A Recipe For Friendship: How India-Russia Relations Stay Strong Despite Headwinds

It has become a cliché to describe the India-Russia relationship as either a friendship encapsulated by the slogan “Hindi Rusi bhai bhai”, or a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”—an official designation adopted in the 2010 bilateral agreement. Both terms are employed to emphasise a strong bond with Russia, a country that has endured the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and other geopolitical shifts. That is how the relationship has acquired the additional title of being “time-tested.”

The phenomenon of India-Russia relations has come to light again amid the Russia-Ukraine war. New Delhi has found itself in the epicentre of the Russia-West tussle, compelled to make tough foreign policy choices. India’s stance has been one of strict neutrality: not endorsing Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine and urging a swift end to the war, while continuing economic engagement with Russia.

Despite its diplomatic finesse, this approach has irked the Western capitals who would like New Delhi to put more pressure on Moscow. However, India’s fence-sitting and its occasional efforts to act as a bridge between conflicting parties—as during its G20 presidency in 2023—have been tolerated by the West. Moreover, India’s record imports of Russian crude oil—which have surged in value from US$2.5 billion in FY2021-2022 to US$50 billion in FY2024-2025—seemingly benefitted all stakeholders, with a significant part of it being re-exported to the US and Europe as refined oil products.

Donald Trump’s ascension to the US presidency has shaken up many things in the global situation, including geopolitical dispositions. In an unexpected and unthinkable move, seven months into his presidency, Trump hosted on American soil Vladimir Putin, the president of a country recognised in the US official documents as an “acute” and “immediate threat”, while simultaneously imposing an unprecedented 50 per cent tariff on India, a US’ “indispensable partner.” The Trump administration’s new assertion that India’s imports of Russian oil are “effectively financing Russia’s war in Ukraine” has posed a challenge to New Delhi’s foreign policy.

Complicating matters further, this coincided with an upward trend in India-Russia relations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Moscow and Kazan in July and November 2024 unlocked the frozen bilateral agenda, with renewed contacts emerging across various sectors of bilateral cooperation, including defence, energy, transport connectivity, trade and business. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the bilateral dialogue remained resilient, with important visits to Moscow by Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in August, and the Modi-Putin meeting at the SCO summit in Tianjin in early September 2025.

Much of these engagements is, in fact, preparatory work for Putin’s visit to India, scheduled for December 2025. The outcomes of the annual leaders’ summit will, however, be largely determined by how India untangles the trade spat with the United States. As Trump sees putting pressure on India as a way of cutting off Moscow’s oil export revenues and eventually bringing the war in Ukraine to an end, New Delhi’s ties with Moscow lie at the heart of Indo-US divergence. This means that finding a middle path in dealing with Trump’s demands can force India to sacrifice some of its energy cooperation with Russia.

While the government-level interaction has remained quite solid, there are more nuances in the business ties. The Indian companies have not rushed to fill in the niches left vacant by Western companies in the Russian market. Those who had previously worked with Russia continued business as usual, while globalised companies joined the exodus from Russia in 2022. Top Indian businesspeople, particularly those with ties to global markets, have been quite reluctant to attend major economic forums in Russia.

Russia’s attempts to woo Indian companies to invest in its economy or to develop joint projects have been generally in vain. Conversely, Russian businesses have shown a spike in interest in either entering the Indian market or expanding their operations. They have experienced many hurdles along the way, though some success stories have emerged, primarily in the railway and digital sectors. The surplus of Indian rupees that Russian companies possess as a result of shifting trade from US dollars to “national currencies” has also prompted Russian companies to invest in the Indian economy, specifically in infrastructure projects, government securities, and stocks.

New trends have also emerged in people-to-people ties. India has always attracted Russians as a tourist destination, but it seems that there has been a steady increase in tourist arrivals over the past three years. There is greater interest in Indian culture, as reflected by the growing number of festivals, book fairs and exhibitions. One such event, “Utsav Bharat”, held in Moscow in July 2025, drew an estimated 850,000 visitors. Bollywood films are now more widely available in the Russian market than before. While they have yet to gain widespread popularity and become as familiar to the Russian people as they were in the Soviet era, the premieres in Russia’s major cities suggest a rekindled enthusiasm.

There has been a growing influx of Indian manpower in Russia, with Indian citizens now the second largest group of foreign nationals for “far abroad” after Chinese workers. Indian labour is now in high demand among Russian enterprises, primarily in the construction, textiles, warehousing, agriculture and food industries. The number of Indians studying in Russia is growing, with more than 30,000 students enrolled at Russian universities in 2024-2025 academic year, primarily undertaking medical studies. That said, Russia does not appear to be an appealing destination for Indian tourists. Although the e-visa system enables visitors to stay in the country for up to 16 days, the number of Indian tourists arriving has not come close to reaching pre-pandemic levels, fluctuating around 25,000-30,000.

Despite positive dynamics, the tenuous connection at a grassroots level is arguably the weakest point in India-Russia ties. While the older generations are more aware of the friendship between the two countries, having a general knowledge of each other through Bollywood films and Soviet literature, the younger generations are much less informed. Historical memory remains an invisible link between the two countries, a recipe for their friendship, with sentiments from the past—sometimes embellished—still informing much part of today’s decision-making. However, the choices of the future leaders will likely be driven by much more pragmatic considerations and this generational shift will inevitably affect the political ties between the two countries within a decade or so.

Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow–Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation (ORF).

(Views expressed are personal)