'Saddam: Less Of A Danger Now Than Before 911' - II

Various questions are circulating among people worried about war and the imminent attack on Iraq. On August29, 2002, Michael Albert of Znet put a dozen of these toNoam Chomsky, via email. The first three were carried by us on September9 -- here are the remaining nine, concluding the interview which appears in full in the October edition ofZ magazine.

Some argue that there is ample justification for treating Iraq's potential for weapons of massdestruction differently from those of other countries because, under the terms of Security Council Resolution687, agreed to by Saddam Hussein, Iraq is to be disarmed, in part as punishment for its flagrant violation ofinternational law in invading Kuwait. Is the international community justified in trying to restrict Iraq'sweapons of mass destruction? If one accepts this argument, as put, what would be the internationalramifications? Is there a different version of this argument with better logic and methodology, and what wouldbe its implications?

As noted, 687 has other provisions, rather significant ones.

The invasion of Kuwait is one of Saddam's lesser crimes. It is not very different from one of the footnotesto US crimes in its own traditional domains: the invasion of Panama a few months earlier, which didn't haveeven a marginally credible pretext. The main difference is that the US could veto Security Council resolutionscondemning the invasion, disregard the harsh condemnations from the Latin American democracies (barelyreported), and basically do what it liked. 

It's all removed from sanitized history for the same reasons. As Imentioned, Washington feared that Saddam would emulate the Panama invasion and worked hard to prevent it. Inthe region itself, the invasion of Kuwait, criminal as it was, doesn't compare with the US-supported Israeliinvasion of Lebanon, which left some 20,000 dead. And it's embarrassingly easy to continue with much worsecases that we all know.

That aside, these arguments are somewhat beside the point. Those who believe that the Security Councilresolutions of a decade ago (which said nothing about use of force) indirectly authorize an invasion have avery easy way to prove that they are serious in that claim: they can urge the US to approach the SecurityCouncil for Chapter VII authorization to use force. That will settle the matter. Authorization could probablybe obtained: a veto is unlikely. 

But the US does not want such authorization, at least now, just as it refusedit when it chose to bomb Afghanistan, though authorization would surely have been given. For such reasonsalone, these discussions are irrelevant.

As for the "international community," in practice, it means the US and whoever will go along withit.

More generally, it would make good sense to try to implement the non-proliferation treaty, the chemical andbiological weapons treaties, and the relevant provisions of 687. And to proceed with more serious efforts atdisarmament across the board. But any such steps would require US acquiescence, a remote contingency unlessthere are significant changes here.

Hasn't the history of previous weapons inspections shown that weapons inspectors can be fooled,delayed, and otherwise prevented from actually accomplishing their task? Is there a viable inspections methodor related policy, and could it be applied universally?

Sure they can be fooled. However, the weapons inspections were vastly more effective than bombing indestroying Iraq's military capacities, and appear to have been largely successful. Going a step beyond, whenwas the last time there was a meaningful (or any) international inspection of Israel's nuclear and (probably)chemical weapons facilities? Or those of the US? Inspection regimes should be established, and universalized,but that again requires US acquiescence.

During the recent Congressional hearings on Iraq, one witness stated that for inspections to betruly effective, a rapid reaction military force would be needed, so that Saddam Hussein could not prevent theinspectors from making a surprise visit to some site where improper activity was going on. The witness saidthere's no way Iraq would agree to this, but by demanding such a force the U.S. would seize the high moralground. Is such a force a necessary component of an effective inspection regime? Would the U.S. be on highmoral ground? What reciprocal demands might others reasonably make of us?

Is the goal propaganda ("seizing the high moral ground")? Or reducing the threat of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD)? If the former, we can dismiss the matter. If the latter, some obvious questions arise.Weapons inspection appears to have been highly effective, even if imperfect. Scott Ritter's testimony on thetopic is compelling, and I know of no serious refutation of it.

Those who want to reduce the threat of WMDwill, therefore, try to create the conditions for meaningful inspection, as required by resolution 687 andearlier ones, and supported by the actual international community. For some years, the US has sought in everyway to block such eventualities. 

The inspections were used as a cover for spying on Iraq, with the open intentof overthrowing the regime and probably assassinating the leadership. Apart from the violation of elementarynorms, these practices were sure to undermine the inspections regime, and to sharply reduce the likelihoodthat Iraq would accept inspections. Would Israel agree to inspection of its military facilities by spies forHamas? 

In 1998, Clinton withdrew the inspectors in preparation for bombing -- acts that have beenreconstructed in propaganda as Iraqi expulsion of the inspectors. The US-UK bombing was carefully timed tocoincide with an emergency meeting of the Security Council on inspections, hence to demonstrate the uttercontempt of the enforcers for the UN. And the bombing was another blow to the renewal of inspections. 

Sincethen, Washington has been insisting that even if Iraq accepts the most intrusive inspections by American spiesseeking to prepare the ground for invasion, it will not make any difference. In Cheney's recent version,"A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam's] compliance with U.N.resolutions." This stance amounts to pleading with Iraq not to accept inspectors. 

It has been reported,not implausibly, that one reason why Washington forced out the highly respected director of the UNOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jose Bustani, was that he was seeking to arrangeinspections of chemical weapons in Iraq, thus interfering with Washington's efforts to prevent WMDinspections. 

The hypocrisy was particularly stunning, mainstream commentators pointed out, after the Bushadministration undermined the Chemical and Biological weapons conventions by refusing at the last minute toratify enforcement protocols, in part because of its opposition to arms agreements, in part to protectcommercial secrets of US corporations, and possibly in part to keep its own violations of the conventions fromtoo much exposure (though some has already leaked).

So back to the first question: is the goal to block inspections, or to expedite them? The witness, asquoted, evidently seeks to block them, and therefore need not be taken seriously. If, in contrast, the goal isto expedite inspections, then it's necessary to address the US government as well as Iraq.

Just to summarize quickly, WMD programs make the world a more dangerous place, Saddam's in particular. Andthe problem should be addressed in such a way as to make the world safer. The best approach would be global:treaties with meaningful provisions, and universal inspections to verify adherence to them. 

The next bestapproach would be something similar at a regional level. Both approaches would require US acquiescence, butthat's a remote contingency, at least right now. Sensible people should try to change that. The next bestapproach is to return inspectors to Iraq, alone. Every effort should be made to achieve that result -- atleast by those who hope to reduce serious threats, not just to find a pretext for war. 

The worst approachwould be to try to prevent the return of inspectors along the lines just discussed. That continues to be USpolicy, in an effort to set the stage for an invasion. The planned invasion will strike another blow at thestructure of international law and treaties that has been laboriously constructed over the years, in an effortto reduce the use of violence in the world, which has had such horrifying consequences. 

Apart from otherconsequences, an invasion is likely to encourage other countries to develop WMD, including a successor Iraqigovernment, and to lower the barriers against resort to force by others to achieve their objectives, includingRussia, India, and China.

It is sometimes said that Saddam Hussein wouldn't be crazy enough to launch a nuclear weapon at theU.S. or (more realistically) Israel, knowing the inevitable consequences. But wouldn't a nuclear-armed Iraq beable to conventionally attack weaker neighboring states, knowing that his victims could not successfully callon the U.S. (or even the UN) for assistance, because Washington would fear a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv?

All sorts of outlandish possibilities can be imagined. That's kept many people employed at Rand and otherthink-tanks ever since WMD became available. This is hardly one of the more credible examples. One reason isthat the situation will almost certainly not arise. The scenario assumes that Saddam has provided credibleevidence that he has WMD available and is capable of using them. Otherwise, such weapons are not a threat or adeterrent at all. 

But if there ever is any indication that he does have significant WMD capacity, he'll bewiped out before he can threaten anyone with invasion. Suppose, however, just to play the game, we accept theabsurd assumption that the US and Israel will just sit there quietly while Saddam brandishes WMD as apotential deterrent, in advance of the invasion of some other country. Then the US and Israel would instantlyrespond to the invasion, expelling him (and probably destroying Iraq). His WMD would be no deterrent at all. 

Asufficient reason is that to allow his invasion to succeed would leave him as a far greater threat.Furthermore, it would be assumed that he would not use whatever WMD capacity he has because that would meaninstant suicide, and if he was bent on suicide he would have used his WMD against Israel (or someone else)even before invading another country. The scenario has such slight plausibility that it is hardly worthconsidering in comparison with real problems that do not have to be conjured up by fevered imaginations.

If one wants to play such games, why not take some more plausible scenarios. Here's one. Suppose that theUS shifts policy and joins the international consensus on a two-state Israel-Palestine settlement. Suppose,for example, the US endorses the recent Saudi plan adopted by the Arab League. 

Suppose Israel reacts bythreatening the US -- not threatening to bomb it, but in other ways. For example, suppose Israel sends bombersover the Saudi oil fields (maybe nuclear armed, but that's unnecessary), just to indicate what it can do tothe world if the US doesn't get on board again. It would be too late to react, because Israel could then carryout its warnings. That scenario has a certain plausibility because apparently it actually happened, 20 yearsago, when the Saudi government floated a similar plan, violently opposed by Israel. 

According to the Israelipress, Israel reacted by sending bombers over the oil fields, as a warning to the US, but one that wasunnecessary because the Reagan administration joined Israel in rejecting that possibility for a politicalsettlement, as it has consistently done. True, Israel might have been facing destruction, but one might arguethat Israel's strategy allows that possibility. 

As far back as the 1950s, leaders of the then-ruling LaborParty advised that Israel should "go crazy" if the US wouldn't go along with its demands, and the"Samson complex" has been an element of planning -- how seriously, we don't know -- ever since. Sowe should bomb Israel right away, before it has a chance to carry out these evil plots.

Do I believe any of this? Of course not. It's nonsensical. However, it doesn't compare too badly with thescenario about Iraq.

It should be added that there are circumstances under which Saddam might use WMD, assuming he has thecapacity. If Iraq is invaded with the clear intention of capturing or more likely killing him, he would haveevery incentive to go for broke, since he'd have nothing to lose. But it is hard to imagine othercircumstances.

How will the Iraqi people react to a U.S. attack on Iraq? What are the likely humanitarianconsequences of a U.S. war?

No one has a clue. Not Donald Rumsfeld, not me, no one. One can imagine a delightful scenario: a few bombsfall, the Republican Guards rebel and overthrow Saddam, crowds cheer as US soldiers march in while the bandplays "God Bless America," the people of the region hail the liberator who proceeds to turn Iraqinto an image of American democracy and a modernizing center for the entire region -- and one that producesjust enough oil to keep the price within the range that the US prefers, breaking the OPEC stranglehold. 

AndSanta Claus smiles benignly from his sleigh. One can easily imagine rather more grim outcomes. That's a normalconcomitant of the decision to resort to massive violence, and one of the many reasons why those who advocatethat course have a very heavy burden of proof to bear. Needless to say, neither Rumsfeld nor Cheney nor any ofthe intellectuals urging war against Iraq have remotely begun to meet this burden.

What in your view are the true motives propelling a possible war?

There are longstanding background reasons, which are well known. Iraq has the second largest oil reservesin the world. It has always been likely that sooner or later, the US would try to restore this enormous prizeto Western control, meaning now US control, denying privileged access to others. But those considerations haveheld for years. 9-11 offered new opportunities to pursue these goals under the pretext of a "war onterror" -- thin pretexts, but probably sufficient for propaganda purposes.

The planned war can serveimmediate domestic needs as well. It's hardly a secret that the Bush administration is carrying out an assaultagainst the general population and future generations in the interest of narrow sectors of wealth and powerthat it serves with loyalty that exceeds even the usual norms. Under those circumstances, it is surelyadvisable to divert attention away from health care, social security, deficits, destruction of theenvironment, development of new weapons systems that may literally threaten survival, and a long list of otherunwelcome topics. 

The traditional, and reasonable, device is to terrify the population. "The whole aim ofpractical politics," the great American satirist H. L. Mencken once said, is "to keep the publicalarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all ofthem imaginary." 

In fact the menaces invoked are rarely imaginary, though they are typically inflatedbeyond all reason. That's a good part of the history of "practical politics," not only here ofcourse. It doesn't take much skill to evoke an image of Saddam Hussein as the ultimate force of evil about todestroy the world, maybe the universe. And with the population huddling in fear as our gallant forcesmiraculously overcome this awesome foe, perhaps they won't pay attention to what is being done to them, andmay even join the chorus of distinguished intellectuals chanting praises for Our Leaders. 

The US preponderanceof power is so extraordinary that there will be plenty in reserve if things seem to be going wrong. And ifthat happens down the road, it can all be shovelled deep into the memory hole, or blamed on someone else, ormaybe on our naive faith that others are as benign as we are. It's pretty easy: there's a treasure trove ofexperience to draw from.

Some advocates of war have suggested that if the economic sanctions on Iraq are as horrible as theleft claims, then a war, even a war that killed 100,000 civilians, would be a humanitarian blessing, since,presumably, after a U.S. victory there would be no more sanctions. How do you answer this argument?

I've heard some zany arguments in the past, but this must break some new records. I suspect it was offeredtongue in cheek. Note first the conception of "the left": the UN's humanitarian coordinators (DenisHalliday, Hans van Sponeck) who know more about the country than anyone else, UNICEF, etc. It's a bit likesaying that the left is concerned about global warming -- and tells us something about where those whoquestion "the claim" place themselves on the political spectrum.

But that aside, the argument does have appeal. For example, we could offer Iran assistance in conqueringIsrael and carrying out appropriate "regime change," so that suicide bombings would stop. Since thewar advocates doubtless regard suicide bombing as atrocious, they should be calling for that. Or, we couldhelp Russia grind Chechnya to dust, so that Chechens would no longer have to suffer Russian terror andatrocities. The possibilities are endless.

What will the implications of war be in the Mideast, and also other parts of the world? Do U.S.elites care?

Elites of course care, though the small group that holds the reins of power currently may not care verymuch. They evidently believe that they have such overwhelming force at their command that it doesn't reallymatter much what others think: if they don't go along, they'll be dismissed, or if they are in the way,pulverized.