Operations Order

If Ariel Sharon were to formulate his intentions as an military operations order, like he used to do in thearmy, instead of hiding them behind a host of smoke screens, it would look like this:

1. Aims:
To bring the Zionist Revolution to its conclusion, by turning all of Eretz-Israel, from the sea to the Jordanriver, into a Jewish state, with a minimum of non-Jewish inhabitants (if any at all).

2. Information:
The 1948 War of Independence was broken off before achieving its aim. The State of Israel was established onlyon 78% of the land, which brought about the removal of only 64% of the Palestinians. In the 1967 Six-Day Warwe conquered the remaining 22% of the territories, but successive Israeli governments lacked the necessarywillpower to conclude the Zionist revolution by annexing the territories and removing the remaining Arabpopulation.

Now a window of opportunity has opened for concluding the job. Only one super-power (the US) remains; allthe other powers (the UN, Europe, Russia and others) have effectively been eliminated. The US is now lendingus unlimited and unqualified support. It is to be hoped that it will continue to do so even when we employharsh methods in the pursuit of our national aims.

Experience shows that even when somebody in the American administration resists the implementation of ouraims, this resistance collapses when faced with our determined stand (Operation "Defensive Shield").Our control over both houses of the Congress and our decisive influence on most of the American mediaguarantee us freedom of action.

3. Methods:
Our task will be achieved by the following methods, to be employed simultaneously:
a. Military operations, to break the armed Palestinian resistance.
b. Economic pressure, to cause mass Arab emigration from the country.
c. Settlement activity, to cut up the territories and prepare them for annexation to Israel.
d. Political action, to break the Palestinian political and social institutions.

4. Implementation:

(a) Military Operations: These will be conducted incessantly, without long pauses. The whole army, including the reserves, will beemployed for this task, even if this necessitates a weakening of our preparedness vis-a-vis the Arab statesand limiting training. The IDF will occupy the Palestinian territories as needed, for long and short periods,in order to catch, arrest or execute all Palestinian militants who could organize resistance to our policy.For this purpose there is no difference between terrorists and political leaders, between armed or civilresistance, between Hamas and Fatah. Maximal destruction of property will cause deterrence. This will be arepeated action, in order to eliminate every new set of leaders as it emerges. Our actions will necessarilyincrease the motivation for terrorists to execute suicide-bombings in Israel. These will provide us – bothin the domestic and the international arena – with reasons for our military action, which will be seen as aresponse. The IDF will also assume a central role in exercising economic pressure (as follows). It must beensured that no officer who does not wholeheartedly support this task attains a senior position(Chief-of-Staff, officer in charge of regional commands, chief of departments, commander of divisions andbrigades). For fulfilling a historic mission, hardness and cruelty are needed; there can be no place forbleeding hearts.

(b) Economic Pressure: Mass expulsion, like in 1948, can be effected only in a special situation, such as a fully-fledged war orduring an exceptional international event that draws away world attention. Until this eventuality occurs,Palestinians must be induced to leave the country by economic pressure that makes their life intolerable. Suchpressure will be achieved through closures and blockades that will prevent the movement of merchants andworkers, teachers and pupils, doctors and patients. The whole economic life in the territories must begradually brought to a standstill, so that the ability of the heads of families to feed their children iseffectively destroyed. IDF actions will enclose the Palestinians in small enclaves, where they will receivesome kind of limited local autonomy, so as to relieve us of any formal responsibility for their situation. Inthe prosecution of this policy, international public opinion and international aid agencies must be taken intoaccount. From time to time, exceptions must be made to prevent extreme situations from arising.

(c) Settlement Activity: This is a central tool for fulfilling the historic task. In spite of the fact that all Israeli governmentssince 1967 have understood this and acted accordingly, the tempo was slow. While more than 30% of Judea andSamaria are part of the town planning areas of the settlements, hardly more than 1% is actually settled. Thisis an intolerable scandal which must be speedily rectified. All ministries must take part in this urgenteffort, devoting a considerable part of their resources to it. Existing settlements must be enlarged and newones set up by all possible means (takeovers after terrorist attacks, new neighborhoods far from the existingsettlements, etc.) The network of bypass roads must be expanded rapidly in order to cut off Palestinians townsand villages, to annex more land to the settlements and strengthen our control on the ground. All this must bedone according to the existing strategic plan, which prevents Palestinian territorial continuity and tightensthe economic blockade. For the settlement effort, the economic resources of all ministries must be centralizedand all other tasks must take second place. More people, including new immigrants, must be encouraged to jointhe settlements. If necessary, young couples should be offered villas at zero cost. The flight of thefactories from the settlement industrial parks, following threats by the European Community, must be stopped.The IDF will devote the necessary resources to the protection of the settlements and the roads leading tothem, even if this means calling up the reserves and ordering a whole battalion to protect one single isolatedsettlement.

(d) Political Pressure: Breaking the Palestinian leadership is a central component of the whole campaign. In order to destroy theability of the Palestinians to resist, the central leadership, and especially Yasser Arafat, who is a unifyingsymbol and a strong leader, must be eliminated. Therefore, the whole propaganda effort must be concentrated onArafat personally. Every Palestinian factor that is ready to fight against Arafat (including Hamas) must beexploited, as well as anti-Arafat utterances by Israeli left-wing extremists. Arafat will be physicallyeliminated once the international situation permits. At the same time, in-fighting between second-rowPalestinian leaders must be encouraged, in order to create a leadership vacuum, such as existed in 1948.

All these pressures – military, economic, settlement and political – must be increased, until thesituation of the Palestinians becomes so intolerable that they prefer to move to Jordan. If a historicalopportunity for mass expulsion should present itself, we shall exploit it rapidly. The apparatus for this mustalready be prepared now. The Israeli Arabs are a special problem, as they have been given (by mistake) Israelicitizenship. The problem demands a creative solution, in accordance with our main aims.