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A $128 Billion Trade Tangle: The ASEAN Problem PM Modi Takes To Manila

India’s trade with ASEAN has crossed $128 billion, but rising imports and lagging exports raise concerns over trade imbalances. As PM Modi attends the Manila summit, the trade pact review will test India’s Act East ambitions and regional supply-chain goals

PM Narendra Modi
Summary
  • India’s merchandise trade with ASEAN reached $128.4 billion in FY2025–26, but the trade deficit widened to $51.6 billion

  • The AITIGA review aims to improve market access and address barriers facing Indian exporters

  • Modi’s Manila visit also highlights expanding defence, maritime and digital cooperation with Southeast Asia

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Manila on Monday and Tuesday for the 23rd ASEAN-India Summit comes at a critical juncture for one of India’s most important regional partnerships. Merchandise trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reached $128.38 billion in FY2025–26, but the headline figure masks a growing imbalance: India’s exports to the bloc have declined over the past four years while imports have increased sharply.

India exported goods worth $38.4 billion to ASEAN in FY2025–26, against imports of $90 billion, taking the trade deficit to $51.6 billion. The figures raise questions about how much Indian businesses are gaining from the existing free trade framework and whether the relationship is translating into greater access to Southeast Asian markets.

The summit offers New Delhi an opportunity to push for a more balanced partnership. The ongoing review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), alongside cooperation on maritime security, defence, investment and connectivity, will shape the next phase of engagement.

Why Has A $128-Billion Partnership Become A Trade Concern?

India’s merchandise trade with ASEAN has grown from $110.4 billion in FY2021–22 to $128.4 billion in FY2025–26, an annual compound growth rate of about 4%. But the growth has not been matched by stronger Indian exports.

Exports fell from $42.4 billion to $38.4 billion during the period, while imports rose from $68.1 billion to $90 billion. The resulting deficit has nearly doubled, from $25.7 billion to $51.6 billion.

ASEAN’s share in India’s overall merchandise trade has also remained relatively stable at around 11% over the period. In other words, trade has increased in absolute terms without a significant expansion in the bloc’s share of India’s global trade.

This is the central challenge for New Delhi. The objective is no longer simply to increase the volume of commerce with Southeast Asia, but to improve India's export competitiveness and secure a larger place for Indian businesses in the region.

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Which ASEAN Economies Dominate India’s Trade?

India’s trade with ASEAN is concentrated in a handful of economies. Singapore was the largest trading partner in FY2025–26, with bilateral merchandise trade of $36.1 billion, followed by Indonesia at $24.8 billion. Thailand and Malaysia accounted for $21.5 billion and $21 billion respectively, while trade with Vietnam stood at $18.3 billion.

Singapore and Indonesia together accounted for approximately 47% of India’s total trade with the bloc. The concentration is also visible in export markets: Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam accounted for about 66% of India’s exports to ASEAN.

India’s exports to Indonesia have been particularly weak, falling from $8.5 billion in FY2021–22 to $4.5 billion in FY2025–26. The decline, which represents an annual compound contraction of about 15%, has contributed to the broader weakness in export performance.

The Philippines, by comparison, accounted for $3.9 billion of India’s ASEAN trade. Cambodia, Laos and Brunei remain smaller markets. Their relatively low trade volumes also indicate room for diversification, although expanding into these economies will require stronger commercial links and better access for Indian exporters.

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What Does India Buy From And Sell To Southeast Asia?

The composition of trade helps explain why imports from ASEAN have risen. Indonesia is an important source of coal and palm oil, which accounted for 30% and 19% respectively of India’s imports from the country in FY2025–26. Palm oil also represented 22% of imports from Malaysia.

Manufactured goods form another important part of the import basket. Telecommunications equipment, flat-panel displays and broadcasting and camera equipment were among India’s leading imports from Vietnam. Electronic integrated circuits and computers were prominent imports from Singapore.

Indian exports, meanwhile, are concentrated in petroleum products, engineering goods, agricultural commodities, pharmaceuticals and automobile components. Petroleum products accounted for 37% of exports to Singapore and 25% of exports to Malaysia. India's shipments to the Philippines included pharmaceutical products, frozen bovine meat and motorcycles and scooters.

Singapore’s position as a regional financial, logistics and re-export hub also needs to be considered when reading bilateral trade figures. The relationship is not limited to direct consumption of goods in each market; trade through regional hubs forms part of the wider supply-chain network.

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The deficit therefore reflects several factors, including India's demand for energy and industrial inputs, the composition of its exports and the competitiveness of regional manufacturers. It cannot be attributed solely to the free trade agreement.

Can The AITIGA Review Address The Imbalance?

The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) provides the institutional framework for economic engagement. It comprises three separate agreements covering trade in goods, services and investment. The goods agreement, AITIGA, was signed in August 2009 and came into force in January 2010. The services and investment agreements followed in 2014.

The current negotiations concern the goods agreement. India and ASEAN began its review in September 2022, with eight sub-committees established to examine different parts of the framework. The agenda includes market access, rules of origin, national treatment, technical standards, customs procedures and trade remedies.

India has sought to address concerns over non-tariff barriers, complicated documentation and limited access for some of its products in ASEAN markets. Rules of origin are another sensitive issue, with New Delhi concerned that goods from third countries could be routed through ASEAN to benefit from preferential tariffs.

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These concerns have featured in Indian policy discussions and research by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS). However, instances of circumvention need to be established through product-level evidence; an increase in imports by itself does not prove that trade rules have been violated.

The latest round of negotiations took place in Jakarta from October 6–9, 2026. At the 15th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting, both sides directed their sub-committees to expedite outstanding chapters and establish time-bound deliverables. The next meeting is scheduled for January 2027 in India.

The review is therefore an immediate test of whether the partnership can move beyond tariff preferences towards practical market access. Timor-Leste, which became ASEAN’s 11th member in October 2025, is yet to complete its accession to AITIGA.

Where Can Indian Exporters Find Room To Grow?

A 2026 report by RIS estimates that India has additional export potential of about  $41 billion across 110 tariff lines in ASEAN markets. This is a research estimate based on trade data, not a government target or a guarantee of future exports.

The opportunities are spread across electrical and mechanical machinery, chemicals, base metals, motor vehicles and components, prepared food products, plastics, rubber and textiles. Pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, agricultural commodities and marine products also offer scope for expansion.

For Indian businesses, lower tariffs alone may not be enough. Differences in technical standards, certification requirements and customs procedures can make it difficult to enter new markets. Better recognition of standards, simpler documentation and stronger business-to-business networks could help exporters reach economies beyond the bloc’s largest trading hubs.

The Philippines is one such market. India’s exports there include pharmaceuticals, a sector in which Indian manufacturers have an established presence. The scope to expand trade in healthcare products, automobiles and engineering goods is also significant, although this will depend on commercial access and demand.

Is India Missing Out On Southeast Asia’s Supply Chains?

ASEAN has become an important manufacturing and export base for electronics, machinery, automobiles and intermediate goods. India’s position outside the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), however, leaves it outside a major regional trade framework.

New Delhi chose not to join RCEP in 2019, citing concerns that the agreement did not adequately address the interests of Indian industries and other domestic stakeholders. The bloc brings together ASEAN and major regional economies, including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

India’s absence does not prevent bilateral trade with these economies, but it limits its participation in a framework that governs tariffs and rules of origin across much of the region. The RIS report argues that improving AITIGA alone will not resolve all the structural constraints facing Indian businesses in regional production networks.

The digital economy is another emerging area. ASEAN signed its Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) on November 14, covering digital trade, cross-border e-commerce, electronic payments, data governance, cybersecurity and emerging technologies. The agreement is expected to enter into force in early 2027.

India is not a party to DEFA. As regional rules and digital infrastructure become more integrated, regulatory cooperation and interoperability will matter for Indian technology and services companies seeking to operate across Southeast Asia.

How Does The Philippines Fit Into India’s Wider Regional Strategy?

Modi’s Manila visit also highlights the growing strategic dimension of India’s engagement with individual ASEAN members. India and the Philippines elevated their relationship to a Strategic Partnership in August 2025, with cooperation covering defence, maritime security, trade, science and technology.

The defence relationship has acquired particular significance through the BrahMos missile deal. India signed a $375-million contract in January 2022 to supply the Philippines with a shore-based anti-ship missile system. Deliveries began in 2024.

Manila has expressed interest in acquiring additional BrahMos systems. Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said on November 5 that the country hoped to procure more units and had shared a wish list with Indian authorities. There has been no announcement of a second contract, but the interest points to the potential for further defence exports.

The two countries have also discussed cooperation in pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, energy, construction and information technology. Bilateral merchandise trade reached $3.9 billion in FY2025–26, leaving considerable room for expansion.

Can Maritime Cooperation And Connectivity Give Act East A Stronger Foundation?

The Philippines is also central to India’s maritime engagement with ASEAN. The two sides designated 2026 as their Year of Maritime Cooperation, with the programme covering maritime security, connectivity and capacity-building.

The second ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, AIME-2026, was held at Subic Bay in September and October. Indian naval ships INS Sahyadri and INS Kulish took part alongside regional forces in coordinated maritime activities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises, and search-and-seizure drills.

The wider regional context includes tensions in the South China Sea, where the Philippines has maritime disputes with China. India has emphasised respect for international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the importance of ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific.

Physical connectivity remains another constraint on deeper economic integration. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are intended to improve links between India’s Northeast and Southeast Asia. But political instability in Myanmar, infrastructure delays and security concerns continue to affect their progress.

For India, the Manila summit is therefore about more than sustaining diplomatic momentum. The growing trade relationship has not yet translated into a comparable expansion of Indian exports or a stronger presence in regional supply chains. Whether the AITIGA review can improve market access, whether businesses can diversify beyond established trading partners and whether maritime and connectivity projects can support closer economic links will determine how much more India can gain from its ASEAN partnership.

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