In the labyrinthine alleys of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, merchants often repeat an old Persian adage: history rarely repeats itself, but it rhymes. That idea captures the arc of modern Iranian power, from the secret police of a pro-Western monarch to the ideological military force that now shapes Iran’s politics, its regional strategy, and its confrontations with rivals such as Israel and the US. At the centre of that story stands the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military, intelligence, and economic powerhouse, often described by analysts as a state within a state. Born out of the revolution in 1979, the force has grown into one of the most influential institutions in West Asia. It is also a projecting power―from Lebanon to Latin America―and playing a pivotal role in the escalating tensions between Iran, Israel, and Washington.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Tehran’s Shadow Army
The IRGC has evolved into one of West Asia’s most powerful military agencies.
To understand the IRGC’s rise, experts say it is necessary to go back to the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran’s last monarch.
During the Cold War, Iran was one of the US’ closest allies in the region. After the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, backed by American and British intelligence, the Shah consolidated his rule and pursued rapid modernisation. But modernisation came with authoritarian control. In 1957, with the assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Shah created SAVAK, Iran’s national intelligence and security service. Some called it the secret police.
SAVAK grew into a monster, with membership swelling to around 6,000 agents, explains Anu Sharma, assistant professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. But they were not just spies; they were the gatekeepers of fear. The main aim of SAVAK was simple: curb dissent. They had a stranglehold on the media, ensuring that no bad news about the Shah ever reached the public. “If anyone dared to spread anti-government propaganda, they risked being hanged or simply disappearing into the Shah’s prisons,” says Sharma.
The repression helped fuel the very revolution the system was meant to prevent. By the late 1970s, economic inequality, political repression, and anger at Western influence triggered mass protests. The movement found its most powerful voice in exiled cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, whose sermons and speeches circulated widely across Iran. In 1979, the monarchy collapsed in the Iranian Revolution. But the new regime faced a problem: the regular military, known as the Artesh, had been closely tied to the Shah. Revolutionary leaders feared it could stage a counter-coup.
Khomeini’s solution was to create an entirely new force. In April 1979, he formally established the IRGC, a paramilitary organisation tasked with defending the revolution and safeguarding the new Islamic system. Unlike the traditional army, the IRGC was built on ideological loyalty.
Sharma explains: “The IRGC is widely seen as the core force safeguarding the identity and ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic established after the Iranian Revolution. Unlike Iran’s regular military or elected government, the IRGC does not report to the president; instead, it answers directly to the Supreme Leader, currently Ali Khamenei.”
The IRGC’s transformation from an improvised militia into a powerful military institution came during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Iran. “Iran became locked in a battle for survival that necessitated a deep reliance on the IRGC to supplement its conventional military capabilities that had been ravaged by post-revolution purges,” notes Cameron Keyani, Director of Analysis at Artis International in a research paper.
The brutal eight-year conflict killed hundreds of thousands of people while reshaping Iran’s security structure. While the regular army fought conventional battles, the IRGC developed tactics that would later define Iran’s military strategy: asymmetric warfare, guerrilla operations, and the use of ideologically motivated fighters. “For young Iranian men destined for conscription, the IRGC became an attractive destination for those seeking better pay and social advancement, and thus attracted some of the best and brightest Iranian youth,” Keyani explains. During the war, the IRGC expanded into multiple branches―ground forces and naval units operating in the Persian Gulf, missile programmes, and intelligence divisions. By the end of the conflict, it had become a parallel military structure with immense political influence.
The IRGC and its affiliated forces, including the Basij militia, number in the hundreds of thousands. But the organisation’s power extends far beyond military strength. Sharma notes that in many ways, the IRGC is another form and type of SAVAK. “Just as SAVAK kept a stranglehold on the media and crushed dissent for the Shah, the IRGC maintains a strong control on the media and businesses to keep the idea of the Supreme Leader intact,” says Sharma.
Over the past three decades, the IRGC has embedded itself deeply into Iran’s economy. Through conglomerates such as Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the Guards have secured major infrastructure contracts, including pipelines, ports, and telecommunications networks. Sanctions imposed by Western countries unintentionally strengthened the organisation’s economic influence by pushing more strategic industries into semi-state networks dominated by the IRGC. Former members have also entered politics in large numbers. Several ministers, parliamentarians, and even former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once served in the Guard.
Western intelligence agencies have long accused the IRGC of running covert operations far beyond West Asia. Authorities in Europe have linked Iranian operatives to plots targeting dissidents and Israeli interests. In Latin America, investigators connected Iran and Hezbollah to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. The US formally designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation in 2019, an unprecedented move against an official branch of another country’s military. Iran denies many of these allegations, arguing its operations are defensive and aimed to counter Western and Israeli influence.
The IRGC also oversees Iran’s rapidly advancing missile and drone programmes. Its ballistic missile arsenal, among the largest in West Asia, serves as the backbone of Iran’s deterrence strategy. Iranian-designed drones such as the Shahed-136 have gained global attention in recent conflicts due to its low cost and ability to overwhelm air defenses. These technologies are central to Iran’s doctrine of asymmetric warfare, challenging technologically superior adversaries without matching them weapon for weapon.
Inside Iran, the IRGC acts as both guardian and power broker. The force helps enforce internal security, particularly through the Basij militia, which has been deployed during major protest movements over the past two decades. Its influence over the media, security services, and economic networks has made it one of the most powerful actors in the Islamic Republic. Some analysts argue that Iran has gradually evolved into a hybrid system in which elected institutions coexist with a powerful security establishment led by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard.
“The IRGC’s success was buttressed by its centrality to the ideological framework underpinning the Iranian state, and by its indispensability to the most powerful political elites in the country. This early success was further enforced by the IRGC’s development of Iran’s offensive capabilities. It was not through conventional military buildup and outright invasions of neighbouring countries, but through the creation of proxy paramilitaries and institutional capture of neighbouring governments,” explains Keyani.
Beyond Iran’s borders, the IRGC exerts influence through its elite expeditionary unit, the Quds Force. For decades it was commanded by Qasem Soleimani, a powerful general who became a central architect of Iran’s regional strategy until he was killed in a 2020 US drone strike. The Quds Force trains, funds, and arms allied militias across West Asia, building what Tehran calls the Axis of Resistance. Through these alliances, Iran has extended its strategic reach across West Asia without relying solely on its conventional military. The first group the IRGC cultivated for the purposes of proxy warfare was Hezbollah. Hezbollah was the incubator for the expression of IRGC ideology outside of Iran. While the realist, hard-power benefits of developing such a group might seem obvious in retrospect, it was developed at a time when the nascent Iranian state was under significant military and economic pressure.
More than four decades after the revolution that created it, the IRGC has evolved from a loose collection of revolutionary militias into one of West Asia’s most powerful military agencies, an organisation capable of shaping wars, influencing politics, and projecting Iranian power far beyond Tehran. And as regional tensions intensify, the shadow army forged during the revolution remains at the centre of the unfolding crisis.
Jinit Parmar is senior correspondent, Outlook. He is based in Mumbai