Unremitting Terror

With 248 militancy relateddeaths in 2006 (data till October 22), Manipur remains the third most violenttheatre of conflict in the country, behind Jammu & Kashmir and Chhattisgarh.While each of Manipur’s nine districts has been affected by unending militantviolence, severely impacting on the capacity of the state to govern, administerjustice, and provide minimal security to its citizens, the pattern of violencehas been the most persistent and convoluted in the hilly district ofChurachandpur.

Located in the south-westerncorner of Manipur and spread over an area of 4,570 square kilometres,Churachandpur or Lamka (as the locals call it) meaning 'roads meeting at amouth', is the largest district in the state. While it shares its northern andeastern boundaries with six of Manipur’s districts (Imphal East, Tamenglong,Senapati, Bishnupur, Thoubal and Chandel), in the west and south, it is bound byAssam, Mizoram and Myanmar. The district population was 228,707, according tothe 2001 census, and was distributed across several tribes, most belonging tothe Kuki-Chin-Mizo group. The district also has sizeable Meitei (dominant in thevalley areas of the Manipur) and a marginal Naga (dominant in the Hill districtsof Manipur) population.

In an age of competitiveprimordial assertion, ethnic diversity has been the bane of Churachandpur. The districthas scarred by the bitter ethnic clashes between the Kukis and theNagas that have recurred in several of the Hill districts in the state since1992. Similarly, in 1997, the Kuki and the Zomi tribes clashed, resulting in anundocumented number of fatalities and large internal displacement. With passingdays, several militant groups, each claiming to represent specific tribes, andmore often than not, multiple outfits claiming to represent the same tribe (e.g.there are about nine groups claiming to represent the Kukis), have cropped up inthe state, and almost all of them have significant presence in Churachandpur. Even the Valley-based outfits, such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), have found secure bases in Churachandpur.

The geography and patterns ofpopulation settlement in the district have facilitated the militants in no smallmanner. As per the 1994-95 satellite imagery, the total built-up area ofChurachandpur was 6,726 Hectares (Urban - 585 Hectares and Rural - 6,141Hectares), just 1.47 per cent of the total land mass, and the cropland area is9,928 hectares (2.17 per cent of the district territory). Apart from a handfulof tiny townships like Henglep, Thanlon, Tipaimukh and the district headquartersat Churachandpur, the population is located over many scattered villages, oftenseparated by hills, rivers, rivulets, streams, bamboo groves and thickets, eachafflicted by serious problems of transportation and communication. For example,many interior villages in the district can only be reached after a journeyinvolving a three to four days’ trek from the district Headquarters.

While Churachandpur has beenthe hotbed of intense militancy, the incident that brought the district to thenational limelight in 2006 was the rape and molestation of at least 25 womenbelonging to the Hmar tribe, by cadres of Valley-based militant groups, the UNLFand the KCP. On January 6, 10 girls, some of them minors, were raped or molestedand several villagers assaulted in Parbung village in the Tipaimukhsub-division, located in the southern part of the district. One boy, whose twosisters were sexually assaulted, was shot dead the same night. Ten days later,on the night of January 16, about 18 armed militants assaulted about 402villagers of Lungthulien. They went on to molest and rape 15 girls and womenaged between 12 and 27. The villagers were so terrified that early in themorning of January 17 many of them fled to neighbouring Mizoram. 650 people wereaccommodated in camps set up by the Mizoram government at Sakawrdai.

Fear of reprisal attacks bythe militants ensured that the incidents were brought to the notice of anunresponsive and incapacitated administration only in the month of March.Widespread condemnation forced the state government to appoint a one-man InquiryCommission, whose report has since been submitted. Notwithstanding the findingof the Commission, the state’s ability to prosecute the militants remainsseverely limited, to say the least. Both the state and other agencies have foundit convenient to view the incident as an isolated and horrific act that needsimmediate punitive action – though the latter remains improbable. Moreover,one can hardly ignore the fact that the tribal population of Churachandpur hasconstantly been subjected to systematic acts of terror by Valley-based militantgroups, who have tended to exploit the schism between the Valley and the Hills.For a number of years, the UNLF maintained ‘liberated zones’ in areas likeHenglep, until the Army claimed to have flushed them out in January 2006.‘Operation Dragnet’ launched by the Army on January 20, resulted in thedeath of seven UNLF militants and two army personnel including a LieutenantColonel. Although Army personnel are deployed in areas like Parbung andLungthulien, militant activities continue to be reported from adjoining areas,and prominent incidents this year include:

February 6: Fifteen Border Security Force (BSF) trainees were injured in a bomb explosion triggered by suspected UNLF militants at Mualkawi near Lamka.

February 16: The body of a security force (SF) man, T. Ginlunlang Simte, suspected to have been killed by militants, was recovered by the Churachandpur district Police from Tolbung village.

April 21: Suspected militants shot dead an unidentified youth near Khuga Dam.

May 4: Three suspected militants were killed while four persons, including two SF personnel, sustained injuries in an encounter at Rengkai.

May 5: Unidentified militants shot dead a civilian, Genminlun alias T. Benjamin, at Bijang.

May 8: Two Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) cadres, Ningthoujam Shyamkahai and Khundrakpam Ranjit, were shot dead in an encounter with the SF personnel at Zouveng Meetei Leikai.

May 28: UNLF killed a youth at Meitei Leikai in the Churachandpur town.

June 18: Unidentified gunmen killed a youth, Seitin Chongloi at K. Salbungvill.

August 3: Two motorcycle-borne militants fired at a SF patrol party at the New Bazar area of Churachandpur town and killed a BSF soldier besides injuring a civilian.

September 18: A SF personnel belonging to the Assam Rifles was killed and five others sustained injuries in an attack by PLA at Telkotjang.

Planting of anti-personnellandmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the groups like the UNLFand the KCP to deter the movement of the SFs has been constant in the militancyin Churachandpur. Areas like Singngat, Thanlon, Henglep and Tipaimukhsub-divisions have been the worst affected. A number of civilians have also beenkilled, injured or maimed in landmine/ IED explosions. Separate data forChurachandpur is unavailable, but official data for the state indicates thatthree persons were killed and 30 were injured in 37 IED/mine blasts in 2004. Thesituation worsened in 2005 with 26 persons killed and 75 injured in 66 blasts.Till August 2006, there have been 33 incidents of IED/mine explosions, in which17 persons have been killed and 73 were injured. A bulk of these incidents hastaken place in Churachandpur district. The Hmar Students` Association, in fact,quotes much higher figures for the district, claiming that 81 persons have diedin landmine blasts and booby traps planted by militants at Tipaimukh betweenSeptember 2004 and January 2006. Recently, on August 15, 2006, a 57-year oldman, identified as Lalroshang was killed in a landmine explosion at Parbung. Ina muted official response, on September 18, 2006, the Manipur state LegislativeAssembly passed a resolution condemning the planting of IEDs/mines.

While Valley-based militantsappear to carry a mandate of sorts to target the non-Meitei population in the state, which is often implicitly endorsed by sections of the intelligentsia andhuman rights groups located in the Meitei dominated capital, Imphal, (this wasevident in the muted reaction that the mass rape incidents attracted in mainlandManipur), such violence is only a part of the narrative on militancy inChurachandpur. The hill based militant outfits are also responsible for asubstantial share of militancy-related excesses, and 13 of these groups operatein Churachandpur, each claiming to represent the rights of particular tribes.Incidentally, nine Kuki groups had signed a ‘cessation of hostilityagreement’ with the Union government in September 2005. That has, however,done little to lessen the spate of violence in the district.

Incidents of the tribal militants rising against atrocities on their own constituencies by Valley-based militants are surprisingly rare. In January 2006, the UNLF and the Hmar People’s Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) militants clashed in the Parbung area, and this resulted in the migration of the civilian population to Mizoram. On January 27, 2006, the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), in a statement, accused UNLF of pursuing divisive tactics among various tribal communities. On September 15, 2006, the obscure Hmar National Army (HNA) issued a Press Release with a warning that if the Manipur government failed to look into its demands of relief and rehabilitation facilities to the Hmar Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) within 45 days, it would be constrained to serve a ‘quit notice’ on the Meitei community in Churachandpur. The notice, however, was never served.

Such symbolic bravadonotwithstanding, internecine clashes among the tribal groups have brought aboutbigger miseries upon the people. Just the past six months several such incidentshave been witnessed:

April 18, 2006: HPC-D cadres killed Isaac L. Hmar, the ‘information secretary’ of the Hmar Inpui, a Hmar community- based organisation believed to be opposed to theHPC-D.

April 25, 2006: Two unidentified militants were killed and a civilian was critically wounded in an exchange of fire between cadres of two rival militant groups at Lhangjol village.

September 21, 2006: Three ZRA cadres were beaten to death after being abducted by rival cadres of the Kuki National Army (KNA) at Sielmat.

September 26, 2006: HPC-D militants killed two HNA cadres in the Khomoi village under Chuarachandpur police station saying that the HNA is "an organisation which the Hmar nationals did not accept".

Attacks on civilians have alsobeen common, and the more prominent of recent attacks include the killing of acivilian, Songkhotinthang alias Tinthang, at Bijang Buite Veng by the KukiNational Organisation (KNO) on April 22; the killing of a youth, GinpithangKipgen, at a place between Nengthal and Ngathal, by ZRA militants on June 30;and the killing of two civilians and injury to four others, when a group of ZRAcadres opened fire towards a crowded church, targeting a patrol party of theAssam Rifles at Vengnuom on August 20. These incidents are only the mostsignificant in widespread regimes of intimidation, extortion and quotidianviolence by terrorist groups across the district.

The situation in Churachandpuris part of the enveloping anarchy in Manipur, and must be blamed squarely on thecollapse of governance in the state. The problem here can by no means beattributed to a dearth of security personnel or resources. Compared to thenational average of 122 policemen per 100,000 population, Manipur has a ratio of535/100,000. In addition, the presence of the Army and para-military forces makeit one of the most heavily securitized states in the entire country— the expenditure on security is substantially underwritten by thecentre. With the state administration constantly surrendering to terrorist pressures over theyears, districts like Churachandpur can be expected to remain subject to cyclesof militancy in the foreseeable future.

Bibhu Prasad Routray isResearch Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia IntelligenceReview of the South Asia Terrorism Portal