The Aatma Nirbhar Paradigm

On August 6, 2025, US President Donald Trump imposed a 50 per cent tariff on all Indian imports―25 per cent reciprocal tariffs, and an additional 25 per cent levy on its purchases of Russian oil. Following the imposition, the US Vice President said in a media interview that Trump is still ‘thinking about’ slapping tariffs on China for buying more Russian oil, just like he did with India, but there are more complications than just Russian oil in the equation!

Clearly, the tariffs on India are about more than just Russian oil, as at the same time, the US has extended the trade ceasefire with China by an additional 90 days. It needs little reiteration that the US power to impose tariffs and/or sanctions on China is limited by economic, political, and global factors. The instant leverage with China is their control over rare earth minerals and magnets, essential for components in industries from automotive to aerospace.

Even as this trade confrontation is eliciting different reactions from different quarters, China is utilising the opportunity to project itself as a progressive and reliable power. It is widening trade links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), West Asia, Africa and South America. It is offering competitive pricing in technology, electronics, green energy and even the sale of defence equipment where they see strategic value and trust.

The India-US tariff confrontation weakens the QUAD (Australia, India, Japan and the USA) significantly, benefiting China. And if the proposed US-China summit in September leads to a workable trade agreement with strategic accommodation, there are enough indicators to suggest that the US may climb down from the ‘China threat’ to ‘China-competitor’ status with reduced weightage for Indo-Pacific strategy.

There is palpable excitement in Pakistan with these developments. Field Marshal Asim Munir, in an address to the Pakistani diaspora in the US on August 9, reportedly said: “We are a nuclear nation. If we think we are going down, we’ll take half the world down with us.” And Islamabad would defend its water rights “at all costs”, if India proceeds with dam construction on the Indus River. “We will wait for India to build a dam, and when they do so, we will destroy it.” Munir, in this speech in the US, also repeated a statement he had made earlier, that in a future war against India, ‘operations would start in the East’.

Delusional as these Munir rantings may appear, given his swift cosying up to Trump, he may be tempted to fish in more troubled waters. The US is not known to be fair when it comes to applying non-proliferation policies against Pakistan. Also, there is great interest now in Pakistan’s critical minerals and hydrocarbons.

It may be in place to recall some history here. In 1971, Pakistan’s military crackdown against East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was based on an assurance of America’s commitment to ensure Pakistan’s integrity. Pakistan was pivotal in providing secret communication channels for the rapprochement between the US and China. In return for their services, Pakistan secured US support even as they continued with the deplorable genocide in East Pakistan. Relieved at having to contend against two fronts, the Soviet Union (Ussuri River conflict, 1969) on the West, and the USA (Vietnam) on the South, China reciprocated to Pakistan by being indifferent to the genocide and continued to supply arms.

With the China-US rapprochement, Moscow was keen to deepen its relations with India. On August 9, 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” treaty, valid for 20 years, which was a stitch just in time for the final showdown.

To deter India, the US deployed its Seventh Fleet led by the 75,000-tonne nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, with more than 70 fighters and bombers in the Bay of Bengal, through the Malacca Strait. The Soviet Union responded by deploying its Pacific Fleet in the region.

Despite the pressures, India’s armed forces, supported by Bangladesh’s Mukti Juddha (Liberation War), executed a ‘lightning campaign’, and Dhaka fell in less than 13 days, providing the finest military victory for India and liberation for Bangladesh.

Notwithstanding India’s stance of ‘non-alignment’, the US and most of its allies viewed India on the side of the Soviet Union, and our armed forces and public sector-driven defence R&D and industry became more dependent on the Soviet Union for procurements and licensed production.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its aftereffects caused major disruptions in India’s defence procurement and sustenance, as many industries in the supply chain were in countries that gained freedom from the Soviet Russia. The war in Afghanistan was one of the main factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, a war that helped Pakistan to secure both short-term and long-term leverage with the US, the UK, Arabic countries, and China. People in the US establishment still remember with gratitude the support they got from Pakistan’s military in securing access for their operations in Afghanistan through the Karachi Port and the troubled areas of Baluchistan.

In May 1998, post the Pokhran II nuclear tests, the US imposed sanctions on India. The intensive engagement between the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, spanning two years, brought about a shift in perceptions, and sanctions were gradually lifted.

In 2008, the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, which allowed for civilian nuclear cooperation, ended the nuclear isolation and technology denial. India agreed to place its civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and strengthened the security of its nuclear arsenals. Between 2002 and 2020, after much back and forth, India and the US signed four foundational agreements.

India has made substantial defence acquisitions from the US since 2008, including the Apache attack helicopters, Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and M777 ultra-lightweight artillery, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure, and MQ-9B Armed Predator drones.

Today, some of India’s critical defence programmes, dependent on the US, face uncertainties―the execution of the 2024 deal for MQ-9B drones, co-production of GE F414 engines for fighter projects, LCA Tejas Mark 2 and AMCA Mark 1. Even before the tariff confrontation, there were reports of delays in the GE F404 engines used in the LCA Tejas Mark 1 & 1A; Gas turbines for the stealth frigates; and Cummins engines for the Zorawar light tanks.

Dependence on Russia is not without pitfalls either. Decades of licensed production of aircrafts, tanks, infantry combat vehicles and so on have provided for short-term capabilities at the expense of long-term capacity-building and the ability to modernise specific to India’s operational needs. Life cycle sustenance, too, has taken a hit due to the unavailability of spares and components. Given the large inventory of Russian platforms, including legacy systems, the dependence will continue and be an irritant in our relations with the European Union (EU), Japan and the USA. Defence procurements from France and Israel have limitations, too.

Strategic autonomy to be worthwhile requires self-reliance (Aatma Nirbhar). This manifested clearly in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Independence Day speech in 2025: Made-in-India semiconductor chips by the end of 2025, advanced indigenous weapon and defense system to protect critical infrastructure by 2035, National Critical Minerals Mission, design and manufacture of jet engines for fighter aircraft, Demographic Security Mission, Tech-Driven Security Network to protect strategic, civilian, and religious sites, National Deepwater Exploration Mission and more.

There are four recommendations to support the mission: One, develop intelligence capability, including high-class analysis covering all domains―military, economics, commerce, technology and information―to help the leadership foresee what’s brewing and forewarn the entities concerned. Two, to develop a culture of long-term perspective planning across all branches of the government to ensure appropriate preparation. Rather than perpetually managing crises and looking for short-term fixes, we must focus on building strategic assets across multiple domains. Three, even though defence production has increased to Rs 155,000 crore, the contribution of the private sector is less than a quarter. Indigenous cutting-edge capabilities are few and far between. Increasing participation of the private sector in defence and mandatory stipulations for investment in R&D by the industry must go hand in hand. Four, emergency procurements as the ‘way around’―a tardy defence capital procurement process―cannot go on for perpetuity. There must be revolutionary reforms in the procedures and structures to keep pace with technological changes, accelerated innovation cycles and evolving threats.

Whether it’s a trade war or a military war, we must “Win India’s Wars with Indian Solutions”.

(Views expressed are personal)

Lt. Gen Subrata Saha (Retd)

IS EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE MANEKSHAW CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AND RESEARCH