Bashar al-Assad has been sentenced to death in Syria. But the man now at the centre of the country's attempt to reckon with the former regime is not in a Syrian courtroom, he is in Moscow, under Russian protection.
Bashar al-Assad has been sentenced to death in Syria. But the man now at the centre of the country's attempt to reckon with the former regime is not in a Syrian courtroom, he is in Moscow, under Russian protection.
A Syrian court convicted Assad in absentia over crimes committed during his rule, giving the authorities in Damascus a judicial sentence they can seek to have enforced. But before that can happen, Syria needs custody of the former president. That puts the question of extradition squarely between the Syrian verdict and Assad's fate.
The crucial detail is that Russia and Syria already have an extradition treaty. Signed in St Petersburg in 2022, it provides a formal mechanism for one country to request the surrender of people wanted for criminal prosecution or execution of sentences. But the treaty also sets out circumstances in which extradition cannot take place — and Assad's case potentially touches several of them.
Assad's death sentence comes after years of allegations against his government over its conduct during Syria's civil war.
A UN Commission of Inquiry report published in 2012 documented what it described as widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations by Syrian state forces, alongside abuses by anti-government armed groups. The commission investigated allegations including arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances and attacks on civilians, while also examining responsibility for violations that could amount to crimes against humanity.
The report predates many of the worst years of the conflict, but it provides an early international record of the abuses attributed to Syrian government forces during the crackdown that followed the 2011 uprising.
The new Syrian authorities have since pursued accountability against figures associated with the former regime. The Syrian Network for Human Rights, which called on Russia to extradite Assad shortly after his arrival in Moscow, has also documented allegations against him and urged that he face trial in Syria.
Assad fled Syria in December 2024 as rebel forces entered Damascus and his government collapsed after more than five decades of Assad family rule.
Russia, which had been Assad's most important military ally during the civil war, provided him refuge in Moscow. That relationship is central to the extradition question because Russia is not simply the country where Assad happens to be living: it was the foreign power most closely associated with preserving his government during the war.
Moscow's relationship with Syria also did not end with Assad's fall. In December 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow was maintaining contacts with the different groups controlling the situation in Syria and discussed the future of Russia's military facilities there, including the Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval facility.
That leaves Assad's fate connected to a much larger relationship between Moscow and the authorities that replaced him.
No. The treaty gives Syria a mechanism to request extradition, not an automatic right to receive Assad.
The 2022 treaty says Russia and Syria undertake to extradite people sought for criminal prosecution or execution of sentences for extraditable offences, subject to the treaty's conditions. The central authorities are the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and the Syrian Ministry of Justice.
A request for execution of a sentence must include, among other things, a copy of the enforceable sentence and a certificate showing the unserved portion of the punishment. The treaty also allows the requested country to seek additional information if it considers the application incomplete.
In Assad's case, however, the existence of a death sentence creates an immediate complication.
The treaty expressly says extradition shall not take place where the offence is punishable by death unless the requesting country gives an assurance that the requested country considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be carried out.
That creates an unusual contradiction for Damascus: Syria is asking Russia to surrender Assad to enforce a sentence that Russia's own extradition treaty potentially prevents it from allowing to be carried out.
The treaty does not specify exactly what assurance Russia would consider sufficient. It therefore leaves open a practical question for the Syrian authorities: could Damascus provide a binding assurance that Assad would not be executed, even though the Syrian court has imposed the death penalty?
That does not necessarily mean Syria would have to formally overturn the sentence before making a request. The immediate treaty issue is whether it can provide assurances acceptable to Moscow that the death penalty will not be carried out.
In practical terms, Damascus could therefore face a choice between maintaining the death sentence as imposed and offering the assurances that could make extradition possible.
There is another provision that is particularly relevant because Assad was not present at his trial.
The treaty says that when extradition is sought to execute a sentence rendered in absentia, the requesting country must guarantee the person's right to a retrial in accordance with its applicable legislation.
That means the Syrian extradition request cannot simply rely on the existence of the death sentence. It would also have to address the treaty's requirement concerning Assad's right to have the case reviewed under Syrian law.
This matters because the manner in which Assad was convicted becomes part of the extradition question itself.
The treaty lists circumstances in which extradition shall not take place and others in which it may be rejected.
Mandatory grounds include cases where the requested person is a citizen of the requested country, the offence does not meet the treaty's definition of an extraditable offence, or the requested party has sufficient grounds to believe the request is intended to persecute or punish someone because of characteristics including political beliefs. It also bars extradition where the same case has already been adjudicated in the requested country or where legal limitations prevent prosecution or enforcement.
Separately, extradition may be rejected in circumstances including ongoing proceedings in Russia or where Russia considers surrender undesirable because of the person's age, health or other personal circumstances.
For Assad, the most politically sensitive possibility would be whether Moscow could argue that the prosecution is politically motivated following the overthrow of his government. That would be a potential Russian argument under the treaty, not an established determination about the Syrian case.
The treaty therefore gives Russia legal grounds to examine the request rather than simply treating the Syrian judgment as an instruction to surrender Assad.
Damascus would have to submit a formal extradition request through the two countries' designated central authorities.
Because Assad has already been sentenced, Syria would be seeking extradition for execution of a sentence, rather than primarily for prosecution. The request would have to include the required judicial and legal documents, including the sentence and information on the punishment that remains to be served. Because the sentence was imposed in absentia, Syria would also have to provide the treaty-required guarantee concerning a retrial.
The treaty also allows Syria to seek provisional arrest before submitting the full extradition request. Such a request can be sent directly to the Russian central authority or through Interpol and must indicate that a formal extradition request will follow.
If Russia provisionally arrests Assad, however, that would not mean extradition had been approved. The treaty says he must be released if the full extradition request and required documents are not submitted within 60 days of his detention, although a subsequent request could lead to further detention.
In principle, the process is straightforward. Syria would submit an extradition request to Russia, Moscow would examine the legal documents and could seek additional information or assurances before deciding whether to surrender Assad. The difficulty lies in what happens during that review — particularly over the death sentence, his in-absentia conviction and the treaty's grounds for refusing extradition.
If Moscow refuses to surrender Assad, the Syrian sentence would remain difficult to enforce because the person sentenced is outside Syrian custody.
Damascus could continue pursuing accountability against other former regime officials, seek cooperation from other jurisdictions where possible and maintain diplomatic pressure on Russia. But none of those measures would put Assad physically in Syrian custody.
That is why the extradition treaty matters so much. It provides a formal legal route, but it does not guarantee that the route ends with Assad being handed over.
For Moscow, the question is larger than the fate of one former president.
Russia invested heavily in its relationship with Assad and intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 to support his government. Even after his fall, Moscow has sought to preserve its strategic position in the country, including its military facilities, while negotiating with Syria's new authorities. Putin's December 2024 remarks showed that those discussions were already underway.
The extradition of Assad could therefore become part of the broader relationship between Moscow and Damascus.
The question has also acquired a wider dimension with other former Syrian security figures reportedly remaining in Russia. The BBC recently located former intelligence chief Hussam Luka in Moscow. That report is relevant here only for establishing his whereabouts; it does not establish his legal status in Russia or whether Moscow intends to surrender him.
For Syria, however, Assad is the most consequential case.
Syria has a treaty-based mechanism to seek Assad's extradition, but it cannot compel Russia simply by producing the death sentence.
The 2022 Russia-Syria extradition treaty gives Damascus a formal route to request his surrender. But the death penalty is a major obstacle: Russia can refuse extradition unless Syria provides an assurance that the sentence will not be carried out. The fact that Assad was convicted in absentia creates another requirement concerning his right to a retrial.
That leaves Damascus with a difficult legal and political calculation. It could seek to preserve the sentence while asking Russia to accept assurances over its execution, or it could have to alter the consequences of the sentence in order to make extradition more viable.
The treaty also allows provisional arrest and sets out a formal process for submitting and examining an extradition request. But ultimately, it is the Russian authorities who will decide whether they are prepared to surrender Assad under those conditions.
Syria can ask. The treaty gives it a route. Whether that route ends with Assad in Syrian custody will depend on the request Damascus makes, the assurances it is willing to provide and whether Moscow is prepared to surrender its former ally.