Yet Another Coup

The political confrontation, which was triggered off by allegations ofarbitrary and corrupt governance by Mr. Thaksin and his erratic styleof functioning, was made worse by the divide between Bangkok and ruralThailand. The Bangkok elite, which has always exercised, like theParisian elite of France, a disproportionately large influence overthe country's political landscape despite its numerical minority, haddifficulty in accepting a leader, who owed his political rise andsurvival to the support of the rural poor and not to the elite of thecapital.

Mr. Thaksin, an ex-policeman of Chinese origin, who himself came fromChiangmai in the rural north, gravitated to politics from the world ofbusiness, where he had made a name as Thailand's telecom tycoon afterleaving the police. He tried to introduce into the corridors of theGovernment the lessons on efficiency and success which he had learntin the corporate world. Even his worst critics admit that hiscontribution to improving governmental efficiency and the resultingeconomic prosperity was considerable. For a tycoon from the corporateworld, he showed more sensitivity to the welfare and problems of therural and urban poor than any professional politician had done in thepast.

What undid him despite this was the widespread perception in Bangkokof nepotism and corruption and his seeming disregard for the rules ofthe democratic game. The overwhelming support of the rural poor forhim and his ability to win elections with their support made himdisregard the views and criticism of the urban elite, which unitedagainst him last year to start a long period of street agitation inthe name of good and democratic governance free of the evilsassociated with his tenure.

They projected his continuance in politics as incompatible with goodand democratic governance and boycotted the parliamentary elections oflast April, which robbed the elections of any constitutional validitydespite his securing a majority for his Thai Ruk Thai party. He made atemporary exit from the post of Prime Minister in order to satiate theopposition and make it amenable to participation in a fresh election,scheduled for November.

When the opposition agitation seemed to have started losing steam as aresult of his temporary exit, he resumed charge again as the caretakerPrime Minister, thereby provoking them again into a state ofconfrontation. It was the intervention of the King, who is veneratedby the entire country, which managed to restore a semblance of balanceto political life in the country.

But this did not change his ways of functioning. The on-again,off-again political confrontation between him and the opposition andhis chronic inability to change his style of functioning endangeredpolitical stability in Thailand, creating fears of its likely negativeimpact on its hitherto prosperous economy.

In his preoccupation with the political challenges from the oppositionin Bangkok, he neglected the bleeding ulcer of jihadi terrorism in thethree Muslim majority provinces of Southern Thailand, which hasresulted in nearly 1,400 fatalities during the last two years. Hishandling of the persisting terrorism was typical of his erratic styleof functioning. A lack of consistency in his attention to the problemsand grievances of the Muslims of the south, his failure to realise thegravity of the problem and his reliance on old cronies from the policeto deal with the situation despite their lack of understanding of thesensitivities of the Muslims resulted in a bleeding low-intensity,medium- fatality and high-alienation insurgency.

The jihadi terrorism in Southern Thailand has more in common withterrorism in Bangladesh than with that in the rest of South-East Asia.The apparent model is not so much the Jemmah Islamiya (JI) ofSouth-East Asia as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and theJamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) of Bangladesh. The defining characteristicsof the Bangladesh model--well-orchestrated multiple attacks meant moreto demonstrate their presence and strength than to kill unnecessarily,avoidance of mass casualty terrorism and avoidance of attacks onforeign nationals--were replicated in Southern Thailand andsupplemented by targeted assassinations from moving two-wheelers ofnot only non-Muslims, but also Muslims associated with the localadministration, a typical modus operandi of the HUJI and theLashkar-e-Jhangvi of Pakistan.

The implications of the large-scale movement (over 1000) of Muslimsfrom Southern Thailand to Pakistan and Bangladesh for studying in themadrasas there remained unexamined by successive Governments inThailand. This has created a growing reservoir of jihadi recruits inthe area.

Dealing with the jihadi terrorism and putting an end to it called foran integrated counter-terrorism strategy encompassing the revamping ofthe intelligence apparatus in the southern provinces and in Bangkok,strengthening of physical security and the counter-terrorismcapability of the local police and a mechanism for monitoring andsolving the grievances of the Muslims. Such a strategy is yet to beevolved. The apparently weak state of the intelligence collection,analysis and assessment process is reflected in the inability of theGovernment to clearly identify the organisation or organisationsresponsible for the terrorism and their external linkages. Recentterrorist strikes indicate a possible change in the jihadi tactics,with a willingness to target the foreign tourists to SouthernThailand, who are not many. The terrorists are still keeping away fromBangkok and other tourist spots.

In June, at least 40 home-made bombs exploded across the threesouthern provinces, killing at least two people and injuring manyothers. On August 31, two people were killed and many others injuredin the Yala province when 21 banks were attacked with bombs in quicksuccession. On September 15, four people, including two foreigners,were killed and 62 injured after five bombs ripped through a populartourist area at Hat Yai in the Songkhla province. On September 17,bombers and arsonists set fire to school buildings, attacked amilitary convoy and damaged a railway track in the Narathiwatprovince. There were no fatalities.

Among the various organisations, which have been blamed by the localPolice from time to time, are the Pattani United LiberationOrganisation (PULO), an organisation of the 1970s vintage, the BRN(the Barisan Revolusi Nasional), its offshoot RKK (Runda KumpularmKecil) and the GMIP (Gerakan Mujahadeen Islam Pattani). The RKK hasbeen blamed by the police for many of the recent incidents.

These two factors--the continuing high political and economic cost ofMr. Thaksin's confrontation with his political opponents and his lackof effective attention to the bleeding ulcer in the South--seemed tohave triggered off the coup led by Army chief General SonthiBoonyaratkalin, with the reported backing of the chiefs of the AirForce and the Navy. Sonthi, who is reputed to be close to the King,will serve as acting Prime Minister, army spokesman Col. AkaratChitroj said. Gen. Sonthi is reported to be a Muslim.

In a televised statement, the General said: "We have seized power. TheConstitution, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Cabinetand the Constitutional Court have all been terminated. We agreed thatthe caretaker Prime Minister (Mr. Thaksin) has caused an unprecedentedrift in society, widespread corruption, nepotism, and interfered inindependent agencies, crippling them so they cannot function. If thecaretaker Government is allowed to govern it will hurt the country.They have also repeatedly insulted the King. Thus, the council neededto seize power to control the situation, to restore normalcy and tocreate unity as soon as possible."

Mr. Thaksin's deputy and most trusted aide Mr. Chidchai Vanasathidya,the secretary in the Prime Minister's office, Mr. Prommin Lertsuridej,and Mr. Thaksin's brother-in-law Mr. Somchai Wongsawat, who ispermanent secretary in the Justice Ministry, are reported to havebeen detained by the Army.

There have been 17 coups in Thailand since World War II. This is thefirst coup since 1992. Whether the coup leaders are able to stabilisethemselves or face opposition would depend on the attitude of the Kingto the coup.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for TopicalStudies, Chennai.