April 22, 2021
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Confessions & Evidence

Part 3 of 7—Supreme Court Judgment: '... disclosures made by the first two accused viz. Afzal and Shaukat ... leading to the discovery of the hideouts of the deceased terrorists and the recovery of a laptop computer, a mobile phone and cash o

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Confessions & Evidence

14. Joint disclosures

Before parting with the discussion on the subject of confessions under Section 27, we may briefly refer to the legal position as regards joint disclosures. This point assumes relevance in the context of such disclosures made by the first two accused viz. Afzal and Shaukat. The admissibility of information said to have been furnished by both of them leading to the discovery of the hideouts of the deceased terrorists and the recovery of a laptop computer, a mobile phone and cash of Rs. 10 lacs from the truck in which they were found at Srinagar is in issue. Learned senior counsel Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Mr. Sushil Kumar appearing for the accused contend, as was contended before the High Court, that the disclosure and pointing out attributed to both cannot fall within the Ken of Section 27, whereas it is the contention of Mr. Gopal Subramanium that there is no taboo against the admission of such information as incriminating evidence against both the informants/accused. Some of the High Courts have taken the view that the wording "a person" excludes the applicability of the Section to more than one person. But, that is too narrow a view to be taken. Joint disclosures: to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. 'A person accused' need not necessarily be a single person, but it could be plurality of accused. It seems to us that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other person would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later, or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may reduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to the police officer at the same time. We do not think that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one after the other without any break, almost simultaneously, and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, we find no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27. However, there may be practical difficulties in placing reliance on such evidence. It may be difficult for the witness (generally the police officer), to depose which accused spoke what words and in what sequence. In other words, the deposition in regard to the information given by the two accused may be exposed to criticism from the stand point of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects, as pointed out by Mr. Gopal Subramanium. Whether and to what extent such a simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon by the Court is really a matter of evaluation of evidence. With these prefaratory remarks, we have to refer to two decisions of this Court which are relied upon by the learned defence counsel.

In Mohd. Abdul Hafeez vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1983 SC 367], the prosecution sought to rely on the evidence that the appellant along with the other two accused gave information to the IO that the ring (MO 1) was sold to the jeweller- PW3 in whose possession the ring was. PW3 deposed that four accused persons whom he identified in the Court came to his shop and they sold the ring for Rs.325/- and some days later, the Police Inspector accompanied by accused 1, 2 and 3 came to his shop and the said accused asked PW3 to produce the ring which they had sold. Then, he took out the ring from the showcase and it was seized by the Police Inspector. The difficulty in accepting such evidence was projected in the following words by D.A. Desai, J. speaking for the Court:

"Does this evidence make any sense? He says that accused 1 to 4 sold him the ring. He does not say who had the ring and to whom he paid the money. Similarly, he stated that accused 1 to 3 asked him to produce the ring. It is impossible to believe that all spoke simultaneously. This way of recording evidence is most unsatisfactory and we record our disapproval of the same. If evidence otherwise confessional in character is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is obligatory upon the Investigating Officer to state and record who gave the information; when he is dealing with more than one accused, what words were used by him so that a recovery pursuant to the information received may be connected to the person giving the information so as to provide incriminating evidence against the person".

There is nothing in this judgment which suggests that simultaneous disclosures by more than one accused do not at all enter into the arena of Section 27, as a proposition of law.

Another case which needs to be noticed is the case of Ramkishan vs. Bombay State [AIR 1955 SC 104]. The admissibility or otherwise of joint disclosures did not directly come up for consideration in that case. However, while distinguishing the case of Gokuldas Dwarkadas decided by Bombay High Court, a passing observation was made that in the said case the High Court "had rightly held that a joint statement by more than one accused was not contemplated by Section 27". We cannot understand this observation as laying down the law that information almost simultaneously furnished by two accused in regard to a fact discovered cannot be received in evidence under Section 27. It may be relevant to mention that in the case of Lachhman Singh vs. The State [1952 SCR 839] this Court expressed certain reservations on the correctness of the view taken by some of the High Courts discountenancing the joint disclosures.

15 Call Records: Proof and Authenticity

It is contended by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the accused Shaukat that the call records relating to the cellular phone No. 919811573506 said to have been used by Shaukat have not been proved as per the requirements of law and their genuineness is in doubt. The call records relating to the other mobile numbers related to Gilani and Afzal are also subjected to the same criticism. It is the contention of the learned counsel that in the absence of a certificate issued under sub-Section (2) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act with the particulars enumerated in clauses (a) to (e), the information contained in the electronic record cannot be adduced in evidence and in any case in the absence of examination of a competent witness acquainted with the functioning of the computers during the relevant time and the manner in which the printouts were taken, even secondary evidence under Section 63 is not admissible.

Two witnesses were examined to prove the printouts of the computerized record furnished by the cellular service providers namely AIRTEL (Bharti Cellular Limited) and ESSAR Cellphone. The call details of the mobile No. 9811573506 (which was seized from Shaukat's house) are contained in Exhibits 36/1 to 36/2. The covering letters signed by the Nodal Officer of Sterling Cellular Limited are Ext.P36/6 and P36/7 bearing the dates 13th & 18th December respectively. The call details of mobile No. 9811489429 attributed to Afzal are contained in Ext.P36/3 and the covering letter addressed to the Inspector (Special Cell) PW66 signed by the Nodal Officer is Ext.36/5. The call details of 9810081228 belonging to the subscriber SAR Gilani are contained in Exts. 35/8. The above two phones were obtained on cash card basis. The covering letter pertaining thereto and certain other mobile numbers was signed by the Security Manager of Bharti Cellular Limited. The call details relating to another cellphone number 9810693456 pertaining to Mohammed is Ext.35/5. These documents i.e. Ext.35 series were filed by PW35 who is the person that signed the covering letter dated 17th December bearing Ext.35/1. PW35 deposed that "all the call details are computerized sheets obtained from the computer". He clarified that "the switch which is maintained in the computer in respect of each telephone receives the signal of the telephone number, called or received and serves them to the Server and it is the Server which keeps the record of the calls made or received. In case where call is made and the receiver does not pick up the phone, the server which makes a loop of the route would not register it". As far as PW36 is concerned, he identified the signatures of the General Manager of his Company who signed Ext.P36 series. He testified to the fact that the call details of the particular telephone numbers were contained in the relevant exhibits produced by him. It is significant to note that no suggestion was put to these two witnesses touching the authenticity of the call records or the possible tampering with the entries, although the arguments have proceeded on the lines that there could have been fabrication. In support of such argument, the duplication of entries in Exts.36/2 and 36/3 and that there was some discrepancy relating to the Cell I.D. and IMEI number of the handset at certain places was pointed out. The factum of presence of duplicate entries was elicited by the counsel appearing for Afsan Guru from PW36 when PW36 was in the witness box. The evidence of DW10a technical expert, was only to the effect that it was possible to clone a SIM by means of a SIM Programmer which to his knowledge, was not available in Delhi or elsewhere. His evidence was only of a general nature envisaging a theoretical possibility and not with reference to specific instances.

According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among other things, "copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies". Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the Court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service providing Company can be led into evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak to the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the compliance of the requirements of Section 65B which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely Sections 63 & 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-Section (4) of Section 65B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely Sections 63 & 65.

The learned senior counsel Mr. Shanti Bhushan then contended that the witnesses examined were not technical persons acquainted with the functioning of the computers, nor they do have personal knowledge of the details stored in the servers of the computers. We do not find substance in this argument. Both the witnesses were responsible officials of the concerned Companies who deposed to the fact that they were the printouts obtained from the computer records. In fact the evidence of PW35 shows that he is fairly familiar with the computer system and its output. If there was some questioning vis-a-vis specific details or specific suggestion of fabrication of printouts, it would have been obligatory on the part of the prosecution to call a technical expert directly in the know of things. The following observations of House of Lords in the case of R Vs. Shepard [1993 AC 380] are quite apposite:

"The nature of the evidence to discharge the burden of showing that there has been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating properly will inevitably vary from case to case. The evidence must be tailored to suit the needs of the case. I suspect that it will very rarely be necessary to call an expert and that in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to discharge the burden by calling a witness who is familiar with the operation of the computer in the sense of knowing what the computer is required to do and who can say that it is doing it properly."

Such a view was expressed even in the face of a more stringent provision in Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Act, 1984 in U.K. casting a positive obligation on the part of the prosecution to lead evidence in respect of proof of the computer record. We agree with the submission of Mr. Gopal Subramanium that the burden of prosecution under the Indian Law cannot be said to be higher than what was laid down in R Vs. Shepard (supra).

Although necessary suggestions were not put forward to the witnesses so as to discredit the correctness/genuineness of the call records produced, we would prefer to examine the points made out by the learned counsel for the accused independently. As already noted, one such contention was about the presence of duplicate entries in Ext.36/2 and 36/3. We feel that an innocuous error in the computer recording is being magnified to discredit the entire document containing the details without any warrant. As explained by the learned counsel for the State, the computer, at the first instance, instead of recording the IMEI number of the mobile instrument, had recorded the IMEI and cell ID (location) of the person calling/called by the subscriber. The computer rectified this obvious error immediately and modified the record to show the correct details viz., the IMEI and the cell I.D. of the subscriber only. The document is self-explanatory of the error. A perusal of both the call records with reference to the call at 11:19:14 hours exchanged between 9811489429 (Shaukat's) and 9811573506 (Afzal's) shows that the said call was recorded twice in the call records. The fact that the same call has been recorded twice in the call records of the calling and called party simultaneously demonstrates beyond doubt that the correctness or genuineness of the call is beyond doubt. Further, on a comparative perusal of the two call records, the details of Cell I.D. and IMEI of the two numbers are also recorded. Thus, as rightly pointed out by the counsel for the State Mr. Gopal Subramanium, the same call has been recorded two times, first with the cell ID and IMEI number of the calling number (9811489429). The same explanation holds good for the call at 11:32:40 hours. Far from supporting the contention of the defence, the above facts, evident from the perusal of the call records, would clearly show that the system was working satisfactorily and it promptly checked and rectified the mistake that occurred. As already noticed, it was not suggested nor could it be suggested that there was any manipulation or material deficiency in the computer on account of these two errors. Above all, the printouts pertaining to the call details exhibited by the prosecution are of such regularity and continuity that it would be legitimate to draw a presumption that the system was functional and the output was produced by the computer in regular use, whether this fact was specifically deposed to by the witness or not. We are therefore of the view that the call records are admissible and reliable and rightly made use of by the prosecution.

16. Interception of Phone Calls

The legality and admissibility of intercepted telephone calls arises in the context of telephone conversation between Shaukat and his wife Afsan Guru on 14th December at 20:09 hrs and the conversation between Gilani and his brother Shah Faizal on the same day at 12:22 hrs. Interception of communication is provided for by the provisions contained in Chapter V of the POTO/POTA which contains Sections 36 to 48. The proviso to Section 45 lays down the pre-requisite conditions for admitting the evidence collected against the accused through the interception of wire, electronic or oral communication. Chapter V governing the procedure for interception and admission of the intercepted communications pre-supposes that there is an investigation of a terrorists act under the POTA has been set in motion. It is not in dispute that the procedural requirements of Chapter V have not been complied with when such interceptions took place on 14th December, 2001. But, as already noticed, on the crucial date on which interception took place (i.e. 14th December), no offence under POTA was included--  whether in the FIR or in any other contemporaneous documents. We have already held that the non- inclusion of POTO offences even at the threshold of investigation cannot be legally faulted and that such non-inclusion was not deliberate. The admissibility or the evidentiary status of the two intercepted conversations should, therefore, be judged de hors the provisions of POTO/POTA. On the relevant day, the interception of messages was governed by Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act read with Rule 419-A of the Indian Telegraph Rules. The substantive power of interception by the Government or the authorized officer is conferred by Section 5. The modalities and procedure for interception is governed by the said Rules. It is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the two accused : Shaukat and Gilani, that even the Rule  419A, has not been complied with in the instant case, and, therefore, the tape- recorded conversation obtained by such interception cannot be utilized by the prosecution to incriminate the said accused. It is the contention of learned counsel for the State, Mr. Gopal Subramanium, that there was substantial compliance with Rule 419A and, in any case, even if the interception did not take place in strict conformity with the Rule, that does not affect the admissibility of the communications so recorded. In other words, his submission is that the illegality or irregularity in interception does not affect its admissibility in evidence there being no specific embargo against the admissibility in the Telegraph Act or in the Rules. Irrespective of the merit in the first contention of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, we find force in the alternative contention advanced by him.

In regard to the first aspect, two infirmities are pointed out in the relevant orders authorizing and confirming the interception of specified telephone numbers. It is not shown by the prosecution that the Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau who authorized the interception, holds the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Secondly, the confirmation orders passed by the Home Secretary (contained in volume 7 of lower Court record, Page 447 etc.,) would indicate that the confirmation was prospective. We are distressed to note that the confirmation orders should be passed by a senior officer of the Government of India in such a careless manner, that too, in an important case of this nature. However, these deficiencies or inadequacies do not, in our view, preclude the admission of intercepted telephonic communication in evidence. It is to be noted that unlike the proviso to Section 45 of POTA, Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act or Rule 419A does not deal with any rule of evidence. The non-compliance or inadequate compliance with the provisions of the Telegraph Act does not per se affect the admissibility. The legal position regarding the question of admissibility of the tape recorded conversation illegally collected or obtained is no longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in R.M. Malkani Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 1 SCC 471]. In that case, the Court clarified that a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible as res gestae under Section 7 of the Evidence Act. Adverting to the argument that Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act was contravened the learned Judges held that there was no violation. At the same time, the question of admissibility of evidence illegally obtained was discussed. The law was laid down as follows:

"There is warrant for the proposition that even if evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones V. Owen (1870) 34 JP 759. The Judicial Committee in Kumar, Son of Kanju V. R [1955 1 All E.R. 236] dealt with the conviction of an accused of being in unlawful possession of ammunition which had been discovered in consequence of a search of his person by a police officer below the rank of those who were permitted to make such searches. The Judicial Committee held that the evidence was rightly admitted. The reason given was that if evidence was admissible it matters not how it was obtained. There is of course always a word of caution. It is that the Judge has a discretion to disallow evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused. That caution is the golden rule in criminal jurisprudence."

We may also refer to the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pooranmal Vs. Director of Inspection [1974 2 SCR 704] in which the principle stated by the Privy Council in Kurma's case was approvingly referred to while testing the evidentiary status of illegally obtained evidence. Another decision in which the same approach was adopted is a recent judgment in State Vs. NMT Joy Immaculate [(2004) 5 SCC 729]. It may be mentioned that Pooranmal's case was distinguished by this Court in Ali Musfata vs. State of Kerala [(1994) 6 SCC 569] which is a case arising under NDPS Act on the ground that contraband material seized as a result of illegal search and seizure could by itself be treated as evidence of possession of the contraband which is the gist of the offence under the said Act. In the instant case, the tape recorded conversation which has been duly proved and conforms to the requirements laid down by this Court in Ramsingh Vs. Ramsingh [(1985) Suppl. SCC 611] can be pressed into service against the concerned accused in the joint trial for the offences under the Indian Penal Code as well as POTA. Such evidence cannot be shut out by applying the embargo contained in Section 45 when on the date of interception, the procedure under Chapter V of POTA was not required to be complied with. On the relevant date POTA was not in the picture and the investigation did not specifically relate to the offences under POTA. The question of applying the proviso to Section 45 of POTA does not, therefore, arise as the proviso applies only in the event of the communications being legally required to be intercepted under the provisions of POTA. The proviso to Section 45 cannot be so read as to exclude such material in relation to POTA offences if it is otherwise admissible under the general law of evidence.

17. Procedural safeguards in POTA and their impact on confessions

As already noticed, POTA has absorbed into it the guidelines spelt out in Kartar Singh's case and D.K.Basus's case in order to impart an element of fairness and reasonableness into the stringent provisions of POTA in tune with the philosophy of Article 21 and allied constitutional provisions. These salutary safeguards are contained in Section 32 and Section 52 of POTA. The peremptory prescriptions embodied in Section 32 of POTA are: (a) The police officer shall warn the accused that he is not bound to make the confession and if he does so, it may be used against him (vide sub-section (2). (b) The confession shall be recorded in an atmosphere free from threat or inducement and shall be in the same language in which the person makes it (vide sub-section (3). (c) The person from whom a confession has been recorded under sub-section (1) shall be produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate along with the original statement of confession, within forty-eight hours (vide sub-section (4). (d) The CMM/CJM shall record the statement, if any, made by the person so produced and get his signature and if there is any complaint of torture, such person shall be directed to be produced for medical examination. After recording the statement and after medical examination, if necessary, he shall be sent to judicial custody (vide sub-section (5).

The mandate of sub-sections 2 & 3 is not something new. Almost similar prescriptions were there under TADA also. In fact, the fulfillment of such mandate is inherent in the process of recording a confession by a statutory authority. What is necessarily implicit is, perhaps, made explicit. But the notable safeguards which were lacking in TADA are to be found in sub-sections 4 & 5.

The lofty purpose behind the mandate that the maker of confession shall be sent to judicial custody by the CJM before whom he is produced is to provide an atmosphere in which he would feel free to make a complaint against the police, if he so wishes. The feeling that he will be free from the shackles of police custody after production in the Court will minimize, if not remove, the fear psychosis by which he may be gripped. The various safeguards enshrined in Section 32 are meant to be strictly observed as they relate to personal liberty of an individual. However, we add a caveat here. The strict enforcement of the provision as to judicial remand and the invalidation of confession merely on the ground of its non-compliance may present some practical difficulties at times. Situations may arise that even after the confession is made by a person in custody, police custody may still be required for the purpose of further investigation. Sending a person to judicial custody at that stage may retard the investigation. Sometimes, the further steps to be taken by the investigator with the help of the accused may brook no delay. An attempt shall however be made to harmonize this provision in Section 32(5) with the powers of investigation available to the police. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the obligation to send the confession maker to judicial custody cannot be lightly disregarded. The police custody cannot be given on mere asking by the police. It shall be remembered that sending a person who has made the confession to judicial custody after he is produced before the CJM is the normal rule and this procedural safeguard should be given its due primacy. The CJM should be satisfied that it is absolutely necessary that the confession maker shall be restored to police custody for any special reason. Such a course of sending him back to police custody could only be done in exceptional cases after due application of mind. Most often, sending such person to judicial custody in compliance with Section 32(5) soon after the proceedings are recorded by the CJM subject to the consideration of the application by the police after a few days may not make material difference for further investigation. The CJM has a duty to consider whether the application is only a ruse to get back the person concerned to police custody in case he disputes the confession or it is an application made bona fide in view of the need and urgency involved. We are therefore of the view that the non- compliance with the judicial custody requirement does not per se vitiate the confession, though its non-compliance should be one of the important factors that must be borne in mind in testing the confession.

These provisions of Section 32, which are conceived in the interest of the accused, will go a long way to screen and exclude confessions, which appear to be involuntary. The requirements and safeguards laid down in sub-sections 2 to 5 are an integral part of the scheme providing for admissibility of confession made to the police officer. The breach of any one of these requirements would have a vital bearing on the admissibility and evidentiary value of the confession recorded under Section 32(1) and may even inflict a fatal blow on such confession. We have another set of procedural safeguards laid down in Section 52 of POTA which are modelled on the guidelines envisaged by D.K. Basu (supra). Section 52 runs as under:

"52 (1) Where a police officer arrests a person, he shall prepare a custody memo of the person arrested.

(2) The person arrested shall be informed of his right to consult a legal practitioner as soon as he is brought to the police station.

(3) Whenever any person is arrested, information of his arrest shall be immediately communicated by the police officer to a family member or in his absence to a relative of such person by telegram, telephone or by any other means and this fact shall be recorded by the police officer under the signature of the person arrested.

(4) The person arrested shall be permitted to meet the legal practitioner representing him during the course of interrogation of the accused person:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall, entitle the legal practitioner to remain present throughout the period of interrogation."

Sub-sections 2 & 4 as well as sub-Section (3) stem from the guarantees enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Article 22(1) enjoins that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. They are also meant to effectuate the commandment of Article 20(3) that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The breadth and depth of the principle against self-incrimination imbedded in Article 20(3) was unravelled by a three Judge Bench speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in Nandini Satpathy Vs. P.L. Dani [(1978) 2 SCC 424]. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that the area covered by Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) of Cr.P.C. is substantially the same. "Section 161(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional clause"it was observed. This Court rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the State that the two provisions, namely, Article 20(3) and Section 161, did not operate at the anterior stages before the case came to Court and the incriminating utterance of the accused, previously recorded, was attempted to be introduced. Noting that the landmark decision in Miranda Vs. Arizona [1966, 384 US 436] did extend the embargo to police investigation also, the Court observed that there was no warrant to truncate the constitutional protection underlying Article 20(3). It was held that even the investigation at the police level is embraced by Article 20(3) and this is what precisely Section 161(2) means. The interpretation so placed on Article 20(3) and Section 161, in the words of the learned Judge, "brings us nearer to the Miranda mantle of exclusion which extends the right against self-incrimination, to police examination and custodial interrogation and takes in suspects as much as regular accused persons". The observations in M.P. Sharma Vs. Satish Chandra [AIR 1954 SC 300] to the effect that "the protection afforded to an accused insofar as it is related to the phrase 'to be a witness' is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him" were cited with approval.

In the same Judgment, we find lucid exposition of the width and content of Article 22(1). Krishna Iyer, J. observed:

"The spirit and sense of Article 22(1) is that it is fundamental to the rule of law that the services of a lawyer shall be available for consultation to any accused person under circumstances of near- custodial interrogation. Moreover, the observance of the right against self-incrimination is best promoted by conceding to the accused the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice."

Article 22(1) was viewed to be complementary to Article 20(3). It was observed: "we think that Article 20(3) and Article 22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the police to permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one to be present at the time he is examined". It was pointed out that lawyer's presence, in the context of Article 20(3), "is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right to silence". It was then clarified : "we do not lay down that the police must secure the services of a lawyer but all that we mean is that if an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be denied", without being exposed to the charge of securing involuntary self-incrimination. It was also clarified that the police need not wait more than for a reasonable while for an advocate's arrival. But they must invariably warn, and record that fact about the right to silence. It was aptly and graphically said:  "Article 20(3) is not a paper tiger but a provision to police the police and to silence coerced crimination". Based on the observations in Nadini Satpathy's case, it is possible to agree that the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(1) only implies that the suspect in the police custody shall not be denied the right to meet and consult his lawyer even at the stage of interrogation. In other words, if he wishes to have the presence of the lawyer, he shall not be denied that opportunity. Perhaps, Nandini Satpathy does not go so far as Miranda in establishing access to lawyer at interrogation stage. But, Section 52(2) of POTA makes up this deficiency. It goes a step further and casts an imperative on the police officer to inform the person arrested of his right to consult a legal practitioner, soon after he is brought to the police station. Thus, the police officer is bound to apprise the arrested person of his right to consult the lawyer. To that extent, Section 52(2) affords an additional safeguard to the person in custody. Section 52(2) is founded on the MIRANDA rule.

A discussion on the raison d'etre and the desirability of the provision enacted in Section 52(1) read with Section 52(4) can best be understood by referring to the seminal case of Miranda Vs. Arizona which is an oft-quoted decision. The privilege against the self-incrimination was expressly protected by the V amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It provides, as Article 20(3) of Indian Constitution provides, that no person. "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". Such privilege lies at the heart of the concept of a fair procedure and such norm is now recognized to be an international standard. The V amendment also guarantees a right akin to Article 21 of our Constitution by enjoining that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Another notable safeguard to the accused is to be found in the VI amendment which inter alia provides that in a criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defence. The safeguard is substantially similar to Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution. It is in the context of exposition of these constitutional provisions that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the significant ruling in Miranda. The core principles underscored in Miranda have withstood the judicial scrutiny in the subsequent rulings, though the straight jacketed warning procedures and the effect of technical non-compliance of Miranda procedures evoked critical comments and set a process of debate. Miranda is often referred to as "the marriage of the V&VI amendments" and it is seen as the natural outgrowth of V Amendment guarantees, spread over a century or more. Prior to Miranda ruling, confessions were only required to meet the 'voluntariness' test. In the post Miranda era, police have to prove that they read specific Miranda warnings and obtained an 'intelligent waiver'. The purpose of Miranda it is said, is to neutralize the distinct psychological disadvantage that suspects are under when dealing with police. The proposition laid down in the majority opinion in Miranda case was that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination". To ensure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honoured, the Court laid down the following measures:

"He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a Court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him".

On the content of the right to consult a counsel not merely at the stage of trial, but also at the interrogation stage, Chief Justice Warren observed thus:

"In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigentthe person most often subjected to interrogationthe knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present."

At the same time it was clarified:

"This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a "station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person, they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation."

It was aptly pointed out that "the modern practice of 'in custody interrogation' is psychologically rather than physically oriented".

Now the question remains as to what is the effect of non-compliance of the obligations cast on the police officer by sub-Sections (2) to (4) of Section 52. This question becomes relevant as we find the non observance of the requirements of sub-Section (2) read with sub-Section (4) as well as sub- Section (3) or one of them in the instant cases. Does it have a bearing on the voluntariness and admissibility of the confession recorded under Section 32(1)? Should these safeguards envisaged in Section 52(1) be telescoped into Section 32? These are the questions which arise.

In our considered view, the violation of procedural safeguards under Section 52 does not stand on the same footing as the violation of the requirements of sub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 32. As already observed, sub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 32 have an integral and inseparable connection with the confession recorded under Section 32(1). They are designed to be checks against involuntary confessions and to provide an immediate remedy to the person making the confession to air his grievance before a judicial authority. These safeguards are, so to say, woven into the fabric of Section 32 itself and their observance is so vital that the breach thereof will normally result in eschewing the confession from consideration, subject to what we have said about the judicial custody. The prescriptions under Section 52, especially those affording an opportunity to have the presence of the legal practitioner, are no doubt supplemental safeguards as they will promote the guarantee against self-incrimination even at the stage of interrogation; but these requirements laid down in Section 52 cannot be projected into Section 32 so as to read all of them as constituting a code of safeguards of the same magnitude. To hold that the violation of each one of the safeguards envisaged by Section 52 would lead to automatic invalidation of confession would not be in consonance with the inherent nature and scheme of the respective provisions. However, we would like to make it clear that the denial of the safeguards under sub-Sections (2) to (4) of Section 52 will be one of the relevant factors that would weigh with the Court to act upon or discard the confession. To this extent they play a role vis-a-vis the confessions recorded under Section 32, but they are not as clinching as the provisions contained in sub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 32.

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