A Surgical Separation...

In every theatre of terrorism, the separation of the terrorist from the largercommunity is the first imperative of effective counter-terrorism responses. Noquantum of lawful force against the terrorist is unnecessary, and there shouldbe no reluctance to use every legitimate instrument and power to bring theperpetrators and facilitators of terrorist acts to book. As Prime MinisterManmohan Singh has expressed it with exceptional clarity, "There can be nopolitical compromise with terror. No inch conceded. No compassion shown."

But the state's actions must be narrowly targeted, and must never bring theinnocent and wider community into their sweep. A surgical separation betweenthose who are directly involved in terrorism, and others - even where theseothers may include some elements sympathetic to the extremist cause, but who arenot associated with any terrorist or criminal activity - is the most fundamentalprincipal of a war against terror. India's own experience is replete withexamples of over-reaction and indiscriminate operations that have taken largesections of a particular community into their sweep and, in doing so, infinitelycompounded the problem.

In Punjab, this is precisely what happened after Operation Blue Star, in the'mopping up' exercise, Operation Woodrose, which sought to capture Jarnail SinghBhindranwale's surviving associates and clear all gurudwaras in the Stateof extremist elements. The Army had been brought into Punjab only days beforeBlue Star, had little of its own intelligence on the ground, and was deeplysuspicious of Punjab Police. Consequently, operating blindly, the Army arrestedlarge numbers of people, many innocent, others merely sympathetic to theextremist ideology, but unconnected with terrorism, and pushed many young menacross the border into the welcoming arms of Pakistani handlers.

This has been the experience in theatre after theatre of extremist violenceacross India, and yet, it seems, the lesson has not been learned. In theaftermath of the latest serial outrage in Mumbai, reports indicate that thepolice simply 'rounded up' over 300 'suspects' for 'questioning'. Worse, themedia was provided access, and humiliating photographs of the detainees werepublished in some papers. Subsequent developments indicate that these detentionswere, at best, shots in the dark, and were not based on any specificintelligence regarding involvement of these individuals in the crimes underinvestigation.

Rounding up hundreds of people in the wake of an incident must seem a strangeway of policing to the general public. Unfortunately, it falls into a fairlyestablished pattern of 'investigation', applied to all manner of crimes, wherethe known 'bad characters' of a particular area are arbitrarily detained andintimidated, cajoled or otherwise coerced, till someone spills the beans. Thisoften works quite well, because there are certain classes of crime where theperpetrators are almost invariably drawn from a small pool of 'history sheeters'.

This practice is, however, disastrous when applied to terrorist crimes,particularly when the terrorists claim to represent a specific community, andmore so where the state's agencies have themselves been substantially polarisedand are perceived as not being fair. Over the past decade and more, it is thecase that Mumbai Police has been significantly politicised and is widelyregarded as being deeply communalised and partisan in many of its actions. Thisperception may be based on an exaggerated assessment of past deviations, butthat does not significantly alter the fact that it is widely shared,particularly in the 'target community'. Under the circumstances, the stockresponse - to sweep with a big broom - will have particularly unfortunateconsequences in Mumbai.

Broad based operations, such as combing operations, serve little constructivepurpose except where there is definitive intelligence, and the agencies are surethat terrorists are present in a particular area. The Mumbai actions, it seems,were 'fishing expeditions', essentially operating on the principle, 'when youdon't have a clue, start combing'.

Enforcement and investigative authorities do, of course, come under enormouspressure after each major terrorist strike to 'show results', and the electronicmedia has contributed immensely to this pressure. Twenty four hour news channelscarry shrill reports, sometime within minutes, and certainly within hours of anincident, screaming "Police in the dark", "Investigatorsclueless", etc., and officers confronted with demands for the immediateidentification of the perpetrators often feel that they have to say something.But results in any systematic investigation cannot be produced on demand. Whilepeople outside the enforcement, intelligence and investigative systems canlegitimately speculate on the identity of perpetrators on the basis of pastrecords and probabilities, these authorities must only speak on the basis ofhard evidence recovered. The police and Government agencies must learn to resistthe temptation to play to the galleries with statements on probable guilt, orwith apparent action - such as the rounding of large numbers of 'suspects' -irrespective of media or political pressures. They must, furthermore, not try togrind other axes, or to 'clean up' a 'sensitive' area under the transientpolitical and public sanction that is ordinarily extended in the aftermath of amajor terrorist strike. All resources should be committed fully to the effort ofidentifying and getting to those who are actually guilty.

Regrettably, irrational practices appear to be embedded into the verystructures of administration and policing in the country. I recall that it tookyears of continuous advocacy, even with the authority of the office of DirectorGeneral of Police, to convince the establishment and my own officers to get thebarricades removed from the roads in Punjab, and get the maximum available forceinto proactive duties. Yet, enormous components of police and paramilitaryforces in violence-afflicted areas across the country continue to be wasted inunproductive static duties, even while the entire initiative continues to bevested in the forces of extremism.

Whether it is the war against Left-wing thuggeries, Islamist terrorism, orthe ethnic fundamentalisms of India's North-East, the communities are thenation's assets. The war against terrorism is a war for legitimacy, apsychological war. No community is a 'natural' recruitment base for terrorists,and must never be abandoned. Across the country, the police, paramilitaries,Army, intelligence and national agencies and organisations have recruited fromthe very communities and classes that various groups of terrorists claim torepresent, and from among whom the largest proportions of the victims ofterrorism are often drawn. It is an unwise state and obtuse politicians thatignore these realities, and jeopardise the national interest and public securityin the process.

K.P.S.Gill is former director-general of police, Punjab. He is alsoPublisher, SAIR and President, Institute for Conflict Management. This articlewas first published in The Pioneer.