Gen Pervez Musharraf has at long last become Gen (retd)Pervez Musharraf, a little more than nine years after Mr Nawaz Sharif, thethen Pakistani Prime Minister, appointed him as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS)in October,1998, after superseding two Lt Gens who were senior to him. They hadreportedly better record as professionals, but had the reputation of not beingamenable to political pressure. Nawaz Sharif thought that Musharraf would bemore submissive as the chief than the two officers senior to him and hence madehim the chief.
In doing so, he committed the same mistake as the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, asthe Prime Minister, did in 1976, when he appointed Zia-ul-Haq as the COAS aftersuperseding two Lt Gens. senior to him, who had the reputation of beingindependent and assertive. Shortly after Zia took over as the Chief, the Shah ofIran had visited Pakistan. While introducing Zia to the Shah, the flamboyantBhutto was reported to have remarked: "Meet my new Army Chief. He istotally loyal to me. If I ask him to stand, he will stand. If I ask him to sit,he will sit. If I ask him to salute, he will salute. With him as the chief, theArmy is in safe hands." Zia gave Bhutto one of his sheepish grins andsaluted him. In 1977, he overthrew Bhutto and sent him to the gallows tied tohis cot in 1979
Nawaz Sharif too thought that Musharraf would be totally loyal to him and thatwith him as the chief, he would not have to fear any threat to his position fromthe Army. He was proved wrong just as Bhutto was . Musharraf had him overthrownin October 1999, and sent on long exile to Saudi Arabia after having got himconvicted by a rubber stamp court as a terrorist and a hijacker under theAnti-Terrorism Act.
As Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani (his name is spelt as Kiyani as well as Kayani)starts functioning as the COAS, Musharraf must be wondering whether Kiyani couldone day do to him what he himself did to Nawaz and what Zia, his mentor, did toBhutto.
In the early 1990s, when Mrs Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister for a secondtime, the Economist of London had described Pakistan as the land ofAurangazebs. Its children are taught in schools that Aurangazeb was the greatestruler the Indian sub-continent had ever produced in its history. There is anAurangazeb lurking inside every Pakistani ruler--political or military. Is therean Aurangazeb lurking inside Kiyani, who may one day stab Musharraf in the back?
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Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, left, salutes to his successor Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani during the change of command ceremony in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on Wednesday, Nov. 28, 2007.
That fear is for the future. Today, Kiyani has thereputation of being totally loyal to Musharraf. That was why Musharraf selectedhim to succeed him as the chief. However, it must be said to the credit ofMusharraf that he did not supersede any officers senior to Kiyani in order topromote him. He went purely by seniority and merit. Kiyani was on the top of theseniority list and had the reputation of being a professional to his fingertips. Moreover, he enjoyed the total confidence of the US, where he had donesome training courses, and was a well-known and well-liked figure in thecorridors of the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
At a time when the so-called war against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban has notbeen going well and when Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri areproving to be as elusive as ever, Washington DC needs in Islamabad political andmilitary leaders who would not be detrimental to the US agenda of preventinganother 9/11 in the US homeland emanating from the tribal lands of Pakistan andAfghanistan. It has high hopes that, acting in tandem with Musharraf, Kiyaniwould deliver where Musharraf was not able to despite his supposedly bestefforts. To give a cloak of political acceptability to the US agenda, it wantsBenazir as a "duly elected" Prime Minister, who would providepolitical backing to the US agenda.
Will Kiyani be able to deliver if not bin Laden and Zawahiri at least otherssuch as Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, whois the de facto ruler of South Waziristan, and Maulana FM Radio Fazlullah,the defacto ruler of the Swat Valley?
Kiyani comes to office as the COAS with impeccable credentials. He has thedistinction of being the first Director-General of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) to be appointed as the COAS since Pakistan became independentin 1947.Ehsanul Haq was also the DG, ISI, before he became the Chairman, Chiefsof Staff Committee. Kiyani is the son of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) of theArmy. His humble background as the son of an NCO has endeared him to the juniorranks of the Army. At a time, when there are signs of some demoralisation in thejunior ranks fighting against Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations in thePashtun belt, high hopes will be placed on him for reversing the process ofdemoralisation.
Kiyani is also a non-controversial officer, who had in the past not come tonotice for any dubious association with the Taliban or Al Qaeda or any ofPakistan's fundamentalist organisations. He was liked by the political leaders,who were attracted by his unassuming nature and humble demeanour. A man of fewwords, he is quite a contrast to Musharraf, a braggart. His reputation as anapolitical officer went up during the recent controversy over Musharraf'ssuspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan SupremeCourt. Knowledgeable sources said that at the meeting held at Musharraf's officein March,2007, at which the decision to suspend him was taken, Kiyani was theonly person, who kept quiet and did not utter a word either in support ofMusharraf's decision or in criticism of the Chief Justice. It was also reportedthat he kept the ISI out of this unsavoury controversy and that it was theDirectorate-General of Military Intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau, whichplayed the leading role in the campaign to denigrate the former Chief Justice,which ultimately boomeranged on Musharraf.
Kiyani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the BalochRegiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chosehim as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two have since maintained theirpersonal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
Kiyani is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the US Armed Forces,but he really attracted the attention of the US' political and militaryleadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 afterthe terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was theDirector-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US wasreportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
In September 2003, he was appointed the Corps Commander of the X Corps atRawalpindi. It was the X Corps that had launched the coup of October 1999 whichbrought Musharraf to power. No military coup in Pakistan could be successfulwithout the X Corps being in the forefront of the coup. All military chiefschose their most trusted officer to head it. The fact that Musharraf chose himfor this key post spoke of his confidence in him as a trustworthy officer, whowould do his bidding.
As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating theinvestigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi inDecember,2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsiblefor the attempts, Kiyani also managed to establish the involvement of somejunior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had themarrested.
In October next year, he was appointed the DG of the ISI and once againimpressed the US by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an al Al Qaedaoperative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrestedin the tribal belt. He was immediately handed over to the US without properlyinterrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf. ManyPakistani sources, however, have not accepted the claim of the ISI and that ofthe US that Abu Faraj was the No.3 of Al Qaeda and had masterminded the attemptsto kill Musharraf. Subsequent evidence has not proved their claims.
Even though Kiyani was projected as a highly successful DGof the ISI, facts speak otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISIthat the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Armypractically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda established itssanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
The US has strongly backed his elevation as the COAS because of his knownloyalty to Musharraf, his friendship with Benazir Bhutto and its hopes that hewould improve the morale of the Army and vigorously pursue Al Qaeda & co.Its hopes in him may ultimately be belied just as its hopes in Musharraf were.The US has never been a good judge of Pakistanis and particularly of PakistaniArmy officers. Will it be different this time? Let us wait and see.
Since he took over as the Vice-Chief of the Army Staff on October 8, 2007,Kiyanihas been co-ordinating the military operations to re-establish the writ of thegovernment over the Swat Valley. He has not been very successful so far. Thetribals of the Swat Valley, ably led by Maulana Fazlullah and backed by Al Qaeda,the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Neo Taliban and the Jaish-e-Mohammad(JEM) have been putting up a stiff fight against the Pakistani Army, despite itsuse of helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. Kiyani's policy of over-relyingon helicopter gunships and heavy artillery and avoiding ground confrontationshas already come in for criticism in Pakistani military circles. Faced with thiscriticism, he has only now sent his troops to engage the terrorists in groundconfrontations. Kiyani has promised that he would eject the terrorists from theSwat Valley before the elections and re-establish the writ of the state. If hedoes not succeed, his reputation as the COAS could take a beating.
Till the elections in the beginning of January next, Musharraf is expected tohandle the political management of the country and Kiyani the operationalmanagement and the fight against terrorism. A new Prime Minister would join thegovernment after the elections constituting a triumvirate. Who will be the PrimeMinister? Benazir, who is preferred by the US, but intensely disliked by manyCorps Commanders because of her confrontational style? Nawaz or his brotherShahbaz Sharif, who have many friends among the Punjabi Corps Commanders despiteNawaz's confrontation with the Army in October, 1999,but are distrusted byMusharraf and the US? Shujjat Hussain or someone else from the rubber-stampPakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam), who were the creations of Musharraf andwill remain his poodles as they were during Musharraf's first tenure as thePresident?
Whoever joins the triumvirate after the elections, power will be sharedunequally with Musharraf as the President, the Commander-in-Chief of the ArmedForces and the Chairman of the National Security Council (NSC) retaining thebulk of it in his hands. There are elements of potential conflict andinstability. Musharraf can assume special powers as he did after imposing theEmergency on November 3, 2007, but only Kiyani as the COAS can help him enforcehis powers. Otherwise, they will remain only on paper. Till now, Musharrafassumed the special powers as the President and had them enforced as the COAS.With the second hat gone, he will have to depend on Kiyani to keep his teethbiting sharp.
Even if they do very well in the elections, neither Benazir nor Nawaz can becomethe Prime Minister unless Musharraf issues an ordinance removing the present banimposed by the previous National Assembly on anyone holding office as the PrimeMinister for more than two terms. Will he oblige them?
Kiyani, as the COAS, will have under him over 30 Lt Gens., who owed their riseto this position to Musharraf. Will they transfer their total loyalty to Kiyanior will they have divided loyalty? Will Musharraf resist the temptation toencourage them to look up to him for favours and orders thereby reducing Kiyanito a figure-head COAS? Will he give Kiyani a free hand in running the Army bynot interfering with his powers of promotion and postings of senior officers?
The future course of events in Pakistan in 2008 would depend on the answers tothese questions. Even after shedding his uniform, Musharraf will be on paper oneof the most powerful Presidents Pakistan has had. He has seen to that byrepeatedly fiddling with the Constitution and the laws of the land. But he mayfind himself reduced to a paper tiger if Kiyani asserts himself and insists onplaying his due role as the COAS.
As the dramatis personae in Islamabad play out the drama, there is a man upthere in the tribal north waiting and watching, hoping that Pakistan and itsnuclear arsenal would ultimately fall into his hands. His name is Osama binLaden. He wears no hats and is not part of the triumvirate, but his threateningshadow will continue to hover over Pakistan till Al Qaeda is defeated andneutralised. That is not for tomorrow.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.
