Diplomatic Tourism

‘Dead on arrival’ is how one observer described Colin Powell’s latest visit (his third since 9/11) toNew Delhi and Islamabad. His earlier statements, downplaying the significance of this excursion, suggest thatPowell himself did not expect much more.

India and Pakistan have become mandatory stopovers for roving Western VIP’s offering non-solutions tonon-problems in South Asia – Powell, for instance, sees images of salvation in international observers forthe forthcoming elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Meanwhile, the core problem in the region – thepersistence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and of the armies and infrastructure of the Islamist jihadin that country – is systematically downplayed.

The trend started after 9/11 (October 2001 saw Powell’s first tour here), and intensified after December13, 2001, when India’s Parliament was attacked by Pakistan-backed terrorists groups, leading –particularly after the brutal Kaluchak massacre of May 14, 2002 – to the largest military mobilisation thisregion has seen. None – without exception – of these diplomatic delegations have had anything concrete tooffer beyond platitudes about ‘talks about talks.’ And yet, to their home constituencies, they haverepeatedly reported ‘great breakthroughs’ in the Indo-Pak imbroglio as a result of their sagaciousinterventions.

The greatest of these supposed ‘breakthroughs’ came in the wake of the artificial hysteria that waswhipped up over an ostensibly imminent war – and possible nuclear holocaust – in South Asia in the latterpart of May 2001, after the Kaluchak massacre tempted the Indian leadership to engage in an experiment inbrinkmanship. The fact is, at no moment during that entire counterfeit crisis, was there even the remotestpossibility of war, and the ease with which the tensions were abruptly dissipated by the Indian PrimeMinister’s sudden pronouncements about ‘clear skies’ bore out the absurdity of Western projections. Thisdid not, however, end war speculation, and ‘experts’ continued to argue that the next time there was amajor terrorist strike in India, the country’s leadership ‘would not be able to resist public pressure’for military retaliation against Pakistan – and Pakistan’s dictator, President Pervez Musharraf, soughtinternational guarantees against Indian ‘overreaction’ in case of a major terrorist attack in India bygroups that he ‘cannot control’. But another massacre of comparable magnitude did occur – at Kasimpuraon July 13 – and there was not even a suggestion of a military response across the Line of Control (LoC).

This is crucial, because the pattern of Western – and particularly American – ‘peacemaking’initiatives has become a critical input in the orchestration of tensions in South Asia, encouraging the majorplayers here to sustain tensions in order to attract ‘favourable’ interventions. The Western discourse hasalso set an unacceptable limit on what needs to be done against terrorism, as evidenced by the incessantharping on infiltration across the LoC – Powell again saw fit to point out that it was ‘difficult’ toaccurately monitor the movement of terrorists from Pakistan into J&K.

The result is that, every time international (read, US) pressure escalates, General Musharraf makes atelevised ‘address to the nation’ roundly condemning terrorism; for a few weeks, infiltration rates drop;and the ‘international community’, goaded by their ‘friend’ Musharraf, immediately begins to pressureIndia to offer some ‘concessions’ to placate Pakistan in return. There is something immensely offensive inthis. As offensive as the suggestion that, since Osama bin Laden has not executed any further attacks onAmerica after 9/11, the US somehow owes him something by way of reciprocal ‘concessions’. The logicappears to be that if a mass murderer agrees – even temporarily – to stop murdering our people, we owe himsomething by way of reward. This is a position that should be rejected with utter contempt. But it finds themost unlikely defenders in the ‘free world’.

This is not the only distortion in the Western discourse on terrorism in South Asia. The Americans continueto find it convenient to project Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ in the war against terrorism, and cite asevidence the fact that Pakistan has ‘co-operated’ with the US and has ‘handed over’ several Al Qaedaoperatives, including some at leadership levels in the shadowy Islamist terrorist organisation. It is certain,however, that US Intelligence and policy makers are entirely aware of the duplicity of these claims.

The truth is, at no point in the ‘war against terror’ has the Musharraf regime given a whit more thanit has been forced to concede. To take an example, the much touted case of Abu Zubaidah – the senior-mostbin Laden lieutenant to be arrested till date – in late March. Abu Zubaidah, and more than 50 other Al Qaedacadre, were arrested at Faisalabad and handed over to US authorities only after the FBI had interceptedtheir telephonic communications and confronted local authorities, making it impossible for the latter torefuse to take action. In another high profile case in December 2001, over 120 Al Qaeda fighters were arrestedin the Kurram Agency and subsequently given over to the Americans – but only when their presence could nolonger be concealed or denied as a result of a quarrel between local tribal groups. There is ampleintelligence regarding numerous cases where Pakistani authorities have turned a blind eye to the presence andactivities of the Al Qaeda until US authorities have coerced action, or till the terrorists have found itpossible to relocate to undisclosed destinations.

Much of this is incomprehensible, particularly in view of the sheer horror of what was done on 9/11, and ofthe enormous danger that the surviving Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates constitute. It appears,however, that domestic political compulsions and the inertia of past policies are, once again, taking Americadown a familiar path of supporting an unconscionable Third World dictatorship – and a sponsor of terrorismto boot.

K.P.S. Gill, the 'super cop', is President, Institute for Conflict Management which runs the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal and brings out a weekly - South Asia Intelligence Review - courtesy whichthis piece appears here.