Strategic Retreat

As winter sets in across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the intensity ofthe ground operations by the Neo Taliban as well as the NATO and Afghan governmentforces against each other is likely to come down. Skirmishes and hit and runattacks by conventional formations will continue, but the likelihood of fightinginvolving large formations will be less. However, there will be no let-up insuicide attacks by Neo Taliban suicide bombers.

Apart from the nearly 130 suicide bombings so far this year-- as high as in2006--the most significant developments in respect of martyrdom operations werethe repeated demonstration by the Neo Taliban of its ability to carry outsuicide attacks in Kabul itself and the better training of its suicide bombers--whowere mostly Pashtuns recruited in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and amongthe tribals of Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In 2006and in the earlier months of 2007, the suicide bombers, out of nervousness, wereblowing themselves up before reaching the vicinity of their targets, therebycausing more civilian fatalities than fatalities among Afghan government forcesand government servants. Better training post-June,2007 is reflected in theirability to hold action till they reached the vicinity of the intended targetsand then only blow themselves up. As a result, they are registering moresuccessful martyrdom operations than  during the pre-June,2007, period.

Claims of NATO spokesmen of active ground involvement of Al Qaeda in Afghanterritory are not independently corroborated. Al Qaeda--mainly through itsUzbeck components--has been actively involved in training the Neo Taliban'ssuicide bombers and other volunteers in camps in North Waziristan in Pakistan'sFATA, but it has been avoiding participation in the ground actions in Afghanterritory. Throughout 2006 and 2007, Al Qaeda's role in Afghan as well asPakistani territory has been as a motivator and a trainer and not as an actualparticipant in the operations. In the current operations of the Pakistan Armyagainst the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Fazlullahin the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), most of thosecaptured or killed by the Pakistan Army were Pashtuns--Pakistani and Afghan--and a couple of Uzbeks, who had been living in the area since the 1980s. Nocapture or killing of an Arab or an Uzbek of post-9/11 arrival in the area hasbeen reported.

While the Neo Taliban has thus kept up its increased suicide bombings, themuch threatened massive spring offensive of 2007-- about which the late MullaDadulla, killed by the Americans on the basis of precise HUMINT in May,2007,used to speak so often before his death-- did not materialise. In 2006, the NeoTaliban showed a remarkable capability for conventional warfare--- standing upand fighting against the NATO and Afghan forces in large formations of evenabout 400. These conventional skills were not much in evidence during 2007.Reliable police sources say that this was due to the fact that while the NeoTaliban has been getting a regular flow of volunteers for suicide missions, itsability to recruit men for conventional fighting in large numbers has beenaffected after the death of Mulla Dadullah, who was a great motivator.

There has been much hype by NATO and Afghan Army spokesmen about theirprojected success in wresting control of the town of Musa Qala in the Helmandarea from the Neo Taliban following a raid jointly organised by American,British and Afghan government forces between  December 7 and 10,2007. Asthe Taliban did in 2001 and 2002, the Neo Taliban has been following anoperational policy of not fighting defensive battles to maintain its controlover territory  as such defensive battles result in large casualties for itas well as the local civilians. Since 2006, its conventional operations havebeen more offensive than defensive. Whenever it assessed that it will not beable to hold on to territory under its control, it has not hesitated to withdrawand disperse. That is what it did at Musa Qala. The real significance of theMusa Qala battle was not any defeat of the Neo Taliban, but its remarkablesuccess in withdrawing and dispersing in order without trace. There were hardlyany significant captures of Neo Taliban fighters by the NATO forces. Some oftheir tall claims about having captured important Neo Taliban commanders haveproved wrong.

AS-Sahab, the PSYWAR wing of Al Qaeda, which was previously focussing oncarrying on PSYWAR mainly  for Al Qaeda,  is now producing PSYWARpackages for the Neo Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) too.It is evolving into the PSYWAR wing of the International Islamic Front (IIF) ofbin Laden as a whole.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.