Been There, Done That?

The March 03, 2009 terror attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team by a dozenunidentified gunmen in Lahore brings home starkly the reality about anincreasingly unstable Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. To manyof the bystanders and terrified Pakistani civilians in Lahore’s busy LibertySquare, it was India’s Mumbai attacks acted out once over again. The CCTVimages of the gunmen in Lahore were chillingly similar to the 10 gunmen involvedin the Mumbai attacks; the terrorists in Lahore like those in Mumbai, werecasually dressed in jeans and jackets, carried haversacks, and calmly shot attheir targets. What is most worrisome is the fact that in both cases, themilitants executed "commando type" operations, in which they engaged thesecurity forces in direct combat. Usually, terrorists are known to carry outspectacular acts of faceless violence through bomb blasts aimed at high civiliancasualties and political impact.

Such frequent terror attacks, be they in Mumbai last year or Lahore now,force us in this part of the world to start questioning the overalleffectiveness of the US "war on terror", whose central front under the ObamaAdministration has shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borderareas. The questions that beg answers are: What are the contours of Obama’sunfolding South Asia policy? Is the Administration on the right path? Does ittake into account the specific sensitivities of the states in the region?

Interestingly, Obama’s South Asia policy team comprises of RichardHolbrooke, a long time US diplomat, famous for his role in the Dayton PeaceAgreement of 1995 in the Balkans and Bruce Reidel, Senior Fellow in foreignpolicy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of the BrookingsInstitution, who also served with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for29 years before retiring in 2006. Holbrooke has been tasked with the role ofObama’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan while Bruce Reidelis chairing a White House policy review team on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Withsuch rich experiences in conflict zones like the Balkans and the Middle East, itappears that both Holbrooke and Reidel have "been there, done that" in avery personal sense of the term regarding conflict prone regions in general.However, their South Asian experience has not stretched beyond two to four yearsand has been mostly wrapped around intelligence gathering and analyses ratherthan a deep understanding of local cultures and ways of diplomacy.

Obama’s Unfolding South Asia Policy
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration’s unfolding South Asia policy focusis and will be on Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is neither surprising norsomething new. During his Presidential election campaign and subsequently duringhis PresidentialInaugural Address on January 20, 2009 and "Address to the Joint Session ofCongress" on February24, 2009  President Obama identified Pakistan and Afghanistan as "thecentral front of the war against al Qaeda and the war against extremism." 

The contours of the policy has been further buttressed by the release onFebruary 24, 2009  of The Atlantic Council of the United States’ reporttitled Needed:A Comprehensive US Policy Towards Pakistan. Co-chaired by Senators ChuckHagel and John Kerry, the Atlantic Council report’s recommendations includethe following:

Besides these specific recommendations for Pakistan, Obama has also pledgedan additional US $1 billion in non-military aid each year to Afghanistan inorder to support education, basic infrastructure and human services and tocounter the opium trade by supporting alternative livelihoods for Afghanfarmers. This is over and above US $ 10.2 billion pledged for security andreconstruction in Afghanistan for 2008-2009.  Further, Obama has statedthat the US combat troops of about 1,42,000 will withdraw from Iraq by August31, 2010 save 35,000 to 50,000 US personnel who will train Iraqi securityforces till 2011 end. These troops are however, not going home. They will berelocated to Afghanistan as the battleground for the "war on terror" inObama’s view has shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. This year, the 36,000 UStroop stationed in Afghanistan will be bolstered by an additional 17,000 troopsfurther strengthened in 2010 by troops coming from Iraq.

The Issue Areas 
Inferring from the above recommendations and statements, Obama’s South Asiapolicy can be located within three main policy props.

First, exit Iraq, entry Afghanistan-Pakistan. The 1, 640 miles longmountainous, remote and virtually inaccessible Afghan-Pakistan border is viewedby the US as the critical support base area for the Taliban and al Qaeda.It is widely believed in US policy circles that following the US invasion ofAfghanistan in October 2001, most of the Pashtun Taliban fighters and the entireTaliban leadership led by Mullah Muhammad Omar has relocated to FATA, NWFP andBaluchistan in Pakistan. Similar to the Bush Administration’s policy, theObama Administration also views air strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas asthwarting the Taliban/al Qaeda’s strike capabilities and organizationalprowess. The wisdom behind this policy is that the US cannot defeat the Talibanand the al Qaeda when they can always escape across a porousAfghan-Pakistan border to FATA and NWFP in Pakistan.

Second, the Obama Administration is keen to devise a regional strategy forSouth Asia primarily to counter the terror outfits dominant in Afghanistan andPakistan. Towards fulfilling this policy, the Administration hopes to enlist thesupport of Pakistan, especially its military, followed by India, China, Russia,Iran, the UN, EU and NATO. There is also policy talk of utilizing thecooperation of Saudi Arabia given its strong influence within Pakistan.

Third, it appears that Pakistan has successfully communicated to the US thatwithout the former’s military support and intelligence, winning the "war onterror" in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s border areas is going to be impossiblefor the US. The Pakistani military has, however, indicated to the US that unlessthe core issue between India and Pakistan--Kashmir--is settled, the Pakistanmilitary cannot relocate its more than 300,000 troops from the India-Pakistanborder to the Afghan-Pakistan border as is desired by the US. The festeringissue of Kashmir and the image of India as an enemy in the Pakistani psyche willalso stand in the way of forming a joint India-Pakistan regional mechanism forfighting terrorism.  This was conveyed by Pakistan to Richard Holbrookeduring his visit to Pakistan in February and articulated by Pakistan duringObama’s Presidential campaign and later during the US transition phase. 

Hence,Obama in his interview to Time Magazine’s Joe Klein on October 23, 2008 stated that "working with Pakistan and India to tryto resolve the Kashmir crisis in a "serious way" would be a criticaltask". Incidentally, the issue of Kashmir or India was absent fromHolbrooke’s agenda during his visit in February after India successfullylobbied against such a move in Washington D.C. However, it can be inferred thatthe US will bring up the issue of Kashmir in order to ensure that India-Pakistantensions do not create obstacles for its own "war on terror" in theAfghan-Pakistan border. The reason for this is starkly based on US realpolitikcalculations. So long as the 300,000 strong Pakistan military posted alongthe India-Pakistan border views India as the enemy, relocation of these troopsfrom the India-Pakistan border to fight the US "war on terror" in theAfghan-Pakistan border is a distant possibility. Hence, an India-Pakistan peacedeal is in US’s national interest.

Limitations of Obama’s policy
There are several limitations inherent in Obama’s South Asia policyespecially with regard to its focus areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

First, the US needs to recognize the fact that air strikes in Pakistan cannotsucceed in ousting the key Taliban leadership which has support base within thelocal Pashtun population in the area. Simple military response is not theanswer. A better understanding of Pashtun culture known as Pashtunwali(the way of the Pashtun) or the Pashtun social code is perhaps the need of thehour for the US Afghan-Pakistan counter-insurgency policy. In his book, SoldierSahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India’s Northwest Frontier,Charles Allen wrote that "Pashtunwali is an uncompromising social code soprofoundly at odds with Western mores that its application constantly brings oneup with a jolt."  The core principles of Pashtunwali include selfrespect, independence, hospitability, justice, tolerance and forgiveness.Pashtun groups revolve around this more than 1000 years old social code andhence, while western governance structures might be missing in Pashtun areas inAfghanistan and Pakistan, the adherence to Pashtunwali or local unwrittengovernance code is a matter of honour and pride.  The support to theTaliban insurgency from the local population is also governed by this socialcode based on hospitality and tolerance.

Second, the additional 17, 000 US troops in Afghanistan is raising fears inPakistan that this will result in more Taliban militants escaping toPakistan’s tribal areas through the 340 unmanned and illegal border crossingsin the Afghan-Pakistan border further de-stabilizing Pakistan.

Third, Saudi Arabia has been one of the largest financiers of radicalgroups/outfits within Pakistan. Therefore, the US policy talk about utilizingthe same regime to fight terrorism within Pakistan appears skewed.

Fourth, the contradiction in US policy towards the Pakistan military isanother glaring limitation. On the one hand, the US counter-terrorism officialsrecognize that Pakistan supports and finances the Taliban as a proxy. In aninterview to the Council of Foreign Relationswebsite, Bruce Reidel stated that"In Pakistan, the jihadist Frankenstein monster that was created by thePakistani Army and the Pakistani intelligence service is now increasinglyturning on its creators" . On the other hand, the Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani wasinducted into the US Army’s "Hall of Fame" at a ceremony in FortLeavenworth on February 26, 2009. This US contradictory posture weakens theresolve to discourage the Pakistan army in its policy of cultivating non-stateproxies for fighting India in some imagined fictitious war in the future.

Fifth, the Obama Administration’s tendency to view India-Pakistan relationsprimarily through the prism of his "war on terror" framework is flawed. TheAdministration appears to have bought the Pakistan argument that unless Kashmiris resolved, Pakistan military will list the US "war on terror" as numbertwo in its list of priorities; threat perception from India will occupy centrestage in the Pakistan psyche. The US needs to understand that such articulationsare not backed by evidence. There is no Indian policy blue print that it willinvade Pakistan in the near future contrary to what the Pakistan militaryrepeatedly argues in the international forum.

What India needs to do?
First, India must indicate to the Obama Administration that the linksexisting between the Pakistan military, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) andterror groups like the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)must be dismantled. Also, Pakistan’s rationalisation of this linkage based onits construction of India’s offensive posture or image against Pakistan isuntenable. Even during increased tensions between India and Pakistan,post-Mumbai, public debates in India called for caution against the militaryoption and instead urged for cooperation between India and Pakistan in fightingterrorism.

Second, India must objectively place before the Obama Administration thatKashmir is an integral part of India and therefore third party mediation (readUS) will not be appreciated. These arguments must be backed by the reality of anexisting democratic space in Kashmir today and the improving socio-economicsituation. The Kashmiri Muslim is not stopped from travelling to other partsof India or abroad in order to seek better livelihood opportunities or for otherpurposes as is argued by some influential people in Pakistan. Most importantly,India has never followed or will ever follow a diabolic policy of populationextermination in Kashmir, usually a common argument in international law forsecession.

Third, India needs to bilaterally engage Pakistan and reinstate theIndia-Pakistan peace process to deal with the "trust deficit" between bothcountries and to work out a joint mechanism to fight terrorism.

Finally, India needs to point out to the Obama Administration that the US"war on terror" has not brought about any respite to South Asia. Instead,it has made matters worse. The US presence in Afghanistan as well as the airstrikes in Pakistan has further destabilized the region. Hence, while fightingterrorism is a common national security interest for India, Pakistan and the US,the end result should not be an increasingly destabilized South Asia due toincreased US troop presence in the region. This is not in India’s -- or theregion’s --  interest.

Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for DefenceStudies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. The views expressed here are that of theauthor and not that of the IDSA.