'Misunderestimating' The Maoists

Once again, the rampaging Maoist movement has violently drawn attention toitself with a succession of daring and bloody attacks that go to the very coreof governance, the credibility of administration, and the sagacity of politicalleadership across extended areas along India's eastern board. The mostsignificant of these was the February 28 landmine blast in Dantewadain Chattisgarh that killed, accordingto the official record, 26 villagers and injured another 40, while they werereturning in trucks after a meeting of the state-sponsored anti-Maoist SalvaJudum campaign. Whilethis was probably the worst attack in the history of the Maoist movement, thecurrent year has already seen a significant number of major Maoist operations:

February 6, 2006: Ten Nagaland Armed Police personnel were killed andeight injured when a powerful landmine exploded as their vehicle was movingthrough a forest in Dantewada District, Chhattisgarh.

February 9, 2006: Eight Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)personnel were killed and several others injured when a large group of CommunistParty of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)cadres attacked the National Mineral Development Corporation store in theHirauli area of Dantewada District. Mining officials feared that about 50 tonnesof explosives were looted.

February 28, 2006: 26 tribals were killed and 40 others sustainedinjuries in a landmine blast triggered near Eklagoda Village, in thejurisdiction of Errabore police station of Dantewada District, when they werereturning from an anti-Maoist Salva Judum meeting in two trucks and abus.

March 3, 2006: Maoist cadres, mainly women, posing as marriage partyrevelers, attacked a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) camp and a policeoutpost near Chandrapura in Bokaro District, Jharkhand, killing seven SecurityForce (SF) personnel.

March 5, 2006: Over 100 Maoist cadres attacked the Umaria Police Stationin Bihar, close to the Jharkhand border, damaging the police station andadjoining residences. Three Maoists were killed and two policemen injured in theattack.

March 5, 2006: Maoists blew up a major portion of the Bhansi RailwayStation in Dantewada District. A railway engine and a major portion of theplatform were damaged, but no person was killed.

By the end of February, a total of 115 persons had already been killed inMaoist violence in 2006, including 61 civilians and 28 SF personnel �" withChhattisgarh accounting for the largest number, 74, including 49 civilians and22 SF personnel.

This Maoist onslaught comes after another crucial year has been lost tovacillation, incoherence and neglect, as the steady creep of Maoist extremismcontinued across wide swathes of the country, penetrating unexpected areas withan array of unsettling tactics. On February 21, 2006, Minister of state forHome, Sri Prakash Jaiswal, conceded in Parliament that Maoist violence hadincreased dramatically in 2005, with 892 persons killed (516 civilians, 153police personnel and 223 Maoists), compared to 653 persons (466 civilians, 100police personnel and 87 Maoists) killed in 2004. The enhanced lethality of theMaoist conflict was demonstrated by the fact that, while incidents of Maoistviolence had increased by just four per cent between 2004 and 2005, totalfatalities registered an increase of nearly 37 per cent.

The growing audacity of the Maoists has been reflected in actions involvinghundreds, and occasionally thousands, of cadres in operations that increasinglymimic the now-established tactics of their Nepali counterparts, involvingcoordinated attacks on police stations and posts, as well as on administrativeheadquarters and well-guarded government establishments. The first of these "at that time an extraordinary" attacks occurred in Koraput, Orissa, inFebruary 2004, when a few hundred cadre overran the District Headquarters,including the City Police Station, the Sadar (town) Police Camp, theOffice of the District Superintendent of Police, the Treasury and the OrissaSpecial Armed Police 3rd Battalion centre; simultaneous attacks were alsolaunched on three police stations at Laxmipur, Narayanpatna and Kakriguma, allin the Koraput District. The Maoists looted some 200 weapons and killed four SFpersonnel in this raid.

While there were lesser experiments of this nature thereafter, the JehanabadJailbreak set a new benchmark on November 13, 2005, in the midst of theprocesses for the Legislative Assembly Elections in Bihar. An estimated 200Maoist 'hard core' cadre, backed by over 800 'sympathisers', attackedthe Jehanabad District Jail, freeing 341 prisoners and abducting more than 20activists of the Ranvir Sena (a private militia of upper caste landlords), andlooting a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Seven persons (three Maoists,two Ranvir Sena cadre and two police personnel) were killed in this attack. TheMaoists subsequently executed nine of the abducted Ranvir Sena cadre. TheMaoists took control of all the entry and exit points to the town, and carriedout simultaneous attacks on the District Court, Police Lines, District Armoury,the residence of the District Judge, and the SS College, where a Para-MilitaryForces Camp had been set up.

Earlier, on November 11, over a hundred Maoists had attacked a Home GuardTraining centre at Pachamba in the Giridih District of neighbouring Jharkhand,killing five persons and decamping with 183 rifles, some pistols and asubstantial cache of ammunition.

June 23, 2005, had also witnessed synchronized attacks across nine locationsin the Madhuban Block of the East Champaran District, Bihar, when large groupsof Maoists attacked the Police Station, Block Ofice, Post Office, two Banks, aPetrol Pump, and the homes of Rashtriya Janata Dal Member of Parliament from theSheohar constituency, Sitaram Singh, and two supporters. The resultinggun-battle spilled over into the neighbouring Sheohar and Sitamarhi Districts,and twenty Maoists, four SF personnel and two civilians were dead by the timethe assault ended.

The Jehanabad Jailbreak represented a major tactical shift in the Maoiststrategy. As a Maoist Press Release on November 14, 2005, declaimed, theJehanabad attack demonstrated that,

…the well-equipped, well-trained, and numerically superior mercenary enemy forces can be dealt heavy blows by a numerically weaker but determined, fearless and politically motivated armed force of the people through concrete survey of the weak points of the enemy force, meticulous planning and effective execution based on the principle of taking on the enemy through surprise at lightening speed.

The Press Release declared, further,

The guerrilla forces of our Party as well as the revolutionary masses of our country have to undertake more and more such actions in a big way so as to strengthen the guerrilla armies and to transform them into the People's Liberation Army in due course. Vast masses have to be mobilised to expand and deepen the ongoing people's war in our country.

The increasing effectiveness and organization reflected in the Maoist attackshas worried SF leaders. J.K. Sinha, the Director General of the Central ReservePolice Force (CRPF), which has its personnel deployed across all the Maoistafflicted states, admitted, "We are not much concerned about 20 small acts ofviolence because these activities can be controlled by us, but the biggerattacks are worrisome… They (the Maoists) are now trying the ambush our men sothey can have the maximum impact on the morale of the Force."

In the meanwhile, state responses grind on in the established rut, throwingmore men and more money into the conflagration, with little concern forstrategic consistency, operational efficiency, or effective coordination. Largeamounts of money have been allocated by the centre to the states for Policemodernization, but remain largely unused, or are misdirected into otherexpenditure. In May 2005, Jaiswal complained: "The money is under-utilizeddespite the centre relaxing norms and by reducing amount of matching grantswhich have to be given by the states from 50 to 40 per cent, 40 to 25 per cent,and 25 to cent per cent (sic)". Utilization of funds was particularlypoor in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.Jharkhand, for instance, received Rs. 360 million for police modernization forthe period 2005-2006, but till the end of December 2005 had utilized just Rs. 20million. In the meanwhile, Police proposals to purchase 15 anti-landminevehicles were on hold because of 'lack of funds', many of the state's 400police stations were housed in decrepit hired buildings, and funds intended forthe modernisation programme were diverted to buy luxury cars for state Ministersand bureaucrats.

In July 2005, after the breakdown of the talks between the Maoists and the stategovernment in Andhra Pradesh, the Task Force on Naxalism declared a policy of 'zerotolerance' towards the Maoists, unlessthey gave up arms. However, reflecting a habitual confusion, the Task Forcesimultaneously encouraged affected states to initiate talks with the Maoists 'providedthey are within the legal framework' (though it is not clear how talks with ananti-state group that has been responsible for killing thousands of civiliansand security personnel can be 'within the legal framework').

A Naxalite Coordination Centre has been established under the union home ministry, with the National Coordination Committee (NCC) as part of it, sinceJune 1998. There is, however, little evidence of coordination between thevarious states afflicted by the Maoist terror. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister RamanSingh observed, for instance, "Some states want to hold talks with them. Somewould like to take a tough stand. Such individual policies are not going tohelp."

Worse, the Constitutional scheme, which places law and order managementsquarely within the purview of the states' jurisdiction, clearly obstructs anyenlargement of the Central role, even as it undermines effective cooperationbetween often-fractious states ruled by polarized political formations. Afterthe February 28, 2006, landmine explosion that killed 26 tribals in Chhattisgarh,union home minister Shivraj Patil stated in Parliament, on March 1, 2006, "Weare all responsible; we are all sorry." Nevertheless, he noted further thatthe centre had given prior information to the state government regarding such anincident, and that the centre was 'extending all cooperation and had alsodrawn plans with adjoining states'. Further, 26,000 central police personnelwere already 'at the disposal of the states. However, 'it was for the statesto utilize these forces and the centre would not like to direct them, since itwould amount to interference'.

It is not clear how this unwieldy scheme can lend itself to effectiveoperational coordination against as highly motivated, relentlessly violent andstrategically oriented an adversary as the Maoists. Even as Patil apologized inParliament for the February 28 incident, and as criticism of the Salva Judumcampaign mounted across the country, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singhdeclared that the Salva Judum 'would continue' despite the attack: "The government will redesign the strategy and give a new direction to thecampaign," he said, while describing the Maoist attack as "desperate andcowardly".

While the state continues to flounder in confusion, taking refuge in clichésabout terrorist 'desperation' and 'cowardice', there is clear andaccumulating evidence that the Maoists are work according to a coherentlong-term plan. The continuous extension of the sphere and effectiveness ofviolent activities is, no doubt, the most dramatic manifestation of thisstrategy, but it does not exhaust it.

In West Bengal, where Maoist activitiescurrently remain at a low key, a Maoist 'central committee member'identified as 'Comrade Dhruba' explained in July 2005 that, apart fromBankura, Purulia and Medinipur Districts, "our mass base in Murshidabad, Malda,Burdwan and Nadia is ready. After five years, we will launch our strikes."These are the time frames of execution of a methodical and detailed strategythat is currently being executed across large areas of the country that are notcurrently afflicted by Maoist violence, and that are in still in the initialstages of 'mass political mobilization'.

Across these areas, securityprofessionals remain largely oblivious to the dangers, till the stage ofviolence is actually reached "years after the consolidation of the Maoist 'massbase'. Regrettably, apart from throwing in more resources" manpower andfunds" into areas afflicted by high levels of violence, and generaldeclarations of intent regarding economic development, and political and landreforms, there appears to be no coherent or consistent strategy to contain thesystematic extension of the Maoist advance, and no accurate and consistentlyheld assessment articulated within the national policy establishment of themagnitude of the danger to national security.

The dangerous delusion that thisis an 'internal problem' that can be 'easily contained' does not appearto have been diluted in any measure by the many decades across which the countryhas failed abysmally to contain the menace of Left Wing extremism and violence

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for ConflictManagement. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal