A Make Believe World

Let's leave the political implications of the sudden and strange alliancebetween the Congress and the slippery duo of Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Samajwadiparty chief, and his Man Friday, Amar Singh, aside for the present. For that,like the Left Front’s loss of its huge and unprecedented clout at the centreis a different story. What has attracted limelight is the resurrection of theIndia-United States civilian nuclear cooperation deal that most people here aswell as in the US had believed to be "virtually dead". However, asAmerican spokespersons never failed to point out, the cause of the controversialdeal’s impending demise was the "political discord" within India’sruling United Progressive Alliance, not any reluctance on America’s part.

Now that the Congress-led coalition is certain that it would not fall evenafter the Left Front withdraws its support to the government, and the spectre of"early elections" has been exorcised, there is a distinct possibilitythat deal may go through even during the remaining five months of George W.Bush’s thoroughly discredited presidency. The reasons why I say"may", not "will" -- as are asserting the deal’s ardentdevotees -- ought to be obvious.

While there is little doubt that Bush and his cohorts would do all they canto push the deal hard and clinch it before his exit from the White House, thereare limits beyond which the available time cannot be stretched. Just considerthis: The earliest the Prime Minister can send the Indian negotiators to Viennato sign the India-specific safeguards agreement with the UN’s nuclearwatchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would be some daysafter his return from the G-8 Summit at Hokkaido in Japan. That would take us tomid-July. Since the agreement is already initialed by the IAEA Secretariat andthe Indian delegation - which, not "confidentiality" is perhaps thereason for the government’s reluctance to share the agreement’s text withits Leftist supporters - to sign the document would be a simple affair. Theproblem would be with the next step - to secure the endorsement of the IAEABoard of Governors.

Even this will not be difficult because all the IAEA governors reside inVienna and the 35-member board functions by majority. The problem is that thegovernors’ endorsement might take longer than the Indian government believes.Why? Because August is a month of holidays in Europe during which the continentis practically shut. Moreover, Pakistan is a member of the board, as is China.While Beijing would not say or do anything itself, its Pakistani friends arebound to put as many spokes in the wheel as possible. Furthermore, there arereports that Canada wants time to "study" the agreement negotiated byIndia and the IAEA secretariat. 

Only after the IAEA board of governors has ratified the text drawn up by theagency’s secretariat with India’s concurrence can the critically importantnext step of taking the 123 Indo-US agreement, together with the India-specificsafeguards agreement, be taken to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG isto make the necessary changes in its guidelines to enable the US and its 44other members to extend to India the exceptions visualized in the 123 Agreement.Once the NSG guidelines are duly changed the whole package has to be submittedto the US Congress for its approval in a "yes or no" vote.

In objecting to the "compromise" formula that the Indian delegationbe allowed to go to Vienna on condition that any further step would be takenonly in agreement with the Left, the CPI (M) general secretary, Prakash Karatand his comrades had a point. Once the IAEA agreement is endorsed the deal goeson "auto-pilot". India is not a member of the NSG. The Americans alonewould take the issue there. More important, as the veteran Russian ambassador toIndia, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, has said publicly, America alone has the clout to"persuade" the NSG to give the necessary "waiver" to India.But that cannot be an easy and smooth process. Some countries, such as Ireland,Austria and, to an extent, Australia are opposed to any concessions to India. Atthe least they could insist on such conditions as New Delhi signing the CTBT,which would be unacceptable to this country. 

Under the circumstances, it is rather unrealistic to expect that the entireprocess - including the elaborate procedure of the US Congress, even if Bushtries to get it telescoped - can be completed by January 19. Especially, afterthe statement in Delhi by Congressman Ackerman, who is a staunch supporter ofthe deal, that after the election of the new House and Senate, the lame-duckCongress cannot hold a session. Some say this is only a "pressuretactic". But let’s wait and watch,

Meanwhile, two fundamental points need to be made. First, that even thoughthere is substance in some of the points raised by the deal’s inveterateopponents, overall the deal serves Indian interests. As Russia and Franceacknowledge, it is the only way Indian can get out of the "technologydenial trap" since the 1974 underground nuclear detonation. Also, there isacute shortage of uranium in this country and it would take a long time todevelop a fuel cycle based on India’s inexhaustible reserves of thorium. 

Secondly some Indians - including, astonishingly several former foreignsecretaries - seem to believe that once the NSG makes the necessary changes inits guidelines, this country need not bother about the deal with the US, andstart importing nuclear fuel, material and technology from Russia and France. 

As Jawaharlal Nehru said in a very different context, these gentlemen areliving in a "make-believe world" of their own creation. To imaginethat America would invest so heavily in the nuclear deal with India and then becontent to be left in the lurch, while Paris and Moscow have a bonanza, is theheight of naivety