Mohsen Rezaei Named Iran Security Chief: Who Is He And Why Does His Appointment Matter?

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaei has been appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), placing a veteran military and political figure at the centre of Tehran’s security decision-making as the country faces continued confrontation with the United States and Israel and negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz.

The appointment comes at a sensitive point for Iran, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a major source of tension between Tehran and Washington. Rezaei has repeatedly stressed the importance of Iranian control over the strategic waterway and has warned of serious consequences if US pressure on Iran continues. His appointment has therefore raised questions about how Tehran may approach the war and negotiations with Washington.

Rezaei replaces Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who has been appointed political adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The SNSC secretariat was previously headed by Ali Larijani, who was assassinated in a US-Israeli strike in March.

Who is Mohsen Rezaei?

Rezaei, 71, is a veteran of Iran’s military and political establishment. He served as commander-in-chief of the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, including throughout the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, known in Iran as the “Sacred Defence”.

After leaving the IRGC command, Rezaei became a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, the body that resolves disputes over legislation between parliament and the Guardian Council.

The Guardian Council is a separate institution appointed by the supreme leader. It vets candidates for elected political office, including parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts, and reviews legislation for compatibility with Iran’s constitution and Islamic law.

Rezaei has also remained vocal on national security issues, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. In July, he said control of the waterway was worth more than “dozens of atomic bombs”. Last week, he warned the United States that it would “face serious risks and casualties” if its blockade of Iranian ports continued.

Iran has imposed a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US-Israel war launched in February, while the United States has imposed a naval blockade on Iran as part of efforts to increase economic pressure on Tehran.

Why has Rezaei been appointed now?

The Iranian president’s communications office announced on Sunday evening that President Masoud Pezeshkian had appointed Rezaei as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, according to Al Jazeera Arabic.

On the same day, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a decree appointing Rezaei as his representative on the council. The decree referred to Rezaei’s experience and described him as one of the “pioneers of the Sacred Defence era” during the Iran-Iraq War.

The reference to his wartime experience reinforces the importance of his military background at a time when Iran is dealing with an open conflict, pressure from Washington and difficult negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz.

The SNSC is a key institution in Iran’s political system, bringing together strategic considerations from the presidency, foreign ministry, armed forces and security agencies. Its secretary helps coordinate positions between these institutions.

That makes Rezaei’s appointment significant beyond the administrative responsibilities of the secretariat.

What does Rezaei bring to the security council?

Rezaei combines military, political and economic experience. His nearly two decades as IRGC commander gave him longstanding ties to Iran’s military and security establishment, while his subsequent role on the Expediency Discernment Council gave him experience in the political system.

Abas Aslani, a senior research fellow at the Tehran-based Center for Middle East Strategic Studies, told Al Jazeera that Rezaei brings military, economic and political experience to the position.

“They needed to have someone who can somehow synchronise different bodies of the government,” Aslani said.

“Politically, he is not that much different from his predecessor on security, but the role he can play domestically, and being a balancing act in the country, is quite significant in this regard,” he added.

Aslani also said Rezaei’s background could be important in negotiations with the United States.

“I think it is important to have someone who is able to reach out to different factions and to talk to them, and that is why he has been picked,” he said.

Rezaei’s political positioning also matters. During the 2024 presidential election, he backed Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, placing him electorally closer to the conservative wing represented by Ghalibaf, the current parliament speaker and chief negotiator in talks with the United States, rather than the harder-line faction associated with Saeed Jalili, who finished runner-up to Pezeshkian.

That does not make Rezaei a moderate figure, nor does a single electoral endorsement establish his permanent political alliances. But it indicates that his position within the conservative camp does not necessarily align with Jalili and forces most opposed to negotiations with Washington.

His political and institutional connections could therefore give him room to work across several parts of Iran’s establishment: Pezeshkian’s government, which has adopted a discourse more open to negotiations; the conservative camp associated with Ghalibaf; and the military and security establishment with which Rezaei has longstanding ties.

Could his appointment affect talks with the US?

One interpretation is that Rezaei’s military background could strengthen the security establishment’s influence over Iran’s negotiating position. Another is that the same background could give the leadership greater domestic cover if it ultimately chooses to reach an agreement with Washington.

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera Arabic offered both readings.

Iranian journalist and political analyst Mashallah Shamsolvaezin said Rezaei’s appointment surprised some Iranians who had expected new figures to enter the Supreme National Security Council to lead the institution during the war and respond to demands for renewal in decision-making.

At the same time, Shamsolvaezin said Rezaei’s military record could give decisions made by the council stronger political and security guarantees among harder-line forces.

The issue is particularly relevant to negotiations. Any agreement with Washington could face opposition from hardline factions that accuse negotiators of weakness or of compromising Iran’s security interests.

Shamsolvaezin argued that Rezaei’s history as a former IRGC commander could help contain such criticism.

His presence could make it more difficult for opponents of a negotiated settlement to portray the process as a concession driven by weaker or more moderate political forces. If a figure with Rezaei’s military credentials supports a settlement, he could provide greater domestic cover for its implementation.

Al Jazeera Arabic reported two seemingly contradictory interpretations of the appointment. One sees it as Tehran’s response to increased US pressure, with Iran signalling that sanctions, blockades and military pressure will be met with a tougher security posture.

The other interpretation is that Rezaei could help prepare the ground for difficult decisions in negotiations. A figure closely associated with the military and security establishment could potentially defend an agreement within Iran more effectively than a politician perceived as belonging to a more moderate current.

Shamsolvaezin said Rezaei could therefore help advance negotiations with the United States because his military history provides domestic cover and a major guarantee for implementing any future understanding.

Does the appointment signal a harder Iranian position?

Not all analysts read the appointment as preparation for a negotiated settlement.

International relations professor Mohsen Farkhani sees it more as evidence of a shift in Iran’s security doctrine. He told Al Jazeera Arabic that Rezaei’s appointment followed what he described as repeated US violations of the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), as well as the failure of diplomacy to contain tensions and the war. Tehran has accused Washington of violating the terms of the MoU.

Farkhani argues that Rezaei’s experience commanding the IRGC and organising forces during the Iran-Iraq War fits what he describes as Iran’s move towards “offensive deterrence based on punishment”.

Under this approach, Iran would be prepared for a serious military confrontation and a prolonged war of attrition, combining conventional warfare with the asymmetric methods it has traditionally relied upon.

Farkhani expects this reading of the appointment to translate into less flexible Iranian positions in possible negotiations with Washington and on questions involving sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, Rezaei’s appointment does not by itself alter the formal structure of Iranian decision-making. Farkhani noted that the council continues to operate within defined parameters and coordinates between institutions under the supervision of the supreme leader, whose decisions remain final.

The appointment could nevertheless give military and security considerations greater weight when political and diplomatic options are assessed.

What does it mean for the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain one of the most important issues facing Rezaei in his new role. The narrow waterway is a major route for global oil and gas shipments, with roughly a fifth of global oil and gas passing through it.

Rezaei has repeatedly highlighted control of the strait as a central element of Iran’s strategic leverage. His comments about its value and his warning to the United States over the blockade of Iranian ports indicate the importance he attaches to the issue.

His appointment therefore comes as negotiations over the waterway are taking place alongside wider US-Iran tensions. Any discussion over reopening navigation, lifting blockades or determining the terms governing the strait will involve security, military, economic and diplomatic considerations — precisely the areas represented within the Supreme National Security Council.

What does Rezaei’s appointment ultimately signal?

The appointment does not provide a clear answer on whether Iran intends to escalate its confrontation with the United States or move towards a negotiated settlement.

The two main interpretations point in different directions. One sees the selection of a former IRGC commander as evidence that military and security considerations are being given greater priority and that Tehran is preparing for a prolonged confrontation. The other argues that Rezaei’s military credentials could make it easier for Iran’s leadership to secure domestic acceptance for difficult negotiations or an eventual agreement.

For Shamsolvaezin, Rezaei’s importance lies in his ability to provide political cover for decisions taken during a period of war and negotiations. For Farkhani, the appointment reflects a greater emphasis on deterrence and military preparedness.

In either case, Rezaei’s significance lies less in the formal powers of the SNSC secretary than in his position between Iran’s political leadership, military establishment and security institutions. His appointment puts a former IRGC chief at the centre of the process through which Tehran coordinates its response to the United States, manages internal political divisions and approaches negotiations and questions over the Strait of Hormuz.