'United States Should Not Take A Position'

It is an honor to be invited to share my views on the prospects for rapprochementbetween India and Pakistan, and the steps that America might take to strengthen thefledgling peace process now underway. The United States can and should do more—ithas mostly been a bystander—but in the final analysis it will be up to the Indians andPakistanis to determine whether their debilitating rivalry will continue for another fiftyyears. This rivalry is costly to them, but it also places important American interests atrisk.

Senator Lugar, you have asked me to address the internal dynamics in eachcountry that may be driving the current thaw, and to suggest how U.S. policy mightfurther encourage positive trends.

I am pleased to do so, but by way of background the following should be kept inmind.

The Historical Framework

On the face of it, the present thaw will not last. India-Pakistan relations havemoved from crisis to détente and back again for many decades.The most recent cycle began in 1987 with provocative Indian military exercisesdesigned, in part, to pre-emptively attack Pakistan’s fledgling nuclear program. Anothercrisis occurred in 1990, and a mini-war was fought in 1999 in the Kargil region ofKashmir. Two years ago, India again threatened a larger war, this time in response toterrorist attacks in Kashmir and on the Indian Parliament.

These crises have alternated with periods of normalization and even cordiality,marked by several summit meetings. After 1987 President Zia ul-Haq flew to India in agesture of reconciliation; after 1990 Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi crafted someconfidence-building measures (a few of which were implemented); and both before andafter the 1999 Kargil war India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee held summitmeetings with Pakistani leaders (Nawaz Sharif in Lahore, Musharraf in Agra). Finally,Vajpayee and Musharraf met in Islamabad last month in connection with a South AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit.

Lessons Learned

What are we to make of this pattern? I would suggest six lessons:

• India and Pakistan can reach agreement on ancillary issues,includingconfidence-building measures, but not on Kashmir’s final status;
  
  
• The introduction of nuclear weapons has been accompanied by alearningprocess in both states, and several of the crises were exacerbated by thenuclear factor;
  
  
• Negotiations take place at a moment when the two countries are inpolitical and strategic balance; they find themselves momentarily agreeingthat talks are worthwhile, but sooner or later one or the other sideconcludes that the risks of moving ahead are greater than the costs ofbreaking off discussions;
  
  
• In both countries there are powerful forces that oppose seriousnegotiations;
  
  
• Outside powers have played little, if any, role in advancing thedialogue;
  
  
• The United States has intervened several times in times of crisis,but neverdeveloped a strategy that might promote and sustain a real peace process

Domestic Dynamics: India

India has only two realistic choices in its relations with Pakistan. The first is adialogue that might lead to a settlement over Kashmir and other issues (especially trade)without changing core Indian policies; the second is a long-term strategy of containment,which would attempt to promote change within Pakistan while resisting Pakistanimilitary adventures. Two other strategies are now debated in India, but both seemunattractive: one is to completely ignore Pakistan, the other is to openly challengePakistan, forcing change and perhaps (as in 1971), its breakup.

There are senior Indian officers who advocate a "limited war" to teach Pakistan alesson. The 2002 crisis was a turning point: Indian generals could not promise that alimited war against Pakistan would not "go nuclear," and the political leadershipconcluded that the risks of such a war were too great.

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Vajpayee is the leading Indian proponent ofnormalization with Pakistan, first demonstrating this when he was Foreign Minister in theJanata Dal government in the 1970s. No dove, Vajpayee recognizes that India cannotemerge as a truly great Asian state if it is dragged down by the Kashmir conflict, and ifPakistan remains openly hostile to it. Vajpayee’s views are shared by the centristelements of the BJP, including the distinguished Foreign and Finance ministers,Yashwant Sinha and Jaswant Singh. Vajpayee’s standing is such that even his partyhardliners will not challenge him on foreign policy issues, although there are fringegroups that would attempt to end the Pakistan threat once and for all, by war if necessary.

My assessment is that Vajpayee’s initiative, which led to the Islamabad Summit,is serious, but that it is also convenient—burnishing his image as a statesman just beforehe leads his party into an important national election later this year.

Domestic Dynamics: Pakistan

Since 1947 Pakistan has sought to change Kashmir’s status quo or to bring Indiato the negotiating table by appealing to international opinion, and through resolutions inthe UN, a formidable legal effort, and the use of force—usually through proxies.. TheKashmir issue is embedded in the very idea of Pakistan, but it also has a strategicdimension: Pakistani generals are concerned that if India were not pressed in Kashmir, itsconventional military superiority over Pakistan would be overwhelming.Vajpayee’s improbable dialogue partner, Gen. Musharraf, is something of apuzzle. Musharraf lacks strategic vision, he is a bad listener and he believes that rulingPakistan is like running an army division: give the orders and they will be obeyed.

However, after four years he may have learned that this approach does not quite work.One suspects he is tired of water issues, sectarian rivalries and diplomatic double-talk.Even the strategy of using militants to force the Indians to the negotiating table has failed.Now that the militants are more interested in his death than victory in Kashmir, he mayhave second thoughts.

Such doubts are not peculiar to Gen. Musharraf. He represents a large civilmilitaryoligarchy, dubbed the "Establishment" by Pakistanis. This 800-1,000 stronggroup includes senior army commanders, bureaucrats, media leaders, politicians and evensome Islamists. They know Pakistan is failing, that an economic and military race with anexpanding India is a losing proposition and that Pakistan’s friends are unreliable. Theybelieve that once Afghanistan is stabilized and al-Qaeda mopped up, the Americans willdisappear, leaving Pakistan without a major ally. The once-reliable China, alarmed atPakistan’s support for Islamic radicals, is moving towards an understanding with Indiaover their border dispute even as India-China trade soars.

Prospects for Detente

Will Prime Minister Vajpayee’s "third and last chance" succeed? This time,concessions by both sides (more in language than in deed) have started a new peaceprocess. What will it take to bring it to the point where it is easier for the two sides tomove forward rather than backward? In six months, we will know whether the forces inboth India and Pakistan opposed to a South Asian peace initiative are able to sabotage theprocess. By then it will be feasible for militants to infiltrate into Indian-administeredKashmir from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, and the Indian election(scheduled for later this year) will have been concluded, probably with a fresh mandatefor Vajpayee. If the forthcoming talks between government officials do not show sign ofprogress then we may see a new crisis some time later this year.

Will India be able to provide Pakistan with the one thing its army desperatelyneeds, a reason to accept a border drawn through Kashmir? In the words of one Pakistaniofficer, the army understands it cannot wrest Kashmir from India, but it cannot turn itsback on a 55-year struggle. At stake is its pride, and it literally calls the shots. Indiansunderstand this, but many still observe "Chicago rules": the best time to kick a man iswhen he is down. But that only postpones the problem. India cannot afford a radicalPakistan as a neighbor and Gen. Musharraf, for all his shortcomings and bravado,represents the Pakistani establishment.

American Policy

While Secretary Powell has claimed credit for the present dialogue, the Americanrole has been officially downplayed by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. If there wasan important U.S. role, it should not have been the subject of a public boast so soon afterthe Islamabad Summit. However, a somewhat more active role is welcome, and longoverdue.While American officials have, since 1990, tried to play a role in bringingregional crises to a peaceful conclusion, there is no evidence that they have movedbeyond this to a more pro-active role. As the recent Council on Foreign Relations TaskForce advocates, the United States should have a more "forward leaning" posture on theKashmir conflict.

There are other ways in which Washington can be of help. In summary form,these are the six things that the United States can do:

• We should not be over-concerned about the stability of the Pakistaniregime. Musharraf's death would not bring chaos in Pakistan; Pakistan’soverall policies are not likely to change, they are rooted in the interests ofthe Establishment, especially the corps commanders who form an innercircle of power in the government.
  
  

• The United States can enrich and influence the internal Pakistanidebateon Kashmir’s future, but only if it has a presence on the ground. We haveabandoned the field to the radical Islamists and those who purport to see a "Christian-Jewish-Hindu" axis directed against Pakistan and the Muslimworld. We need to dramatically increase our information activities inPakistan, and our exchange programs with key Pakistan institutions,especially the universities and colleges where anti-Americanism is deeplyrooted.
  
  
• India itself needs to be encouraged to continue its policies ofnormalization with Pakistan, and with its Kashmiri citizens. India’sgreatest asset is its own rich and vibrant society. The United States shouldurge India to unilaterally expandaccess for Pakistan scholars, politicians,and media persons.
  
  
• Washington should strengthen the fledgling peace process byincreasingits funding for regional dialogues that now take place in various SAARCinstitutions and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in Colombo.
  
  
• Washington should also consult closely with its most importantallies.Besides providing technical expertise in border monitoring and otherconfidence-building mechanisms, America and its allies should use theiraid programs to reward India, Pakistan, and various Kashmiri groups forprogress in negotiations; they should also encourage Western andJapanese firms to invest in plants and companies that do business in bothcountries, further strengthening regional economic ties.
  
  
• Finally, the United States should not take a position on the shape of a finalsettlement of the Kashmir dispute, but let such a settlement emerge afterdialogue among the parties, including Kashmiris on both sides of theLOC. However, it should support the view that Kashmir is a human rightsissue, not merely one of territory or international law. This positionmaximizes the interests of all parties and would make a final settlementeasier: Pakistanis can claim their struggle resulted in more humanetreatment of the Kashmiri people, even if they do not join Pakistan orbecome independent; Indians will remove a blot on their democracy andthe Kashmiris, of course, will recover a semblance of normal life.

Stephen Philip Cohen is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the BrookingsInstitution and Adjunct Professor in the South Asia program at the School of AdvancedInternational Studies (SAIS).Dr. Cohen has written, co-authored, or edited ten books. The most recent are India:Emerging Power (2001) and The Idea of Pakistan and the Fate of a Troubled State (2004).Transcript courtesy, USCFR