Russia and Ukraine remain divided over territory and security guarantees
Hanna Shelest argues the war has helped Putin consolidate domestic control
Military spending and political repression add to the challenges of ending the invasion
Russia and Ukraine remain divided over territory and security guarantees
Hanna Shelest argues the war has helped Putin consolidate domestic control
Military spending and political repression add to the challenges of ending the invasion
The latest round of US-mediated negotiations has brought Russia and Ukraine back to the diplomatic table, but it has done little to narrow the gap between their positions. Trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11 produced an agreement in principle on a major prisoner exchange, while discussions involving US, Ukrainian and European representatives continued on November 16. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the sides had agreed to meet again in Berlin.
The diplomatic activity has not stopped the fighting or resolved the central disputes. Moscow continues to demand Ukrainian territory it does not fully control and rejects Western military deployments in Ukraine after a settlement. Kyiv, meanwhile, refuses to recognise Russia’s annexations and wants security guarantees that would prevent another invasion.
For Hanna Shelest, director of the Security Studies programme at Kyiv-based Prism UA and editor-in-chief of Ukraine Analytica, the explanation for the Kremlin’s resistance to ending the war also lies inside Russia. She argues that the conflict has become an instrument of domestic political control for Putin, allowing him to strengthen the security apparatus and defer scrutiny of the invasion’s costs. This is an assessment of the Russian president’s political calculations, not an independently established account of his private motivations.
The Abu Dhabi negotiations were the first trilateral meeting involving Russia, Ukraine and the United States in nine months. The discussions were followed by a November 12 meeting between Putin and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Moscow. Zelenskyy subsequently said the talks had produced an agreement in principle on a prisoner exchange, while the Monday discussions brought European representatives from France, Germany, Britain, Italy and Poland into the diplomatic process.
But even the format of the negotiations remains contested. Zelenskyy said European representatives would participate in subsequent discussions, while Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said Moscow had not agreed to their inclusion in the next round. Russia wants to discuss the wider European security architecture but has resisted giving European governments a direct role in negotiations over it.
The disagreement goes beyond diplomatic representation. Russia and Ukraine have fundamentally different ideas about what a settlement should achieve. Moscow wants recognition of its territorial claims and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements. Kyiv sees these conditions as a threat to its sovereignty and a potential invitation to renewed aggression.
A prisoner exchange can deliver a significant humanitarian outcome, but it does not resolve these political and territorial questions. That distinction explains why renewed negotiations have not translated into a ceasefire.
Shelest’s central argument is that the war has become intertwined with the Kremlin’s domestic political system. In her assessment, Putin continues to rely on the conflict to justify a stronger security apparatus, tighter state control and restrictions on dissent. Even after elections, she argues, the Russian president does not necessarily feel politically secure.
The invasion has also allowed the Kremlin to frame domestic opposition and criticism through the language of national security. Russia introduced criminal and administrative penalties in March 2022 for spreading what authorities describe as false information about the armed forces and for discrediting the military. These restrictions have operated alongside the expansion of the foreign-agent and undesirable-organisations regimes.
Independent monitoring documents the consequences. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment describes extensive restrictions on political expression and the application of laws against critics of the state. Human Rights Watch has also documented censorship of information about the war and prosecutions of people who challenge the official narrative.
These developments support the argument that the war has helped consolidate state control. They do not, by themselves, prove that Putin is deliberately prolonging the invasion to preserve his position. That remains Shelest’s interpretation.
But the political difficulty of ending the war is evident. A settlement that falls short of the Kremlin’s declared objectives could prompt questions about the casualties, financial costs and military setbacks accumulated since February 2022. The government would also have to explain what the invasion achieved if Ukraine remained independent, retained its military capabilities and continued to pursue its own foreign policy.
Russia’s negotiating demands are a major obstacle to a settlement. In a speech to Russian Foreign Ministry officials on June 14, 2024, Putin said Ukraine would have to withdraw its forces from the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, including areas not controlled by Russian troops. He also demanded that Kyiv abandon its ambition to join NATO.
Moscow has since continued to treat these conditions as central to its position. Russia claims to have annexed all four regions, despite not controlling their full territory. Its constitutional framework also incorporates the annexation claims, making territorial concessions politically and legally more complicated for the Kremlin.
Following the November 12 meeting with US envoys, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed that Putin had reiterated his demand for control over the four regions and rejected proposals for a future demilitarised zone. It also reported that he continued to oppose Western troop deployments in Ukraine as part of post-war security guarantees. These are ISW’s assessments of Russia’s negotiating position, based on public statements and reporting, rather than an independent account of what Putin might privately accept.
For Kyiv, accepting these demands would mean surrendering territory and limiting its ability to determine its own security arrangements. Ukraine has also rejected recognition of Russia’s annexations, which the United Nations General Assembly has condemned as violations of Ukrainian territorial integrity.
The result is a negotiation in which the two sides are not simply bargaining over a ceasefire line. They are contesting the political and security arrangements that would define Ukraine’s future.
The invasion has reshaped Russia’s public spending and industrial priorities. Defence procurement, weapons production and military contracts have become major sources of government demand, benefiting parts of the industrial sector and regions dependent on defence manufacturing.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that Russian federal funding for the war and other military expenditure reached approximately 16 trillion roubles in 2025, equivalent to 7.5% of gross domestic product. Planned military expenditure for 2026 was reduced to about 14.9 trillion roubles, or 6.3% of GDP. SIPRI also noted that the growth of military spending had moderated and that budgetary pressures were mounting.
The economic picture is under strain, but it does not point to an imminent collapse. The Bank of Russia’s November forecast projected GDP growth of 0.5–1% in 2026 and inflation of 7.1–7.6%. It also kept monetary conditions tight, reflecting continuing inflationary pressures and constraints on production capacity.
A prolonged war has created economic interests around military production and government procurement. Ending it would require the state to adjust spending priorities, manage the transition in defence industries and address the economic effects of a reduction in military demand.
However, the scale of military spending does not prove that Russia’s economy is incapable of functioning without the war. Nor does it establish that economic dependence on defence production is Putin’s principal reason for continuing the invasion. It is one of the costs and institutional complications that a settlement would leave behind.
The dispute is partly about territory, but it also concerns what happens after the fighting stops. Russia wants Ukraine to accept limits on its military and foreign policy, while Kyiv wants guarantees that a ceasefire will not give Moscow time to rebuild its forces and launch another attack.
Putin has repeatedly argued that a temporary ceasefire would not address the underlying causes of the conflict. His government has also rejected the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine after a settlement, describing such forces as unacceptable and potential targets.
Ukraine, by contrast, wants legally binding security guarantees and continued support for its armed forces. European governments have backed the principle that any settlement must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and involve countries that would be responsible for supporting its security.
The disagreement over Europe’s participation reflects this wider conflict. Russia wants negotiations to address NATO and the European security order, but resists European governments having a direct role in the process. For Kyiv, excluding its European partners would weaken the credibility of any guarantees that emerge.
The distinction between a ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement is therefore important. A halt in fighting could reduce immediate casualties without resolving territorial claims, Ukraine’s future military status, sanctions or the wider confrontation between Russia and the West.
The argument that Putin cannot afford to end the invasion brings together several pressures. A settlement that falls short of Russia’s stated objectives could expose the gap between the Kremlin’s initial ambitions and the outcome. The state would also have to address the human and economic costs of the war, while adjusting a system of spending and security controls that has expanded during the conflict.
But the alternative explanation is also important: Moscow may continue fighting because it believes that military pressure can secure better territorial or strategic terms than negotiations currently offer. Russia’s demands over the four Ukrainian regions and its opposition to Western security guarantees indicate that the Kremlin has not publicly abandoned its broader objectives.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Putin may see continued military operations as a way to improve Russia’s negotiating position while also using the war to reinforce domestic control. The available evidence establishes the scale of military spending, restrictions on dissent and the Kremlin’s stated demands. It cannot conclusively establish that the Russian president believes ending the war would threaten his political survival.
For now, the diplomatic process remains active, but the central obstacles are unchanged. Prisoner exchanges and further meetings can keep negotiations alive; they cannot bridge the gap between Russia’s territorial demands and Ukraine’s insistence on sovereignty and credible security guarantees. Whether Putin can present a settlement as a victory at home may be as consequential as what Russia and Ukraine can agree on at the negotiating table.
Tags