From Speech To Action

Pakistan President Gen.Pervez Musharraf's televised speech of May 27, 2002, came as an anti-climax, belyingthe expectations of many analysts that he would address more sincerely than in his speech of January 12, 2002,the concerns of the Government and the people of India relating to the use of terrorism by Pakistan'smilitary-intelligence establishment as a weapon against India to achieve its strategic objective of annexingJammu & Kashmir (J&K) by keeping the Indian security forces bleeding.

The speech was evasive without any reference to specifics and his tone was unyielding and even defiant.Even the self-criticism, which one noticed in his January 12 speech, was absent and there was no condemnationof the activities of the Pakistani Punjabi terrorist groups, which a well-known analyst of Pakistan hadrecently referred to as the Punjabi Taliban, in J & K and other parts of India. What struck one was hisover-anxiety to avoid any criticism of Pakistan's religious extremist parties, which have been used by theInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since 1989 to keep blood flowing in our territory.

Even at the risk of repeating once again what this writer has been saying and writing again and again, onehas to underline that what we are facing since 1993 is no longer Kashmiri militancy due to feelings of deepalienation in the local population, but Pakistani Punjabi terrorism in the name of the Kashmiris. Terroristorganisations such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), theLashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), the Al Badr etc are pure and simple Pakistani Punjabiorganisations, which are not interested in the welfare of the Kashmiris. Even according to the HUJI's ownpublications, only 200 of its 650 cadres killed by the Indian security forces since 1991 were Kashmiris. Theremaining 450 were Pakistanis, with the Punjabis constituting the largest number.

Their interests have nothing to do with the interests of the Kashmiris. These are pan-Islamic organisationsof the same mould as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and members of his International Islamic Front For JehadAgainst the US and Israel. Their aim is not just "the liberation of Kashmir", but the"liberation" of the Muslims of India, their Talibanisation and the creation of a new IslamicCaliphate extending from Pakistan to Indonesia, consisting of Pakistan and the "liberated Muslimhomelands" of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, which they look upon as rightfullybelonging to the Malay Muslims, Brunei, southern Philippines and Indonesia.

Their ranks have been swelled and their irrationality has been hardened after October 7, 2001, by theinflux of the dregs of the present war against terrorism in Afghanistan, who pose a serious threat not only toIndia and the US, but also to the countries of the ASEAN and to international peace and security. BeforeOctober 7, 2001, there were two terrorist infrastructures in the epicentre of international terrorism as thePakistan-Afghanistan region came to be called -- one directed against India located in Pakistan and the otheranti-US and anti-West located in Afghanistan.

The one located in Afghanistan has now been shifted to Pakistan, with the knowledge and complicity ofPakistan's military-intelligence establishment, and the two have been acting in tandem targetting Indian aswell as Western nationals and interests. It will be totally unwise and suicidal to think that Musharraf has nocontrol over them and that they are being activated by rogue elements in Pakistan's military-intelligenceestablishment beyond his control.

The Al Qaeda and the other constituents of the International Islamic Front were the joint creations ofGen.Musharraf, Gen.Mohammad Aziz Khan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Maj.Gen. (retd).Mahmud Ali Durrani, when they were the blue-eyed boys of the late Zia-ul-Haq. They raised this "Army ofIslam" for use against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and diverted it against India post-1993. Thepre-1998 "Army of Islam" has become the post-1998 International Islamic Front.

To expect Musharraf to become a repentant sinner, give up the use of terrorism and destroy his owncreations would be to live in a dangerous world of illusions. Till September 11, 2001, Musharraf used toproject in public the capture of Afghanistan by the Taliban as his and the Pakistan Army's greatest successstory since the defeat of 1971 at the hands of the Indian Army.

He and his officers were hoping and continue to hope, despite the defeat of the Taliban by theinternational coalition in Afghanistan, that this "success story" could be repeated in India withthe help of these Pakistani Punjabi Talibans. He has been able to persist with his perfidious actions becausehe thinks that the US, the UK and other Western countries would not pressure him beyond a point to meetIndia's concerns. Unfortunately, he has been proved right till now in his assessment of the Westernambivalence.

The international coalition led by the US has been fighting against terrorism in Afghanistan for over sixmonths. Apart from having the Taliban replaced, their achievements have been inadequate. Over 80 per cent ofthe Al Qaeda and the Taliban and of the components of the International Islamic Front, including theirleaders, are intact and alive and kicking in Pakistani territory.

They have stepped up terrorism not only against India, but also against the US and France. They arethreatening to target the UK too shortly. What intelligence Musharraf has given to the coalition? How genuinehas he been in his co-operation with the US? What action has he taken to smoke out the dregs from theirPakistani sanctuaries? Why has he made a farce of the investigation and trial of Daniel Pearl, the Americanjournalist, who was kidnapped and brutally murdered? Why has there been no progress in the investigation ofthe grenade attack in an Islamabad church on March 17, 2002, when two Americans were killed, and of thesuicide bomb attack on the French in Karachi on May 8,2002?

An objective examination of the answers to these questions would enable the US to remove the blinkers fromits eyes, but it does not want these blinkers to be removed lest it start seeing Musharraf for what he reallyis -- the godfather of international terrorism emanating from this region.

Since he joined the Army in 1964 Musharraf has grown up with the belief and conviction that he can fool allpeople for all time. We have to prove him wrong.

What are the options available to India? New Delhi would be totally -- legally, morally and ethically --justified in taking military action. But, before doing so, we must carefully examine whether the directmilitary option would help us achieve the objective of putting an end to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

The immediate-short term option has to be decided by the Government on the basis of the intelligence,information, insights etc at its disposal and all should support the Government in implementing its decision.

Any over-all plan has to have short, medium and long-term options. It is here that the importance of covertaction as an essential component arises. Unfortunately, in India, there is no proper understanding of the roleand importance of covert action. Seeing what Pakistan has been doing, we tend to equate covert action withterrorism and recoil in horror at the very mention of it. For Pakistan, covert action means terrorism, but itis not so for democratic and civilised countries such as the USA, the UK, France, etc all of which have andadmit to having an effective covert action capability.

The possession of an effective covert action capability and the willingness to use it, if and whennecessary, is the only deterrent against an adversary such as Pakistan which thinks it can achieve itsobjective against India through covert action.

Since 1968, India had a covert action capability whose role was significant in the then East Pakistan. Butfor the effective use of this capability, there might not have been peace in Mizoram and we might not have putan end to anti-national elements in Sikkim. The role of our covert action capability in putting an end to theISI interference in Punjab by making such interference prohibitively costly to Pakistan is little known andunderstood. The goodwill which India enjoys today in Kabul might not have been possible but for the benign useof our covert action capability.

Covert action is not terrorism. Covert action is identifying the sensitive points of the adversary andexercising sustained pressure on those points through deniable means till results are achieved.

Terrorism, particularly the State-sponsored kind, is an unconventional war. To be effective, the responseto it in thinking and action has to be unconventional.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)