How Changing US-China Dynamics Are Driving India's 'G Minus Two' Indo-Pacific Strategy

India is promoting a "G Minus Two" approach to the Indo-Pacific as it seeks to broaden cooperation in terms of strategy and defence beyond the dominance of the United States and China. 

The country seeks to deepen ties with varying Asian partners on issues like trade, technology, defence and maritime security while also maneuvering a healthy relationship with Washington and Beijing, which is not an easy feat. 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits this week to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's visit to New Delhi earlier this month, and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung's visit in April all point towards a growing push among Asian countries to strengthen partnerships with one another amid shifting US-China dynamics. 

Trump, who has been outspoken about China’s immigration in the US, struck a friendly tone during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May.  In their opening remarks, Xi called for the two countries to be "partners not rivals", while Trump described Xi as a "great leader."

During the day, the two leaders held a closed-door meeting that lasted more than two hours, discussing heavy topics like China’s increasing claims towards Taiwan, US investing in Taiwan’s defence and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

What does "G Minus Two" actually mean?

"G Minus Two" refers to an Indo-Pacific strategy centred on cooperation among Asia's major and middle powers rather than being defined by the overimposing dominance of superpowers United States and China. 

This does not simply mean severing relationships with either of the two, but to diversify its resources, building stronger regional partnerships to boost economic resilience, defence cooperation and strategic autonomy, giving countries greater room to work while continuing to engage both the US and China.

Why are India and Indonesia becoming key partners?

India and Indonesia have transformed a long-standing friendly relationship into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Since Modi's 2018 visit to Jakarta, both countries have expanded collaboration across the Indo-Pacific, including defence, connectivity, the blue economy and regional security. 

President Prabowo Subianto's visit to India in January 2025 and the 8th India-Indonesia Joint Commission Meeting in June underscored a shift from policy commitments to implementation. 

During Modi's latest visit, the two sides agreed on India's supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Astra air-to-air missiles, reviewed cooperation in areas ranging from trade and critical minerals to space and healthcare, and launched the Indonesia Open Network, modelled on India's Open Network for Digital Commerce, signalling a broader strategic partnership beyond defence.

The leaders also had a series of agreements covering critical minerals and rare earths, science and technology, education, telecommunications, agriculture, maritime security, space, disaster management, medical products regulation, health workforce cooperation and steel supply chains. 

How is China changing the Indo-Pacific equation?

Beijing's growing military and economic influence is one of the key factors driving the shift in strategy among other Asian countries. China has also positioned itself at the centre of global diplomacy, hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in September last year, before rolling out a grand welcome for Trump in May. 

Within days, Beijing hosted Putin again on his 25th visit to China to commemorate the treaty signed more than two decades ago that eased historical tensions between the two countries and laid the foundation for closer cooperation along their vast shared border.

These dynamics are reshaping the Indo-Pacific's strategic landscape and prompting other countries across the region to rethink their security and foreign policy priorities, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Beijing has increased military pressure in the South China Sea through repeated confrontations with the Philippines, increased air and naval patrols around Taiwan, an island nation that China claims.  

It has also tightened export controls on critical minerals and dual-use technologies, strengthened strategic cooperation with Pakistan, expanded defence and infrastructure partnerships across Southeast Asia, and continued to invest in regional connectivity projects. At the same time, China has maintained close economic engagement with countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Nepal while deepening its strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific.  

Why isn't this an anti-China alliance?

Despite such concerns about China's military assertiveness, the emerging network of Indo-Pacific partnerships is not intended, or simply cannot, isolate or contain Beijing. 

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, other Asian countries, who depend heavily on China and the US for trade, cannot choose sides.The Indian Express reported that India's annual trade with China stands at about $150 billion, while South Korea and Japan each trade more than $300 billion with Beijing. Australia's trade with China exceeds $200 billion, and ASEAN's total trade with China has surpassed $1 trillion. These figures underscore that economic decoupling is neither practical nor desirable for most countries. Instead, regional powers are looking to diversify supply chains, strengthen economic ties with one another and reduce vulnerabilities , a trend that has gathered momentum amid US President Donald Trump's tariff policies.

Instead, they are pursuing a strategy of reducing strategic vulnerabilities by diversifying supply chains and building closer interpersonal ties with regional partners, to deepen stability and balance of power. 

What does this mean for India's foreign policy?

Amid an increasingly fragmented global order, India's evolving Indo-Pacific strategy reflects an effort to not align itself with any one power. Since the start of Trump's second term, New Delhi has come under pressure from Washington over tariffs and its continued purchase of Russian oil, prompting it to diversify energy supplies while preserving its long-standing relationship with Moscow.

Rather than retreating into any single bloc, Modi has intensified diplomatic outreach across multiple regions. In recent months, he has signed an FTA with the UK, visited Scandinavian countries to deepen cooperation with Europe on green technology, is traveling to Australia and New Zealand, visited Indonesia for a defence agreement covering BrahMos and Astra missiles; and engaged Seychelles as part of India's wider Indian Ocean strategy focused on maritime security, connectivity and development.

At the same time, Modi has maintained close ties with Israel despite its growing international isolation over the Gaza war, while also working to rebuild ties with China after years of border tensions. During his meeting with Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, the two leaders reaffirmed that India and China were "development partners and not rivals" and agreed that their differences "should not turn into disputes." They welcomed progress in maintaining peace along the border following disengagement and said a stable bilateral relationship was essential for "a multipolar world and a multi-polar Asia."

Taken together, these engagements underscore India's increasingly multi-aligned foreign policy. Rather than choosing between Washington, Beijing, Moscow or Europe, New Delhi is widening its network of strategic partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Indian Ocean. The objective is to preserve strategic autonomy, reduce dependence on any single power and create greater diplomatic and economic room for manoeuvre in an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape.