Despite the attempts of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to put a strong lid over the ragingcontroversy on the role of Pakistan in helping Iran, Libya and North Korea to achieve a military nuclearcapability by persuading/pressuring A.Q.Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, to do a meaculpa on Pakistan's TV and then pardoning him because of his past services to the country, this issue isnot going to die down. The world has not seen the last of the nasty surprises in this l'affairePaknucleargate.
There are many intriguing questions which have remained unanswered. The first is why did Iran andLibya let down Pakistan by giving officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all the detailsof the role played by Pakistani scientists in helping them to develop a military nuclear capability? Since thebeginning of 2003, Iran was under tremendous pressure from the IAEA and the US to come clean on its nuclearprojects after the IAEA detected its enrichment plant at Natanz. All that Iran had to do to avoidinternational sanctions was to admit that it had a clandestine programme, give details of it and agreeto dismantle it. It did not have to volunteer details of the role of Pakistan in this programme. Why did it doso?
Ever since sections of the US media got hold of the inspection reports of the IAEA inspectors who hadvisited Natanz and other sites in Iran and reported that the centrifuges being used by Iran, which had tracesof enriched uranium, were second hand and that Iran itself had admitted that it bought them from elsewhere,there was considerable nervousness and even panic in the Pakistan Army's GHQ and in the nuclear establishment.A.Q.Khan made at least half a dozen visits to Dubai to meet officials of the Iranian intelligence and nuclearestablishment. On at least one of his visits, he was accompanied by Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq, the Director-Generalof Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
According to reliable sources, during these meetings A.Q.Khan pleaded with the Iranians to return thecopies of the drawings of the URENCO uranium enrichment plant in Holland which he had given tothem in the past and not to tell the IAEA inspectors anything about the Pakistani origin of the centrifuges.The Iranian officials evaded his requests to return the drawings, but reportedly assured him that they wouldnot reveal anything which might embarrass Pakistan. And yet, they did. Why? What had gone wrong inPakistan-Iran relations which made Teheran insensitive to Pakistani concerns.
The Pakistani military-intelligence establishment was thus aware for over a year that Teheran was underpressure from the US and the IAEA to come clean on its military nuclear programme and the externalassistance received by it. It was, therefore, mentally prepared for the subsequent developments to thedetriment of the credibility of Pakistan's past assurances that there had never been a leakage of Pakistaninuclear expertise to other countries.
What came as a real bombshell to it was the disclosure by the US and the UK towards the end of 2003 thatofficials of Gadaffi had been secretly talking to them on Libya's clandestine nuclear programme and had agreedto dismantle it. The US-UK talks with Libya were a well-kept secret and, to my knowledge, none of the Westernmedia could get scent of it.
Till the Libyan case broke out, Musharraf was fairly confident that he would be able to ride out the stormover the disclosures of Pakistani collaboration with Iran without any adverse consequences to himself or toPakistan because this collaboration had started during the rule of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and Mrs. BenazirBhutto and his own role was minimal.
As against this, the reports towards the end of 2003 that Libya too had made a clean breast of itsclandestine programme and the role of Pakistan in it shook his sang-froid for two reasons. Firstly, much ofthis collaboration had taken place after he seized power on October 12,1999. Secondly, since he had beenunaware of the secret talks of Libya with the US and the UK, he had had no time or opportunity for damagelimitation.
Why did Libya, like Iran, betray Pakistan by volunteering information about the role of Pakistan to itsinterlocutors from the US and the UK and subsequently from the IAEA when it was brought into the picture? Whatexplains the total lack of concern of Iran and Libya to the embarrassment and difficulties which they would becreating for Pakistan by their singing on this subject?
Many reasons are offered by Pakistani sources. They are speculative and not convincing , but would stillneed to be noted:
- Teheran's unhappiness with Musharraf over his failure to end anti-Shia violence in Pakistan and overreports of the ISI's secret co-operation with the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its covertoperations to bring down the Islamic regime in Teheran. Iranian officials say that the CIA has set up relaystations in Pakistan to relay the TV programmes disseminated by the Iranian political exiles from California.
- Gadaffi's dislike of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and his concerns over the links of the Pakistanimilitary-intelligence establishment with them.
- The unhappiness of Iran and Libya over the repeated humiliation of Benazir and her family by Musharraf.Benazir, whose mother Nusrat is stated to be a Shia, had always been closer to Teheran than any otherPakistani political or military leader. For reasons which were never clear, Gadaffi had protected Nusrat,Benazir and her brothers the late Shah Nawaz and Murtaza after Zia overthrew Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and sent himto the gallows. It was to Libya that they first went for protection. From there, Nusrat and Benazir shifted toEurope where they had houses in southern France and Geneva. Shah Nawaz and Murtaza went to Kabul and then to southern France. After the murder of Shah Nawaz allegedly by the ISI in 1985, Murtaza went to Genevaand then to Damascus.Wherever they went, they were financially looked after by Gadaffi.
The third intriguing question without a convincing answer is why did A.Q.Khan have to admit the Pakistanirole in helping North Korea in its clandestine military nuclear programme? In the case of Iran andLibya, he had no other alternative but to admit the wrong-doing after the two countries volunteered to theIAEA the details of the Pakistani role. North Korea has till now not betrayed Pakistan and has not admitted toany foreign role in its programme.
And yet, one could detect from October, 2003, onwards signs of nervousness in Pakistan's GHQ over thepossibility of the US finding a smoking gun there too. Before October, Musharraf repeatedly denied anyco-operation with North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields. After his visit to Kuala Lumpur in October,2003, to attend the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), he went to South Korea where, tothe surprise of many, he admitted for the first time North Korean inputs into Pakistan's missile programme,but denied any co-operation in the nuclear field.
That was the position till the last week of January, 2004. Now, one finds A.Q.Khan admitting in a signedconfession submitted to Pakistan's Nuclear Command Authority his role in assisting North Korea too to developa military nuclear capability. What made him do so?
Dawn, the prestigious daily of Karachi, reported as follows (February 5 ) on the signed confession:
"Dr Khan in his signed statement, which he handed over to authorities, had accepted supplying old anddiscarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data anddepleted Hexaflouride (UF6) gas to North Korea. But he categorically denied that Pakistan's missile programmewas in any way the result of an exchange of technology with Pyongyang. Between 1997 and 1999, orders wereplaced for the production of components for centrifuge machines while during 1998-2000, technical assistancewas provided to North Korea. Between 1999-2001, intelligence officials had found nothing after they raided aNorth Korea-bound chartered aircraft. However, Dr A.Q. Khan was alerted by the chief of the general staff [Mycomment: Lt.Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan?] and the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence [Mycomments: Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed?]."
According to Pakistani sources, after reports appeared in the Pakistani and US media that A.Q.Khan had beentalking of Musharraf being in the picture about his proliferation activities, Musharraf sent for him andpleaded with him in the supreme national interest to admit his personal guilt and not to implicate theGovernments of the day. He told Khan that if he spoke of the Government's involvement in the entire affair,Pakistan's nuclear capability would be in danger.
Khan agreed to do so. His mea culpa statement for public release as drafted by the Nuclear CommandAuthority referred only to his proliferation activities in general without any specific reference toIran, Libya and North Korea. His apology was unqualified. But when he subsequently read out the statementbefore the TV cameras, he surprised Pakistani officials by introducing the words "in good faith".
That is, whatever transgressions he and his colleagues had committed, they did so "in goodfaith", meaning implicitly in good faith that he had the approval of his superiors for histransgressions. After agreeing to bail out the military leadership in supreme national interest, he had secondthoughts and introduced this tell-tale change in his statement to point the needle of suspicion once again atMusharraf and his predecessors.
His mea culpa statement was not telecast live. It was pre-recorded and telecast later. How come thePakistani authorities did not notice the change made by Khan and let it be telecast as read out by him?Another question without a convincing answer.
Pakistani sources claim that there has been another bombshell in the admissions of guilt made by Khan'scolleagues and juniors, who are still under custody and questioning. They are reported to have stated thatduring his over 40 visits to Dubai in the last three years, he had met Iraqi intelligence officials who soughthis help in having some of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material of Iraq airlifted from Syria toPakistan for being kept in safe custody there to prevent their falling into the hands of the UN inspectors.Khan allegedly agreed to their request. According to them, in October,2002, Khan had a Pakistani aircraft,which had gone to Iran to deliver some equipment, stop in a Syrian airport on its way back . It picked up theIraqi WMD "material" and brought it to Pakistan for safe custody on behalf of Iraq. It is not clearwhat did they mean by material -- only documents or something more?
The Musharraf regime has been desperately trying to see that this is not played up in the Pakistani media.There was a note of desperation in Musharraf's admonition of the media during his press conference on February5, 2004, at which he announced his pardon for Khan. He said:
"For me Pakistan comes first and everything else is secondary. In the first place you (themedia) should play a more responsible role in this matter and secondly, even if for the sake of argument it isaccepted that the government and the army were involved in the affair, do you think it will serve our nationalinterest to shout about it from the roof-top?"
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation,Chennai Chapter.
