Great Nicobar Project: Transforming India into a Strategic Maritime and Transhipment Hub in the Indo-Pacific

One is curious to know why when the Great Nicobar Project, officially known as the project for the holistic development of Great Nicobar island, was mooted by the NITI Aayog in 2019 as a “mega-development plan for a strategic, economic and military hub in the Indo-Pacific”, those who are vociferous in their opposition to it now, were silent.

The project, which will eventually span over 166 sq km, about 18 per cent of Nicobar’s 910 sq km, with an estimated cost of Rs. 80,000 crore will have an international container transhipment terminal (ICTT), a greenfield dual-use international airport, a township and its supporting infrastructure and a power plant to make the island energy self-sufficient. The project will also enhance the maritime integration of major Indian ports and go on to create a more integrated domestic-to-global shipping network. It will transform India into a major transhipment hub. Today, nearly 25 per cent of all containers originating from India are transhipped through foreign ports. The Nicobar ICTT will reverse that.

The Great Nicobar Project will be implemented in three phases, between 2025 and 2047, demonstrating that the Narendra Modi government is determined to lay deep the foundations of India’s strategic maritime transformation by the time the country commemorates the centenary of her Independence. Its strategic importance, thus, will be clear even to the lay observer. Only those with a well-crafted agenda of delaying the enhancement of India’s defence infrastructure and capabilities would have an issue with the project and would want to halt it. Even in March 2021, when the Central government formally initiated the work on the mega proposal under the management of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Integrated Development Corporation, those opposing it now, were quiet.

Given its location, the Great Nicobar Project will transform Andaman and Nicobar Islands into a strategic, economic and maritime hub in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific region. It will also enable India to become a major player in the western approaches of the Malacca Strait. The project will place India’s naval presence just a few nautical miles from the Malacca Strait. It will make sure that India can monitor and influence maritime traffic and strategy across some of the world’s most critical sea-lanes such as the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits.

Seen against this backdrop, the question of so-called environmental depredation appears to be a well-camouflaged alibi to stall or delay this historic effort at revamping India’s maritime infrastructure. The Modi government is on record having detailed the diligence it has carried out in countering and mitigating the environmental impact of this project. The government has undertaken surveys, studies and assessments and has come up with structured plans to address the concern of the tribes and conservationists. Is the Congress then, by opposing the project, seriously saying that India must give up the pursuance of her strategic depth and security in her immediate backwater?

In its civilisational heyday during the Chola era, India was recognised as a global maritime power and controlled most of the trade and traffic in the Malacca region and beyond. Why did the Congress, with an uninterrupted five-plus decades of rule, never contemplate the need for projects in this region which would build up and project India’s maritime prowess once again? Instead, the Congress abdicated its responsibility, as a ruling party in the past, to counter the ‘String of Pearls’ policy that sought to encircle and contain India along her maritime boundaries and routes.

In February 2026, the National Green Tribunal (NGT), which had formed a high-powered committee to re-examine the project’s impact on tribal reserves and on the environment, declared that the project’s strategic importance near the Malacca Strait cannot be overlooked, while dismissing the final legal challenges. Indirectly challenging the NGT, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi suddenly decided to visit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in April 2026 and highlight the issue. Perhaps he thought that his theatrics would influence voting patterns in West Bengal! But his actions must be seen against the backdrop of his being the Leader of Opposition. That he chose to play politics over an issue which is critical to India’s national security and will strengthen India’s position across critical international sea lanes, while challenging the monopoly and dominance of other powers, is worrisome and intriguing.

The Congress’ own past record in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is not inspiring. The Congress government’s post-Tsunami rehabilitation was a botched-up relief effort. Contractors and administrators assigned from Delhi ignored the needs of the tribes and their leaders and constructed houses according to their own convenience. Most of the houses remained unoccupied.

Between 1969 and 1980, 330 families who were allotted 11 acres of land each, were settled in seven villages. In order to provide a link between these settlements, two roads—the 43-km East-West and the 51-km North-South Road—were built through the forests, disturbing the delicate Shompen eco-system. Was national security the criterion then? If so, can national security today, in a much more complex global order, not be the criterion?

Rajiv Gandhi had his mega-plans for the islands. In 1986, he wanted to open them to Indian and non-resident industrialists, with his government planning to carry out heavy industrialisation of the area over a 15-year period. His tenure saw proposals for making the islands into a free port, rivalling Singapore and Hong Kong, including the creation of a tax haven. The islands’ pristine eco-system was perhaps the least of the concerns for projects that had little to do with India’s national security.

Internationalising the Issue

It is surprising to see the Congress, a ruling party of the past, internationalise an issue which strictly pertains to India’s national security needs. Why did senior Congress leader Jairam Ramesh cite the ‘genocide letter’ written by a group of western scholars to the President of the India in February 2024, calling to “urgently cancel all plans for the Great Nicobar mega-project”? What interest would these scholars have in wanting to ‘cancel’ the Great Nicobar Project? Why would the Congress leadership amplify this group’s warning in national and international forums and also legitimise the use of the word ‘genocide’ made against the Government of India, for a project that is crucial to India’s national security? The NGO Survival International, which published and publicised this ‘genocide letter’, has a record of meddling in countries and policies in the name of defending indigenous peoples’ rights. By trying to internationalise a national security project, the Congress and its intellectual co-travellers are doing a major disservice to India’s present and future defence preparedness.

(Views expressed are personal)

Anirban Ganguly is a member of the National Executive Committee, Bharatiya Janata Party