstituted into the hard-core of thenewly-created BDR. The force at the lower and middle levels has grown aroundthis hard core. It now has a  strength of around 70,000 and its role ismainly trans-border security in times of peace. In Bangladesh territorybordering India, which has been the hotbed of the activities of the HUJI andwhere many of its training camps are located, the BDR is responsible forsecurity. Its role in this regard often brings it into contact with the HUJI andother jihadi elements.

The unfriendly attitude of sections of the lower ranks of the BDR to Indiabecame evident from the savage manner in which 15 members of India's BorderSecurity Force (BSF) were  abducted, tortured, killed and their bodiesmutilated beyond recognition  by elements from the BDRin April, 2001. Sheikh Hasina, who was  in power at that time too, didnot or could not take action against those responsible for this savagery despiteher professed friendship for India. The BD Press had quoted the then  BDForeign Secretary, Syed Muazzem Ali, as telling journalists at Dacca on April20, 2001, as follows: "The border force has standing responsibility ofprotecting the frontier from any external attacks.  BDR are there torepulse any attack on the country’s frontier. There are some situations whendecisions are taken instantly.  It does not require to send file to Dhaka,get order and then start firing.  It is the charter duty of BDR to protectour frontier from any attack on our border.  If question of war comes, thenthe orders from top level may come." He thus tried to justify the action by the BDR.

The mutiny  and the consequent confrontation between the junior elementsof the BDR and the Army has placed Sheikh Hasina in a tricky situation. The Armyseems determined to act against the BDR mutineers and crush their revolt byusing tanks and other heavy weapons against them. It should be able to crushthem in Dhaka and other big towns. Its ability to do so in the rural areas andparticularly near the border with India remains to be seen. If the mutineersrealise the lack of wisdom of their action and surrender without furtherresistance, the situation may be controlled. If they put up a resistance in therural areas, many HUJI and other jihadi elements might join them in the hope ofexploiting the situation to their benefit.

In the past, the BDR had remained loyal to Sheikh Hasina and other politicalleaders. They preferred to depend on the police and para-military forces fortheir personal security than on the Army, which they distrusted. Now she has noother option but to back the army in its confrontation with the mutineers andauthorise it to take whatever action it considers necessary to quell the mutiny.The political fall-out of the confrontation could be unpredictable for her government.The ultimate beneficiaries of any political instability resulting from it couldbe the jihadis.

The developing situation has to be closely watched by India and the rest ofthe international community.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.