The 'Self-Governance' Bogey

Many observers in Jammu and Kashmir(hereafter called Kashmir) believe today that the solution to the nearly 60-yearold problem may lie in self-governance. Before we explore the concept further,it is important to address what actually led to the 'Kashmir problem' in thefirst place: the fear of trans-nationalism.

This aspect is not much discussed,mainly because most of the relevant records were not available until veryrecently. In fact, many of "political and secret department records" from1947 that were prepared by the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) – nowcalled the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – were declassified about ten yearsago. The India Office Records, which used to be administered by the CRO, are nowadministered as Public Records in the British Library Asia, Pacific & AfricaCollections based in London. 

With honourable exceptions - to name two prominent authors, Alistair Lamb and ChandrashekharDasgupta - surprisingly, not many South Asianscholars have shown much eagerness to learn from these 50-year old papers thathave now been available for almost a decade. These documents allow the clearest view of how theWhitehall, British Military, CRO, Governor-General and Chairman of India’sNational Defense Committee, British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi,as well as Indian and Pakistani cabinet ministers,pondered publicly and privately on issues surrounding Kashmir before andafter it was invaded in 1947. 

And what do some of the declassifiedpapers show? For one, the role played by the Britishbureaucracy is abundantly clear in setting the markers for the British policy in the subcontinent withPhilip Noel-Baker, as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, leadingthe charge both in defining the approach related to Kashmir’s future and inprotecting British strategic interests in the subcontinent. But it was left tothe British High Commissioner in Pakistan, Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, who had thisto say about the Governor-General of India accepting the accession of Kashmir ina memorandum to Noel-Baker (reproduced from File L/P&S/1845 dated 29 October1947): 

"Indian government’s acceptance of accession of Kashmir is the heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle for existence. Strategically, the frontier of Pakistan which must be considered as requiring defense is very greatly extended since India would gain direct access to the North-West Frontier and tribal areas where infinite mischief can be made with "Pathanistan" or other slogans. Afghanistan policy will almost certainly change for the worse; and disturbances and disorders in Gilgit and the North West Frontier zone generally may excite Russian interests and appetites.^"

Indeed the British administration,while being generally supportive of the accession - but insisting on plebiscite- did believe that Indiancontrol of the western borderlands of the princely state (and especially thewestern region of Jammu) would pose a grave threat to Pakistan which could leadto Balkanization of West Pakistan, and would upset Britain's own strategic interestssince at that time the Whitehall and the Pakistani government were also activelydiscussing a military alliance that would maintain British military presence inthe north-west frontier region. 

Once the Indian counter-attack began onOctober 27, 1947 (five days after the Pakistani army and its surrogates hadlaunched the invasion into Kashmir), the British diplomatic and militarydirectives were mostly focused on securing Srinagar and retaking portions of theKashmir valley occupied by invaders, whereas the Indian army suddenly found it"difficult" to retake portions of Jammu region seized by the invading forcefrom Pakistan. The British held all the cards: Mountbatten, not Nehru, was thehead of India’s cabinet defense committee (a mistake by Nehru that isconsidered to be among his biggest blunders), and the military chiefs in Indiaand Pakistan were British nationals reporting to a British supreme commander.Political directives from the Whitehall to British civil and military officersin the subcontinent were precise in stating that India should be denied fullreoccupation of Maharaja’s princely state and a cease-fire should take placealong a well delineated boundary that disconnected Indian Kashmir from Pakistan. 

The declassified papers also clearlyshow how the British Prime Minister Atlee tricked Nehru in believing that Indianinitiative to approach the United Nations (UN) on the Kashmir aggression wouldbe followed up by vigorous effort on part of the British-led Indian Army toretake Poonch and Mirpur areas from Pakistani invaders, when in fact the Britishhad no such plans. Indian inexperience in international diplomacy and Britishcunning are two of the main messages that come through in the 50-year old secretdocuments. 

Another point which doesn't get as much attention as it deserves is theone relating to how the West's policy vis-a-vis Israel has also had an effect onKashmir. Consider, for example, the British Foreign Office minute to PrimeMinister Attlee of 6 January 1948, file FO 800/470, Public Record Office,London:

"With the situation as critical as it is in Palestine, Mr Bevin [the thenForeign Secretry] feels that we must be very careful to guard against the dangerof aligning the whole of Islam against us, which might be the case were Pakistanto obtain a false impression of our attitude in the Security Council.."

My point in all of this is that if onedoes not know this historical perspective, how is one to fully comprehendwhy the "Bus Service" linking Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir hasnot paid the kind of immediate dividends that many observers had hoped for? Inthe one year since the service was initiated on April 7, 2005, only 600 peoplehave availed of this service. Is it because it is extremely excruciating to getapproval for boarding the bus (as many would have you believe) or is it simplybecause there are just not that many "divided families" to begin with,notwithstanding the propaganda that vested interests have unleashed?  

The reality is that the line of control(LOC) is more or less a pretty clean division between various ethnic entitiesthat make up the old princely state and that the current boundary can sustainregional stability even when its political future is questioned. As borne out bythe history that includes four wars, the LOC provides military and geo-politicalstability in the subcontinent. Furthermore, travel across the LOC does representa major confidence building measure (CBM) as I will explain a bit later. 

Having linked the genesis of theKashmir problem to the fear of Pashtun trans-nationalism the British believedwould be unleashed if the "Frontier Gandhi" (Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who theBritish saw as being pro-India) was to have a sympathetic sponsor on the easternborders of Pakistan’s north-west frontier province (meaning Indian Kashmir),it is time to shift to possible solutions. 

Most policy analysts have their own "petapproaches" and I have experienced that first hand in Washington when I seescholars arguing for the "same old, same old" (i.e., "India needs to domore") solutions, when the writing on the wall is clear that any futuresolution to the Kashmir problem will be people-centric, rather thanland-centric, and apply equally to both parts of Kashmir. But one topic that is very hot these daysis self-governance.  

Therecent introduction of the concept of "self-governance" has a bit of ironichistory. It was preceded by the concept of "mutual demilitarization" andboth concepts most recently were proposed by General Pervez Musharraf, thePresident and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan. General Musharraf hasalready created new lexicology of political terms by redefining democracy, therule of law and the freedom of press in Pakistan. So it was only natural that hewould redefine other equally pertinent terms to suit his brand of governance. 

On October 8, 2005, parts ofPakistani-Administered Kashmir, especially around Muzaffarabad, were subjectedto a violent earthquake, and the loss of life and property was not only immense,but also well beyond Pakistani’s ability to manage. There were reports thatmany Kashmiri terrorist camps in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) were destroyedalong with Jihadi warriors occupying those training camps. 

As if to dispel the hopes of optimists,terrorists struck with vengeance in New Delhi on October 29, 2005, killing 62 people and wounding over 200. Indian securityofficials connected the outrage to operatives belonging to the Laskar-e-Toiba(LeT), an organization declared by the U.S. to be a foreign terroristorganization (FTO). The LeT is based in Lahore, Pakistan, and since being listedas FTO has conducted its operations under the name of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).It would be only natural for General Musharraf to create a convenient diversionto turn the focus away from the LeT which is known to have close links with thePakistan’s Military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).  

That is exactly what happened two dayslater on October 31, 2005. Popularly called the "Iftar Diplomacy,"since the General has a history of making dramatic announcements in his firstmeeting with the press after Ramadan, he proposed that bothIndia and Pakistan should demilitarize on their respective sides of Kashmir.Taken to task by India for indulging in public grandstanding rather than seriousbilateral diplomacy, the General quietly retreated to prepare for anotherweighty announcement at the next opportune moment. 

He did not have to wait long. In ameeting with visiting All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders from Srinagaron January 5, 2006, General Musharraf brought up the issue of self-governance.The press quoted him saying that, "For any solution to Kashmir to be durable,it has to be in accordance with wishes of Kashmiri people. I hope that Indiawould respond positively to Pakistan’s proposal to demilitarize the disputedHimalayan region and grant it self-governance."  

The Kashmiri visitors, who haveaccumulated considerable wealth for themselves and their clans while clamouringfor independence on the Indian side of Kashmir, were quick to pick up the new mantra.Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the leader of the visiting separatist delegation chimedin by saying, "the proposal for self-governance in Kashmir should beaddressed," though he could not say then or later what exactly was meant by"self-governance", considering that Indian Kashmir is governed by locallyelected officials who are predominantly Kashmiri Muslim politicians andadministrators and the state enjoys (relatively speaking) a great degree ofpolitical autonomy within India. 

I subsequently participated in a Voiceof America (VOA) Urdu program that brought together South Asian politicalanalysts from the US, Kashmir, India and Pakistan. No one could even guess whatGeneral Musharraf meant by self-governance during that discussion. I suggestedthat since the General does not feel any need for improvement on his side ofKashmir, it may be that General Musharraf’s models of self-governance were thepolitical instruments of governance in either the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)or the Northern Areas (NA). Let us examine those models and try to see if we cancome up with General Musharraf’s definition of self-governance. 

The two areas of Pakistan AdministeredKashmir – AJK and NA – follow differing models of governance. Areas ofGilgit and Baltistan were separated from the rest of the Pakistani heldterritory and were directly ruled by a Political Agent, a system that was inplace during the colonial rule. The AJK, on the other hand, had a Presidentialform of government, but until 1970 the President of AJK was appointed anddismissed by Pakistani officials. The first legislative assembly of AJK wasestablished in 1971. It passed the "Interim Constitution of Azad Kashmir Act,1974," that introduced a parliamentary system of governance by creating theAJK Legislative Assembly ("Lower House") and the AJK Council ("UpperHouse"). The Legislative Assembly currently has 49 seats and the Council iscomprised of 14 members. 

Superficially, it looks like a good workingarchitecture. That is until you look into thedetails. 

The AJK Council is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and itsVice-Chairman is the President of AJK. The Prime Minister of Pakistan appointsfive members of the Council among federal ministers and members of the NationalAssembly (all Pakistanis), the Prime Minister of AJK is an ex-officio member andthe rest are selected from the AJK Assembly.  

In the 49 seat Assembly, 41 are electeddirectly with 12 of those seats (30%) assigned to "refugees settled outside ofAJK", and the remaining 8 elected indirectly (five reserved for women, one each forreligious scholar, technocrat and an overseas expatriate). The 12 Mohajirseats based mostly in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar usually tilt thepolitical balance in the AJK politics, and there are times when some"desirable candidates" (desirable to the Pakistani military-supportedestablishment) who may face harsh prospects in AJK safely get elected from oneof the Mohajir seats. 

Laws passed by the AJK Council do nothave to be approved by the AJK Assembly, and they do not need the assent of thePresident of AJK. However, laws passed by the AJK Assembly have to be approvedby the Council and require Presidential assent. In reality the AJK Council is"managed" by the Federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and is so closelyassociated with the Pakistani government that most AJK citizens believe theCouncil probably meets in Islamabad since it is practically invisible inMuzaffarabad. The majority of the AJK citizens are mostly ignorant aboutworkings of the AJK Council that controls almost all official business and lawsthat affect daily lives of its people. 

AJK just conducted an election for theAssembly on July 11, 2006. The prospect of winning various Mohajir seatsattracted the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),and the People’s Muslim League (PML) to participate in the AJK elections, inaddition to regular players, namely, the Muslim Conference (MC) and the PakistanPeople’s party (PPP). Candidates from political parties that questionPakistani claims on Kashmir were disqualified. Amid allegations of rigging, MCwon 19 seats, PPP won 7 seats, PML won 4 seats, MQM won 2 seats, and the rest ofthe contested seats are scattered among independents and minor parties. In mostparliamentary institutions the legislative body is intended to be pluralistic soas to guard against the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the Islamabad establishment istaking no chances and  the Prime Minister, the President, the Speaker andthe Deputy Speaker all belong to the same party (MC) which enjoys fullconfidence of General Musharraf. 

But if the polity of Azad Jammu and Kashmir(AJK) is a shining example of self-governance, the self-governance in theNorthern Areas (NA) is worthy of a gold medal. 

The NA are officially known as Gilgitand Baltistan. Following the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, thePakistani government "negotiated" an instrument of governance within thePakistan-Administered Kashmir in April 1949. It is known as the "KarachiPact" and should not be confused with the "Karachi Agreement" signed onJuly 18, 1949 between India and Pakistan under auspices of the United NationsCommission for India and Pakistan. 

The Karachi Pact was signed by NawabMushtaq Gurmani, representing the government of Pakistan, Sardar Ibrahim Khan,representing the Azad Kashmir government, and Choudhry Ghulam Abbas,representing the MC. Two interesting observations are of interest:

First, norepresentative from the NA participated in this Pact and yet the deal was madeto put all affairs of the NA under the control of the "Political Agent"assigned by the government of Pakistan. 

Second, the Karachi Pact may not be anofficial document after all. Sardar Ibrahim Khan stated in a public gathering inLondon (in front of Dr. Shabir Choudhry and others) that he did not sign anysuch agreement. 

Indeed, my colleague Khalid Hasan of the Daily Times (Lahore),who once used to be part of the Pakistani political establishment, has more thanonce mentioned that the "so-called Karachi Agreement is of doubtfullegality" and "no copy of this Agreement exists in the governmentrecords." And yet it is true that the matters of life and death in the NA wereonce decided by a mere Joint Secretary in Pakistan’s Ministry of KashmirAffairs. 

In practice every Pakistani governmentsince 1949 has treated the NA as a colony of Pakistan, although some Pakistaniofficials after 1970 have claimed that these areas are a part of Pakistan. I saythis because for many years people in the NA were denied not only the right offranchise, but also the right of legal recourse to courts either in Pakistan orAJK. In effect, the people of the NA were denied their basic human rights bypoliticians and military rulers in Pakistan while the same leaders wereclamouring for wars of liberation to annex Indian Kashmir.  

Even though it was as early as in 1972that the AJK Assembly passed a resolution demanding the return of the NA fromPakistani direct control to AJK (this and many similar appeals were simplyignored by successive Pakistani governments), it was not until 1993 that thefull bench of the AJK High Court passed a verdict that the administrative systemof the NA is arbitrary, and its governance should be handed over to the AJKgovernment.  

The Pakistan government challenged thisorder in the "AJK Supreme Court," which came forth with a compromisedecision in 1994, holding that "the verdict we reach is that the NA are partof the J&K State but not part of AJK as defined by the Interim ConstitutionAct of 1974." The Pakistani government received an assuring nod that it cancontinue its policy of isolating the NA from AJK and maintain its directauthority over Gilgit and Baltistan.