'Proliferation Cannot Be Tolerated'

Full text of the speech by President George W. Bush on Weapons of MassDestruction Proliferation at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. on February 11, 2004

Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National DefenseUniversity. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here have helped toprepare America for the changing threats to our national security. Today, themen and women of our National Defense University are helping to frame thestrategies through which we are fighting and winning the war on terror. YourCenter for Counterproliferation Research and your other institutes and collegesare providing vital insight into the dangers of a new era. I want to thank eachone of you for devoting your talents and your energy to the service of our greatnation.

I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I used to jog bythis facility on a regular basis. Then my age kicked in. I appreciate AmbassadorWolfgang Ischinger, from Germany. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being heretoday. I see my friend, George Shultz, a distinguished public servant and truepatriot, with us. George, thank you for coming; and Charlotte, it's good to seeyou. I'm so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I appreciateyou taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with you, aswell. I appreciate the veterans who are here and those on active duty. Thanksfor letting me come by.

On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new kind ofwar. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could inflict upon ourcountry, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19 airline tickets. Thoseattacks also raised the prospect of even worse dangers -- of other weapons inthe hands of other men. The greatest threat before humanity today is thepossibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological orradiological or nuclear weapons.

In the past, enemies of America required massed armies, and great navies,powerful air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies atrisk. In the Cold War, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of massdestruction, but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. Whathas changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons ofmass destruction would be a first resort -- the preferred means to further theirideology of suicide and random murder. These terrible weapons are becomingeasier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of abiological agent or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, orfailing states, could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten theworld peace.

America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades tocome. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I havemade clear to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terroristsand dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons.

We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will stop theseweapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from being transferred.We'll prevent them from ever being used. One source of these weapons isdangerous and secretive regimes that build weapons of mass destruction tointimidate their neighbors and force their influence upon the world. Thesenations pose different challenges; they require different strategies.

The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass destructionagainst his own people. For 12 years, he defied the will of the internationalcommunity. He refused to disarm or account for his illegal weapons and programs.He doubted our resolve to enforce our word -- and now he sits in a prison cell,while his country moves toward a democratic future.

To Iraq's east, the government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a uraniumenrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear weapons. The UnitedStates is working with our allies and the International Atomic Energy Agency toensure that Iran meets its commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons.

In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-rangeballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and nowthreatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia, America isinsisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantleits nuclear programs.

America has consistently brought these threats to the attention ofinternational organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to answerthem. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these threats. I willcontinue to call upon the world to confront these dangers, and to end them.

In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear, as well.America and other nations are learning more about black-market operatives whodeal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. Thesedealers are motivated by greed, or fanaticism, or both. They find eagercustomers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions for the parts and plans theyneed to speed up their weapons programs. And with deadly technology andexpertise going on the market, there's the terrible possibility that terroristsgroups could obtain the ultimate weapons they desire most.

The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the case of aman named Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it so far.

A. Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's nuclearweapons program. What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he alsoled an extensive international network for the proliferation of nucleartechnology and know-how.

For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning amodest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through thesale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching fromNorth Africa to the Korean Peninsula.

A. Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as directorof the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman.Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and tosell his expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges toenrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistanigovernment. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifugeprocess can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and hisassociates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan'solder centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models.The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases,with complete centrifuges.

To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysiato manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchasedthrough network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Theseprocurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut topersonal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firmsinto selling them tightly controlled materials.

Khan's deputy -- a man named B.S.A. Tahir -- ran SMB computers, a business inDubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferationactivities of the A. Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chieffinancial officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using hiscomputer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients.Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistanidesigns, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahiralso arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transitthrough Dubai for shipment to other customers.

This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years byAmerican and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services graduallyuncovered this network's reach, and identified its key experts and agents andmoney men. Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of itsoperations. They monitored the travel of A. Q. Khan and senior associates. Theyshadowed members of the network around the world, they recorded theirconversations, they penetrated their operations, we've uncovered their secrets.This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hardwork and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals.

Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khannetwork, and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A. Q. Khan has confessedhis crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The government ofPakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning critical details thatwill help them prevent it from ever operating again. President Musharraf haspromised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network, and hasassured us that his country will never again be a source of proliferation.

Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities.Malaysian authorities have assured us that the factory the network used is nolonger producing centrifuge parts. Other members of the network remain at large.One by one, they will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will beended.

As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the Britishintelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured atthe Malaysia facility. We followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, andwatched as they were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. Afterthe ship passed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped byGerman and Italian authorities. They found several containers, each forty feetin length, listed on the ship's manifest as full of "used machineparts." In fact, these containers were filled with parts of sophisticatedcentrifuges.

The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and Americanofficials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its WMD programs. TheUnited States and Britain confronted Libyan officials with this evidence of anactive and illegal nuclear program. About two months ago, Libya's leadervoluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons programs, not topursue biological weapons, and to permit thorough inspections by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons. We're now working in partnership with these organizations andwith the United Kingdom to help the government of Libya dismantle those programsand eliminate all dangerous materials.

Colonel Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once hiscommitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example.Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with theUnited States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will notbring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economichardship, and other unwelcome consequences.

We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network. Othercountries expressed great interest in their services. These regimes and otherproliferators like Khan should know: We and our friends are determined toprotect our people and the world from proliferation.

Breaking this network is one major success in a broad-based effort to stopthe spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the threats ofa new era. America and the nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy andJapan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom havelaunched the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials intransit. Our nations are sharing intelligence information, tracking suspectinternational cargo, conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared tosearch planes and ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raiseproliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo on theBBC China before it reached Libya. Three more governments -- Canada andSingapore and Norway -- will be participating in this initiative. We'll continueto expand the core group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators willfind it harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.

There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated.Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Everycivilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of massdestruction. These materials and technologies, and the people who traffic inthem, cross many borders. To stop this trade, the nations of the world must bestrong and determined. We must work together, we must act effectively. Today, Iannounce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts to stop the spread ofdeadly weapons.

First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative beexpanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the toolswe've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action againstproliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligenceand military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants andother willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring tojustice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seizetheir materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will findthe middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers. Our message to proliferators mustbe consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we're not going torest until you are stopped.

Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and internationalcontrols that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a newSecurity Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation,enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within theirborders. The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly. And when theydo, America stands ready to help other governments to draft and enforce the newlaws that will help us deal with proliferation.

Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War andother dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991, Congress passed theNunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with SenatorNunn, about what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this program, we'rehelping former Soviet states find productive employment for former weaponsscientists. We're dismantling, destroying and securing weapons and materialsleft over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there.

And as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide $20 billionover 10 years -- half of it from the United States -- to support such programs.We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will retain [sic]WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. We will helpnations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. I urge morenations to contribute to these efforts. The nations of the world must do all wecan to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiologicalmaterials.

As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent governments fromdeveloping nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty was designed more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclearweapons beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this treaty,nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energyif they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loopholewhich has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimesare allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs underthe cover of civilian nuclear programs.

So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole. The worldmust create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants withoutadding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclearexporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost tofuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment andreprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seekingto harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.