'A Framework For A Solution'

Text of the Speech delivered by the J&K chief minister at thetwo-day seminar on Peace Dividend – Progress for India and South Asia organised by the Hindustan Times atNew Delhi on December 12, 2003

It is personally a pleasure and intellectually a privilege to beinvited to speak at this scholarly summit organised by the Hindustan Times. I will not even try topretend to give you an expansive view of the dynamics of global peace as was done by Professor FrancisFukuyama here a couple of days of back.

Given my current position and may I say my pre-occupation, I willmuch rather take you through a much smaller slice of the world history – small but very intense and verytroubled – one that has engaged mightier minds and greater leaders: the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

Let me start by saying that any attempt to place the Kashmir issueinto water-tight compartments – Islamic militancy, cross-border terrorism, secessionist insurgency,ethno-national demand -- does less good and more damage to the variety of factors and the sheer complexity ofelements, and their radical hybridity that have caused the problem in Kashmir. There is no gainsaying that itis a highly volatile and extremely contentious matter for which there are no, indeed cannot be, any easyanswers. 

Road maps prejudge the issue; readymade solutions make the problema distorted image of what it actually is and models make a mockery of the specificity of the issue. All thatone can hope to discuss at a forum like this is to look for a framework for a solution. A context in which theissue can be placed and the contours of solution worked out.

Prior to doing so, it might help if we quickly run through themajor strands of thought in the resolution paradigm. First, and perhaps, the oldest are the"internationalists" who look towards the United Nations for a settlement. I believe that it is time thatwe look beyond it.

Sometimes, those who are aggrieved, use the internationalcommunity as an object of appeal for more than human rights. But the fact of the matter is that there is nointernational community. It had some type of structure as long as the United Nations was an organization whichexerted a certain pressure on the policies and situation of governments. With the United Nations having beenmarginalised, there is no centre where a long-term view can be taken and a platform of principle constructed.If we do this, it is akin to assuming the position of litigant before a court which does not exist.

The second most popular strand of thought comes from the "status quoists". They want to convert the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir into aninternational border. Given that it is the Line of Conflict, to recommend that the problem should be resolvedon the basis of the Line of Control, can at best be a part of the solution not the solution, if done on astand-alone basis. Internal dimension of the problem cannot be wished away.  

The oft-repeated demand for autonomy, which has its origins in theearly 50s, is itself a compromise solution. Even though it recognises, the ethno-nationalism of Kashmiris, theimplied political position is that ethnicity need not engender nationhood. That is why independence is not thepursued goal of autonomist viewpoint. Instead, the issue was whether Kashmir should join Pakistan or India.

The political movement of the mainstream parties was not to pursuethe process of nationality-formation to the point where political structures were sought to be made congruentwith nationality by creating an independent entity. This came to the fore in 1975. The view thereafter wasthat even if Kashmiris are a nation it doesn't axiomatically follow that they are entitled to a nation-state.Hence the desire to create an "enclave of autonomy within India".

While most political analysts subscribing to the autonomistviewpoint do recognise the ethno-nationalism of the Kashmiris -- Kashmiriyat -- they differ from the advocatesof independence insofar as the latter go further and make an ethno-territorial demand.

Further, the basis of this form of autonomy as practiced in theearly 1950s was flawed as it sought to create an enclave of federalism within a unitary system and combine theadvantages of a loose federation with those of a centralised system without impairing its functioning. But nowthese situations have changed with the regional parties gaining in prominence and the centre being ruled by acoalition of political parties. Even though it is the same Constitution, the spirit is far more federal todayand the autonomy issue may not suffer from the same ills as it did earlier. 

But then there are down-the-line issues. How can one conceive ofpolitical autonomy without a fiscal autonomy? Political autonomy derives its substance and sustainability fromeconomic independence. The most serious problem with the pre-1953 position is that there will be no financialor fiscal links between the Union of India and the state of J&K.

In the current dispensation it will be difficult for the stategovernment even to pay its wage-bill, let alone finance its development. This is not a reflection of the non-viabilityof the state economy but a commentary on how over the years, successive regimes – at the Centre and theState – colluded and worked in tandem to make a vibrant economy completely dependent on central resourcetransfers. In its present form, this demand shows a complete stagnation of ideas and lack of foresight.

The real danger in this case is that the autonomist viewpoint, canbe very easily diluted which then goes to compromise the basic principle of ethno-nationalism. The entireeffort to create an autonomous unit in recognition of the historically inherited ethno-nationalism can withthe stroke of pen be firmly condemned to the byzantine labyrinth of Indian federal issues. Indeed, in thefifties, even the position of the head of government – Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir -- was notinstitutionalised and hence could be subverted without much effort. 

The moot point is not to look for solutions in the past; but tofind them in the future. A return to the past may not be possible; indeed it may not even be desirable. Theworld has undergone a change and we have to be a part of that changed system. The past offers no hope.

It is very important to recognise that we are living through aperiod where definitions of cultures, societies, sovereignty, nationality themselves are changing very rapidlyand radically. All these issues have gone through a large number of transformations and sometimes dramaticshifts.

Along with the end of the political bi-polarity, an equallyimportant set of factors has been the pressures and opportunities of globalisation. Technological innovations in communications and transportation, and in particular the movement ofcapital across borders, have circumvented or eroded traditional state sovereignty not only in the conduct ofinternational finance and trade, but increasingly in their own domestic affairs. This is a crucial fact thatwill have to be borne in mind for any future dispensation that we might conceive for Jammu and Kashmir.

The vacuum left behind after the Cold War, coupled with thevagaries of globalisation, has created serious external strains on the traditional nation-state apparatus,particularly in the developing world.  Manydeveloping states that were already weakened or failing due to a variety of internal factors, will be undergreater pressure now. All this will lead to newer and more relevant definitions of sovereignty.

Indeed, I think that the seeds of a solution lie in using thelogic of this change that is spearheaded by globalisation to evolve a framework for new political dispensationin Jammu and Kashmir, which will resolve the issue on a long-term basis. In this context, our first move hasto be to look for and create a much larger common economic space in the sub-continent and beyond. We can, forinstance, look for a SAARC economic space where we can have a free movement of factors of production likelabour and capital; have greater market relations and indeed, have a single currency, a consistent andcongruous monetary and fiscal policy, and uniform trade policy.

Today the dominant analytic in the global order is economic powerand economic interests override all other kinds of interest. With binding and self propelling economicinterests, political disputes will automatically become less intense, frozen positions will get surely thawed,and all economic relations will bring us to being just one step away from political resolutions. 

Fortunately, we are thinking along these lines at a time when inthe Islamic world, there is an extraordinarily energetic debate taking place from Morocco to Indonesia as towhat Islam is, what it can be interpreted as, and where it might be going. This is routinely overlooked in theWest, where a traditional Orientalism maintains its hegemony and overrides the dynamic of cultures and thediversity of what is within them. All this will have a bearing on how the masses in Kashmir react to asolution; how they see the road ahead and how actively they further it. It is no longer correct to say thatglobally Islam is in the grip of a wave of unyielding fundamentalism: this is very far from the truth. Thereare serious movements of self-assessments taking place within Islam.

Finally, I think it is of utmost importance to recognise theinter-generation dimension of the problem. We are now well into the third generation of the problem. The firstgeneration, which was involved in the freedom movement, did not accept a division of Kashmir on the basis ofreligion but the divide across secular lines – Hindus versus Muslims -- did become a part of the mentalmakeup. 

The second generation witnessed the 1965 war between India andPakistan and the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, responded differently mentally and a majority of them developedanimosity, mistrust and suspicion towards each other. Using nationalistic perspectives, this generation wasnot prepared to maintain friendly relations with each other.

As historical memories recede, the third generation, which belongsto the age group of 30s or slightly more, is not emotionally swayed as the earlier generations. The thirdgeneration did not witness any large-scale war between India and Pakistan. Emotional detachment helped them torise above psychological barriers and be more forward-looking and future oriented.

As Stephen Cohen puts it, "A Third Generation is nowemerging…the third generation does not have a sense of responsibility for the gloomy history. Theircompetence and their interest in the things that matter—above all a fresh approach to economic issues, plusthe collapse of many institutions dominated by a generation in the past—will bring them to power soonerrather than later. More than any other development in the region, this new group of regional leaders will makeit possible for a change to occur."

A generational shift in the politics of Kashmir is near completionnow. It is a process that is well and truly entrenched. Look around and you will find that every major political group in the wide spectrum of the state hasits leader who is in his/her 40s or even less. Maulvi Umar Farooq, Sajjad and Bilal Lone, Omar Abdullah, YasinMalik and Shabbir Shah and of course, the leader of my party, Mehbooba Mufti.

To see such a confluence of young blood and brains across allshades of the political spectrum is rare indeed. Not many places in the world can claim to have its toppolitical leadership in their late twenties and early thirties. I can’t think of any place especially in theage obsessed politics of the subcontinent, which even comes anywhere close. That of all the places in theworld, this should happen in Kashmir -- the oldest and the most intractable problem in the world – not onlyaugurs well but makes the static state of affairs not only interestingly significant but also pregnant withpossibilities. A breakthrough is more than a mere possibility when the excess baggage of the past is not ahindrance.

Will the new generation bring about the minimization of theethnic, class, regional, and ideological distinctions that have – independently and collectively – a majorbearing on the core of the Kashmir issue? Or will it heighten these tensions? While a view of the broadpolitical culture appears to have been passed from one generation to the next, will the most salient issuesshift along with a change in the agents of politicisation? One hopes not. However, what one does hope that there is a complete break from the past in the mannerin which the issue is conceptualised, the politics conducted, and the conviction communicated. For what mygeneration has done is to let the issue fester. We are guilty and shall be deemed so in the court of historyunless we act and act fast. 

Sure, there will be an attitudinal change: the young populationsthe world over is increasingly connected to international culture through new means of mass communication;slow economic development and limited political opportunities threaten governmental legitimacy all over theglobe; moves toward democratization are taking place at many levels.

To understand these disparate and inter-connected dynamics andinitiate action what the new leadership, irrespective of their political affiliations and goals, needs to dois to combine comparative politics and political economy with the emerging international political order andstrategic analysis.

What have we achieved? First, we have shown that politicalfundamentalism was the face of frustration; frustration because of the lack of dialogue. It was not the norm,but the exception to the historically known mental make up of Kashmiris.

In the first year of governance, we did not focus our attention somuch on changing the political systems, but we tried to change the structures in which political, civil andeconomic life is conducted. Our attention went to the major responsibilities of state which is provision ofpublic goods and provide (at a minimum) the infrastructure to allow for economic activity. 

This is a part of the overall resolution strategy of mine, becauseI do believe that complex political emergencies are not only to be found in the issues around which conflictsare politicised, such as ethnicity or regional identity, but also in the prior trend towards a failure ofgovernance.  In fact, it is often thisprior failure of governance that is the causal factor in the politicisation of ethnic identity issues. So wehave tried to focus on these, less glamorous issues of conflict resolution, in the first year.

It must be recognised that it is for the first time in thetroubled history of our state, the state government is not in an adversarial role while talks are beingconducted with the separatist groups. Indeed, we are the facilitators and see this as a major achievement ofour one-year in power.

We believe that we have met our first objective: of being a means foreffective articulation of political, social and economic aspirations of Kashmiris. The illegitimate symbioticrelationship with the State, its repressive arms and the civil bureaucracy, which had imparted a strand ofauthoritarianism to the governance in J&K, has been substantially broken and it is this that has allowedus to pursue a meaningful non-violent agenda.

Second, we have stopped the marginalisation of moderates in thepolitical spectrum of Kashmir. It cannot be denied that this has to a large extent, been possible because of achange in the attitudes and policies of the Government of India. The grim visage of a central authoritydetermined to use coercion over an increasingly alienated people was the source of this marginalisation. Thishas decisively undergone a change for the better.

We are now at the threshold of the third step. Empowering thelegitimate democratic institutions of the state to the extent that they are not played around with anymore byanyone. For instance, if the current or future legislatures of the State that have been democratically electedmake recommendations that are within the purview of the Constitution of the State and the Country, it isobligatory on part of the Centre to treat it with more respect than has been done in the past.