The pressure on Pakistan from the US and other Western countries to actfirmly against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and its political wing called theJammat-ud-Dawa (JUD) is quite strong not only because of their anxiety toprevent an Indian military retaliation for the Mumbai terrorist strike ofNovember 26,2008, but also because of the anger in Israel and the Jewishdiaspora in the West over the brutal massacre of eight Israeli nationals -- twothem with dual US nationality-- and a Jewish person from Mexico by the LETterrorists in the Narriman House of Mumbai..
Concerns of Western businessmen, with business interests in India, over thesecurity of their life and property have also contributed to the Westernpressure on Pakistan, which is more intense this time than it was after thejoint attack on the Indian Parliament launched by the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad(JEM) on December 13, 2001.
Under this pressure, Pakistan has ostensibly acted against the JUD, throughmeasures such as placing its Amir Prof Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed under housearrest, arresting some cadres at senior, middle and junior levels , freezing thebank accounts of the organization etc.
Interestingly, it has attributed its actions to the decision of theanti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council to designate the JUD as aterrorist organization and blacklist four of its top leaders including ProfSayeed. It has sought to avoid adding to the anti-government anger in the pro-jihadisections of its population by creating an impression that its actions weredictated by the decision of the UN Security Council’s Anti-TerrorismCommittee, which the government was bound to obey, and not by US pressure.Despite this, its actions are seen by these sections as due to Indian and USpressure and not just due to the UN designation.
This has added to the anti-Indian and anti-US anger in these sections,comparable to the anti-Chinese and anti-US anger after the commando action inthe Lal Masjid of Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007, which was seen by thepro-Al Qaeda jihadis as dictated by Chinese and American pressure on PervezMushharraf, the then President and Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
One should, therefore, be prepared for a further surge in jihadi terroristattacks on Indian nationals and interests as well as on Western and Israelinationals and interests. The attacks on Indian and Western nationals andinterests could be in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in Indian territory.The attacks on Israeli nationals and interests could be in Indian territory.
The attacks on Indian nationals and interests could be not only from theremnants of the LET and the JEM, which have evaded arrest in Pakistan, but alsofrom their supporters and sympathizers in the Indian Muslim community and inBangladesh. The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), which was not banned byMusharraf in January,2002, and its branch in Bangladesh known as HUJI (B), havealso a presence in a number of States in India having illegal immigrants fromBangladesh.
It is likely that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, (TTP), which has not so farjoined the anti-Indian jihad and has focused its operations against the US andPakistani forces, may do so now in solidarity with the JUD and the LET. Anotherdanger would be from Jundullahs (Soldiers of Allah), who are lone-wolf jihadiswithout any organizational affiliation. Many of them have taken to suicide orsuicidal terrorism in Pakistan after the commando action in the Lal Masjid andhave shown a capability for attacking high-value and hard targets, including inIslamabad and Rawalpindi.
The danger of a further surge in jihadi terrorism against Indian nationals andinterests in the coming months, if not weeks, would call for immediate measuresfor strengthening the physical security in all metro cities, namely, Delhi,Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad as well as in Goa, which hasbeen a favourite destination for Israeli tourists.
The government should immediately lay down tailor-made terrorism prevention andincident management drill for each metro city, clearly identifying who will beresponsible for leadership and co-ordination. A similar drill should be preparedfor the government of India. The drill should cover aspects such as incidentmanagement, media management, relatives management, public management,co-ordination between the state affected and the centre etc.
The measures, which the government of India proposes to take such as thecreation of a national agency for the investigation of terrorism-related caseswith a pan-Indian dimension, additional powers for the police, creating a rapidresponse capability in the Police in important States, the creation of a coastalcommand etc are strategic measures which would take at least one to two years tomature. Till then, enforcement of immediate preventive measures of a tacticalnature would be necessary in consultation with the States of Delhi, Maharashtra,West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Goa.
The government of India should immediately undertake a vulnerability assessmentto identify areas and establishments, which would require immediate attentionand initiate the necessary additional security measures with the presentlyavailable human and technical resources. Among immediate measures required wouldbe intensification and strengthening of Police patrolling, intensification ofenquiries about visitors of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in hotels, inns,guest houses and other places, watch on areas of concentration of illegalimmigrants from Bangladesh etc .
India has been attacked by the jihadi terrorists--home-grown as well as ofPakistani origin--for many years. Despite this, the international businesscommunity with interests in India had confidence in the capability of the Indiancounter-terrorism machinery to prevail over them and in their ability to protectthe lives and property of foreign business executives working and living inIndia. In justification of their continuing confidence in the Indiancounter-terrorism machinery, they remembered the successful record of India indealing with the insurgency in the North-East, the Khalistani terrorism inPunjab, the Al Ummah terrorism in Tamil Nadu and even in controlling the jihaditerrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
That confidence has been shaken after the Mumbai strike of November 26. This canbe seen in the advisories being issued by private risk assessment consultancygroups to their business clients. The image of an India that can in the fightagainst terrorism is slowly giving way to an image of an India that probablycan’t. This negative image of India, which has started emerging, can bereversed by determined tactical action to prevent any more acts of catastrophicterrorism and strategic measures to bring India in step with the Westerncountries in strengthening its counter-terrorism machinery. Mumbai--November 26caused only 185 fatalities. Despite this, it was catastrophic in terms of thedamage it has caused to the external image of India’s political leadership andprofessional national security managers. One more November 26 in any city with alarge population of foreign businessmen--the present nervousness can turn intopanic.
The government of India has been in a denial and cover-up modes since it came tooffice in 2004. As a result of November 26, it is slowly coming out of itsdenial mode, but it continues to be in a cover-up mode as could be seen from itsreluctance to order a detailed enquiry by a commission, enjoying the confidenceof the Parliament and the public, into the sins of commission and omission,which facilitated the operation of November 26 by the LET and Pakistan’sInter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Without such an enquiry with the findings ofthe enquiry available to the public, including the business community, we willfind it difficult to regain the confidence of the public and the businesscommunity.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the main opposition party, which hopes to cometo power after the forthcoming parliamentary elections, has also been in adenial mode of its own. It is refusing to acknowledge that there are pockets ofanger among Indian Muslim youth due to perceptions of the unfairness of theIndian system towards them. This anger has been inducing some of them to assistorganizations such as the LET and the JEM in their terrorist attacks in Indianterritory and some others to wage their own jihad in Indian colours in the nameof the so-called Indian Mujahideen.
Dealing with the internal dimensions of the jihad is as important as dealingwith the external dimensions. While the external dimensions have startedreceiving attention, the internal dimensions are sought to be pushed under thecarpet. Anyone, who persists in drawing attention to the internal dimensions issought to be ridiculed or vilified or projected as an apologist for the jihadis.Such an approach would be counter-productive and will ultimately weaken ourfight against the external dimensions.
For four years, we dithered over the proposal to set up a national agency toinvestigate terrorism cases with a pan-Indian dimension. In our post-Mumbaihaste to set it up, we should not repeat the mistakes we committed whilecreating the National Security Guards (NSGs) by making it over-centralised withno regional presence. The proposed national agency to investigate pan-Indianterrorism cases should not similarly become an over-centralised agency.
When terrorists strike, the first to reach the scene and start the investigationis the staff of the police station in whose jurisdiction the offence wascommitted. This should remain so. The police station should register theoffence, start the investigation and keep it going till the national agencydecides to take it over. This "first to start the investigation" role of thelocal police should not be diluted or supplanted by the proposed nationalagency.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.
