Stop Back Seat Driving

I wrote in that article: "Pakistan is on the brink of a destabilisingsituation. It brings Iraq to one's mind, but it is not yet Iraq. It can turninto an Iraq-like situation at least in the Pashtun belt if Musharraf and hisAmerican backers do not conduct themselves with restraint and wisdom."

The post-Lal Masjid raid Pashtun anger, which caused death and destruction rightacross Pakistan, gave birth to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and triggeredthe assassination of Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, hadrecently shown some signs of subsiding following some conciliatory steps takenby the government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani such as facilitating therelease on bail of those arrested during the raid and allotment of land outsidethe mosque for re-starting the two madrasas attached to the mosque before theraid. These madrasas had catered to the requirements of the children of manypoor Pashtun families from the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) andthe Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), includingSwat, which is presently under the effective control of Maulana Fazlullah of theTehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).

If the US were wise, it would have taken the initiative in funding theestablishment of well-equipped schools with facilities for boarding and lodginglocated outside the tribal belt for the children of internally displaced Pashtunfamilies from the FATA and the Malakand Division, who have been forced to leavetheir villages due to the fighting between the TNSM and the TTP on the one sideand the security forces on the other.

But wisdom has not been a defining characteristic of the US policy in Pakistan.Billions of US dollars have been earmarked for the security forces and for otherprojects with a long gestation period meant for the benefit of the civilians.But hardly any money has been earmarked for providing humanitarian relief to theinternally-displaced persons from the tribal belt and for looking after theirchildren. A new crop of suicide and non-suicide terrorists has started comingout of these internally-displaced Pashtuns and providing a surge to the forcesof the TNSM and the TTP.

The Pashtun anger is the root cause of the mushrooming Taliban organisationsright across the Pashtun belt. There are Talibans and Talibans. There are asmany Talibans as there are tribal chiefs. Instead of trying to understand thePashtun anger and to mitigate it, President Barack Obama, his advisers and aideshave been fueling it further through their insensitive and thoughtlessstatements and comments, which tend to project the Pashtuns as a whole asaccomplices of Al Qaeda, paint an apocalyptic characterisation of thedevelopments in the Pashtun belt and unnecessarily over-stress the role of thesecurity forces in dealing with the violence resulting from the Pashtun anger.

Unless and until the Pashtun anger is understood, addressed and mitigated, thespread of the Taliban virus cannot be arrested and reversed. The most importantrole in this regard has to be that of the progressive Pashtun politicians of theNorth-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. There are many progressivePashtun leaders. Let us not forget that the leftist movement in Pakistan andAfghanistan had its strongest roots in the Pashtun belt. Neither the ObamaAdministration nor its predecessor administration of George Bush has had timefor the Pashtun leaders of the Pashtun soil.

The entire focus of the US administration and the US think tanks has been on theIslamabad-based leaders--political and military-- many of whom enjoy very littlecredibility in the eyes of the Pakistani people in general and the Pashtuns inparticular. Whatever little credibility they might have enjoyed, has beenweakened, if not destroyed, by the unthinking statements and comments coming outof Obama and his advisers. The limited credibility, which President Asif AliZardari enjoyed, has been irreparably damaged by Obama's negative remarks onPakistan's civilian leadership during his interactions with the media on hiscompleting 100 days in office. The subsequent damage control exercise by RichardHolbrooke, his special envoy for the Af-Pak region, who praised Pakistan'scivilian leadership, could not repair the damage.

Of Pakistan's mainstream leaders, Nawaz Sharif enjoyed a high level ofcredibility among the Punjabis and the Pashtuns. This was because of hisindependent line on the way American influence, according to him, has distortedPakistan's handling of the situation in the tribal belt. His call for a re-thinkon the way Pakistan has been uncritically supporting the US operations added tohis popularity. He projected himself as a man who can stand up to US pressure.Pakistan needs more such leaders who are seen by its people as not amenable toUS pressure and as capable of taking an independent line suited to Pakistan'snational interests.

Comments, reports and articles in the US media projecting Nawaz Sharif as aleader with whom the US can do business and as a possible alternative to Zardari,have damaged his credibility as a man capable of independent thinking and newideas as to how to deal with the cancer of terrorism. Both Zardari and PresidentHamid Karzai of Afghanistan have created a negative image of themselves in theeyes of their respective people by the manner in which they responded to theAmerican summons to go to Washington DC to discuss their counter-terrorismpolicy and co-operation.

The statements and comments of Obama and his advisers praising the Pakistan Armyin general and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), inparticular have created suspicions of a new American game to reinforce the roleof the Army even at the cost of further weakening the democratic forces inPakistan. The repeated comments of Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefsof Staff, highlighting his personal equation with Kayani and praising Kayani'spositive response to American concerns on the ground situation have had theunintended effect of making him seen by a growing number of people not only inthe Pakistani civil society, but also even in the armed forces as America's manin the GHQ.

Political and military leaders who are seen by the people of Pakistan ascarrying out the American diktats cannot succeed in winning the support of theirpeople for their policies. The plethora of statements and comments on Pakistan'sinternal situation coming from the Obama Administration without any concernsabout their impact on the minds of the Pakistani people are going to add to thedifficulties of any government in Islamabad in adopting a counter-terrorism andcounter-Taliban strategy, which would be seen as motivated by the interests ofPakistan and not of the US.

Obama and his advisers have been conducting themselves as if they are still inthe midst of their election campaign and not as the new rulers of the US alreadyin office, who have to be careful about their public comments. The internalsecurity situation in Pakistan arising from the activities of the PakistaniTaliban is alarming, but this cannot detract from the fact that how the Talibanis handled in the Pashtun belt is an internal affair of Pakistan. Others such asthe US can give it discreet advice and whatever help it needs in dealing withthe situation, but they should not give the impression that they are back-seatdriving Pakistan's internal security management.

Dealing with the difficult situation in Pakistan at this critical time in itshistory requires a lot of intelligence, sensitivity and discretion. Thesequalities have been in short supply in the Obama Administration. 

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.