A Himalayan Shift

Nepalese Prime Ministers generally prefer to call on New Delhi for their first foreign visit after assumingoffice. The urgency for Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's visit was, however, accentuated by nearly aweek-long effective blockade of Kathmandu imposed by the Maoist insurgents. 

That week exposed the vulnerability of the Deuba government and its capacity to govern. India sent strongsignals to assure Kathmandu that it would not allow the Nepalese state to collapse. Foreign Secretary ShyamSaran's unusual detour to Kathmandu Airport, on his way to Myanmar, during the period of the blockade,appeared to have convinced Deuba that it was time for a serious discussion with his Indian counterpart on theMaoist  challenge.

On leaving Kathmandu for New Delhi, Deuba described his journey as a 'goodwill visit'. He brought along alarge entourage of 66 members drawn from various walks of life, including business and tourism. The mostthinly (or even non-) represented sections in his delegation were the home and defence ministries as well asthe Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), though his core concern was the Maoist insurgency. 

Other issues in his agenda included discussion on projects to harness water resources, the problem ofBhutanese refugees, and visits to temples and holy places in India. There was strong criticism of his visitnot only from customary political baiters like the Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala, but alsofrom members of his coalition government and civil society representatives. 

He was warned against signing any major agreement with India and was even asked to raise some of the majorirritants in relations between Kathmandu and New Delhi, including the revision of the 1950 Treaty that definethe basis of Indo-Nepal relations, and the question of alleged border encroachments by India.

India has preferred to treat the five-day tour as a working visit, and not as a state visit. There were nodelegation level discussions with the Prime Minister, nor any state banquets or lunches. All the officialdiscussions with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Water Resourceswere wound up only in a day and half. 

In between, Deuba also had time to call on the President and meet with other Indian leaders, such as SoniaGandhi, President of the Congress Party, and L.K. Advani, the Leader of the Opposition. He also had a privatedinner with Indian intellectuals and sympathizers. Agreements on culture, sports and exchange of weatherinformation were signed during the visit.

On the core concern of the Maoist insurgency, Deuba got all the assurances he was looking for. India describedthe Maoists as a "common security concern" and pledged "every possible help, military orotherwise". India's worries arise on account of the Maoists' close and growing links with Left Wingextremist insurgents (referred to as Naxalites) in India, and the increasingly strident portrayal of India asan expansionist neighbour by the Nepalese Maoist Chief, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, as well as attacks onIndian business interests in Nepal, along with attacks on enterprises with Royal and American stakes. 

Deuba's shopping-list of military hardware was considered sympathetically in New Delhi, and transfer ofequipment, including Advanced Light Helicopters (not mounted with guns, but to carry troops) was confirmed.India has also agreed to train 400 to 500 Nepalese police personnel in counter insurgency operations. 

The setting up of a Joint Committee to monitor the security situation and suggest appropriate measures was'noted' by the two sides. India assured Nepal it would take all possible steps to coordinate legal actions todeal with the terrorist problem, but ongoing discussions on an Extradition Treaty could not beconcluded. 

The Nepalese side is keen to ink an extradition arrangement, as they want to get hold of some top Maoistleaders under detention in India. Both the sides agreed that they would not allow their territories to be usedagainst each other, implying that, while India would tighten its border security to deter the movement ofMaoists across the border, Nepal would also do every thing possible to curb the activities of Pakistan's InterServices Intelligence (ISI) aimed at fuelling cross-border terrorism against India.

Besides providing security support, India also tried to impress upon the visiting Nepalese Prime Minister thatmilitary means to address the Maoist challenge were not sufficient, and that steps would also have to beinitiated to seek a 'negotiated political solution' of the problem. This Indian message was not onlycommunicated in one-to-one meetings at the higher political level, but was also made public in the IndianForeign Secretary's Statement on September 10. 

The significance of this position lies in the fact that the RNA and the Nepalese establishment do notfavour any talks with the Maoists at present, for fear that this may give the impression that the RNA wassuccumbing to Maoist pressures, since the rebels clearly have an upper hand at the moment. In these one-to-onediscussions, the Indian side also appears to have discouraged Deuba from accepting any third party role in thepeace process with the rebels. The Maoists have favoured international mediation in talking to the Kingdirectly. They have refused to talk to the Deuba government as this is 'neither a legitimate nor a credible government'from their point of view. 

Many international third parties, including the United Nations, have shown interest in acting asfacilitators or mediators for talks between the Nepalese government and the rebels. Switzerland and Norway arethe latest candidates volunteering such a role. India's apprehensions, not without reasons, are that the thirdparties will complicate the Nepalese conflict without having any capacity to discipline either of the partiesfrom betraying good-faith.

On the whole, Deuba has expressed great 'satisfaction' on the outcome of his India tour. Discerning Nepaleseobservers, however, are of the view that, for some military goodies, political assurances, advice on seeking a'peaceful solution' and caution against the role of third parties, their Prime Minister did not have to travelto New Delhi. All this could have been obtained through normal diplomatic channels. 

Their contention is that the real purpose behind Deuba's visit was to get political support for his owncontinuation as Prime Minister. There were rumours - and rumours have considerable political significance inKathmandu - that, following his government's failure during the Kathmandu blockade, the King, while relaxingat his private resort in Pokhara, was having second thoughts on Deuba's Prime Ministership. 

Differences of approach are also crystallizing. Deuba has set up a 'Peace Secretariat', with Americansupport, but the King and the Army do not want any dialogue with the Maoists, at least for the time being.Further, the United Marxist Leninists (UML) of Nepal are Deuba's coalition partners in the government, butthey are breathing heavily down the Prime Minister's neck. Perhaps the political pilgrimage to New Delhi couldhelp Deuba somewhat in easing his crisis of self-confidence.

There are no signs that Deuba's visit to New Delhi would deter the Maoists from mounting further pressure onKathmandu. Just a couple of days before Deuba's departure, they had warned 35 business establishments to ceaseoperations. In the meanwhile, they bombed Malla Hotel in Kathmandu (close to the Royal Palace) and FishtailHotel in Pokhara. And on the day Deuba concluded his official engagements in New Delhi, they blasted theAmerican Information Centre complex in Kathmandu.

The Maoists, it seems, are on their 'strategic offensive', the penultimate stage in their 'peoples' war'strategy. Their war on the Nepalese state is definitely being expanded from the rural theatre to urban centres.Their front organizations are displaying robust competitive initiatives in destroying the credibility of themonarchical order by attacking businesses and public structures. The explosion at the American Centre on theeve of the 9/11 anniversary may alarm terrorism-watchers about the possibilities of their developing linkswith Al Qaeda affiliates.

No matter how well India equips the Nepalese security forces, they are far away from being capable of dealingwith the Maoists. India's own experience in the northeast and in Naxalite affected regions is that militarymethods may, at best, help, but cannot deliver a solution to internal revolts and insurgencies.

India is now planning a co-ordinated political strategy for all the insurgency affected states of the union.It must, therefore, seriously pursue a similar approach in Nepal, as indicated during Deuba's visit. Towardsthat end, Indian policy will have to break from the legacy of supporting the Monarchy as the symbol of orderand stability in Nepal.

The Monarchy is part of the problem in the Himalayan Kingdom, it can hardly be a part of the solution tothe present crisis. Indian policy urgently needs to relate itself to the grass roots and popular forces. Suchforces include the Maoists. India should therefore work with Nepal towards redefining its political order soas to help the rebels shed their arms and violent methods for a respectable and democratic place in themainstream of Nepali national politics.

S.D. Muni is Professor of South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Courtesy, the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal