Full text of the inaugural address by external affairs minister K. Natwar Singh,at the Conference on "Emerging Nuclear Proliferation Challenges"Organised by IDSA and Pugwash - India under the theme "India and theNPT", New Delhi
It gives me great pleasure to inaugurate the seminar on "EmergingNuclear Proliferation Challenges" jointly organised by the Institute ofDefence Studies and Analysis and Pugwash India Conference. Theinstances of onward proliferation which have come to light in the lasttwo years and the growth and spread of international terrorism lend asense of urgency to these discussions. The fact that this Conference isbeing held a few weeks before the Seventh Review Conference of theNon-Proliferation Treaty makes this initiative timely as well asrelevant to the principal concerns of our time.
The non-proliferation order is coming under increasing stress both onaccount of the failure to make any significant progress towards nucleardisarmament as well as the failure to prevent clandestine proliferationby members of the Non Proliferation Treaty as well as some who areoutside it. The infirmities of the non-proliferation order have imposedcosts on India and have had an adverse impact on our security, as muchof the clandestine proliferation which is today the focus of attentionhas tended to flow into or emanate from our neighbourhood. The responseof the international community over the years has been, from our pointof view, inadequate at best or permissive at worst, leading to thepresent adverse situation. Unfortunately, even today we see the sameinconsistencies in approach with selective focus on the recipients ofsuch clandestine proliferation but not enough attention on the sourcesof supply. This uneven approach does not lend credence to the resolveof the international community to deal seriously with this issue.
India has an abiding interest in non-proliferation of Weapons of MassDestruction not just for its own security but for peace and security ofthe world at large. It is now little remembered that India was amongstthe initiators of the proposal for an international instrument toprevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We held, however, thatsuch an instrument should involve not only a commitment by non-nuclearweapon States to abjure nuclear weapons but also a commitment fromthose in possession of nuclear weapons to cease the further productionof fissile material for weapon purposes and to move towards completeelimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. TheTreaty, as it eventually emerged, unfortunately addressed only one partof the proliferation challenge.
During Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure, India again took a majorinitiative in 1988 in presenting an Action Plan for the eventual andcomplete elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound manner.However, this practical and non-discriminatory proposal did not findfavour with those possessing nuclear weapon arsenals.
The end of the Cold War, bringing with it an end to the nuclearconfrontation between the two super powers, once again presented aunique opportunity to move forward in the direction of reducing andeliminating nuclear weapons. These hopes have, however, been belied andinstead of progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament there has beenin general a move to reassert the primacy of nuclear weapons in thesecurity calculus of states, especially those with the largest nucleararsenals. New doctrines and justification for use of nuclear weaponshave been developed. Such an attitude feeds and strengthens the beliefthat nuclear weapons are a currency of power. These developments alsoraise a question: Are we going to see a new nuclear weapons race? Whileit may be premature to call it that at present, the fact remains thatthis is not a welcome development for achieving nuclear disarmament andby extension the goal of non-proliferation.
India may not be a party to the NPT, but, our conduct has always beenconsistent with the key provisions of the Treaty as they apply tonuclear weapon States. Article I of the NPT obliges a nuclear weaponstate not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country or to assistany other country to acquire them. India’s record in this regard isimpeccable and a matter of public knowledge. This is in contrast to thepoor record of some of the nuclear weapon States who have been activecollaborators in, or silent spectators to, continuing clandestine andillegal proliferation, including export of nuclear weapon componentsand technology. Article III requires a party to the Treaty to providenuclear materials and related equipment to any other country only undersafeguards. India’s policies of international cooperation in thenuclear field have always conformed to this principle. Article VIcommits the parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations to bring abouteventual global nuclear disarmament. India is not only committed tocommencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, it is alsothe only nuclear weapon State ready to do so.
India is a responsible nuclear power that practices a policy of utmostrestraint. We have announced a policy of no first use and non-useagainst non-nuclear weapon states, providing thereby negative securityassurance to all non-nuclear weapon states. We have repeatedly declaredthat we shall maintain only a minimum credible deterrent. We havestated that the role of India’s nuclear weapons is entirely defensive.Our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests continues to remain in place.
Friends, it is our view that if the emerging proliferation challengesare to be effectively addressed, the international community shouldreview and re-evaluate existing frameworks with a view to adapting themto current political realities. There needs to be a realization thattreating existing non proliferation structures in inflexibleideological terms, as though they were cast in stone, will yieldlimited results. There is a need for a mind set change in dealing withemerging nuclear proliferation challenges. Approaches which have failedto restrain, let alone punish those guilty of proliferation need to bereplaced by a new framework which, on the one hand, is effective incurbing proliferation and, at the same time, does not inhibitlegitimate cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy by stateswhose non-proliferation records are beyond doubt.
As I said in the beginning, we have a shared interest in preventingproliferation, since our security has been undermined by suchproliferation. We remain ready to work towards this objective in amanner consistent with the requirements of our national security. Fromour perspective, to meet these challenges several steps would need tobe taken, as part of a composite whole, rather than in isolation as theissues are inter-linked.
The first step should be a reaffirmation by the nuclear weapon Statesof their commitment towards irreversible and verifiable cuts in theirnuclear arsenals and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. This cannotbe just an articulation of mere rhetoric but would have to be matchedby concrete action. Our goal should be to have a universally applicableand multilateral Nuclear Weapons Convention similar to the one adoptedin the case of Chemical Weapons. India remains ready to participate inagreed and irreversible steps to prepare the ground for such aConvention. During the Cold War, it was said that a ‘nuclear war cannotbe won and must not be fought’. The need now for all the nuclear weaponStates is to reaffirm this logic.
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In parallel to this reaffirmation,the nuclear weapon States should take visible steps to reduce thesalience of nuclear weapons in their strategic calculus. Since nuclearweapons are not really usable, efforts should be directed at takingsteps, in the first instance, towards reducing their importance insecurity approaches. India believes in this approach and has thereforefollowed a policy of "No First Use". A step in this direction would bea global No-First-Use agreement. An agreement by Nuclear Weapon Statesruling out the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon stateswould also be an important step. The nuclear weapon States should alsotake practical steps to lower the alert status, through gradualde-alerting actions of their strategic weapons, consistent with thedefensive role of nuclear weapons. Such concrete steps would reaffirmthe solemn commitment of the international community, in particularnuclear weapons States, to nuclear disarmament and mark concreteprogress in that direction.
The tendency so far has been to work on an exclusivist approach. Suchan approach, we have witnessed, has neither succeeded in stopping, norin punishing, those who are guilty of proliferation, either as a sourceor a recipient. Quite the contrary, it has led to putting undueconstraints on those who are responsible and who have followedtransparent policies. The international community needs to discard theold mindset and acknowledge the record of states, like India, who haveproved time and again that they are reliable partners in the globaleffort to ensure non-proliferation.
India has developed a comprehensive indigenous infrastructure and apool of skilled manpower in the nuclear sector, to meet both its energyrequirements generated by the development aspirations of a billionpeople as well as to enhance national security. India’s nuclearprogramme, civilian or strategic, has not violated any internationalobligations. At the same time, conscious of the responsibilities thatsuch technologies bring, we have taken stringent measures to safeguardthem. We are committed to further strengthening our regulatoryframework in this regard in keeping with changing technical andsecurity challenges. India has never been and will never be a source ofproliferation. This has been reiterated at the highest political levelsand is an article of faith of our foreign policy.
Today a key development goal across the globe is to raise the livingstandards of people. A critical ingredient in this process is theavailability of a cheap and clean source of energy. As an energydeficit nation, India has placed considerable importance on nuclearenergy in its energy mix. We will continue on the path of indigenousdevelopment. The pace of this development can be accelerated withgreater international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclearenergy. Such cooperation would not only help bring greater prosperityto a large number of people but would also help in meeting the concernsarising out of green house gas emissions. We have repeatedly said thatevery cooperation project in nuclear power would be open tointernational safeguards. However, such cooperation, today, remainshostage to restrictive denial regimes.
The need of the hour therefore is to move away from an exclusivistapproach and to create a more inclusive framework based on principlesof equality. We should evolve a framework which, on the one hand,effectively curbs and prevents proliferation and, on the other, doesnot unduly restrict cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy withstates, who by their actions have strengthened the objective ofnon-proliferation. It has been noted in recent discussions, thatinternational frameworks need to adapt to the rapid development anddiffusion of technology. I would also like to add here thatinternational frameworks must be dynamic and keep pace with the presentday political realities.
Our actions have always been guided by the principle that we should beable to retain our freedom of thought and action to take stepsnecessary for our national security as well as to meet internationalconcerns arising out of the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction especially its linkages with terrorism. Consistent withthis basic position, we remain ready to engage and cooperate on thebasis of equality, in all multilateral consultations, to develop suchan effective framework, and to bring about a stable, genuine andlasting non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our eventualgoal must remain the complete elimination of such weapons.
I wish you well in your deliberations and look forward to a substantive outcome.
