Shock And Outrage

Even as global attention remains focused on the war on Iraq, the trajectory of Jehaditerrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is beginning to soar. Two dramatic incidents in the space of 12 hourson Sunday, March 23, 2003, demonstrate the strengthening trends to escalation of terrorism in the State.

Former Hizb-ul-Mujahideen  Salar-e-Ala or chief commander, AbdulMajeed Dar, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the Noor Bagh area of Sopore township in north Kashmirwhen two gun-wielding youth barged into his ancestral house and fired indiscriminately, killing Dar on thespot and critically injuring his mother and sister.

In the second incident, at least 24 Kashmiri Pandits were killed at the Nadimarg villagenear Shopian in the Pulwama district around midnight. The terrorists first snatched the policemen's weaponsand later fired indiscriminately on the Pandits. The dead included 11 women and two children. According topreliminary reports, approximately 25 heavily-armed terrorists dressed in police uniforms descended on thetiny village, 75 km from the capital city of Srinagar, and fired indiscriminately on the unarmed Pandits.[Editor's note: this preliminary version has since been supplemented by subsequent accounts from officialsources and survivors. Please click here for latest updates]

Two terrorist organizations have claimed responsibility for Dar's killing: the hitherto little-known, 'SaveKashmir Movement', believed to be a front of the Al Umar Mujahiddeen, while claiming responsibility, labeledDar as "an informant of Indian agencies" and "an enemy of the Kashmiri people." Separately, a person describing himself as the spokesperson of Al Nasireen, another obscure group, in amessage to a local news agency, said that activists of his group killed Dar for his 'anti-movementactivities'.

Meanwhile, another person claiming to be a spokesperson for the HM called up the newsagency and condemned Dar's killing. Dar had been a front ranking terrorist in the HM before his 'expulsion' inMay 2002. In his capacity as 'deputy supreme commander', 'Military adviser' and 'chief commander ofoperations', Dar played a significant role in the indoctrination, recruitment, launching and training of Hizbcadres. Reports suggest that, while managing the Hizb training camps in Pakistan, he was the only Kashmiriterrorist who had direct access to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief as also General Pervez Musharraf.

Dar's killing is the culmination of an almost three-year old battle for supremacy being waged by his followersagainst the faction led by Syed Salahuddin, the HM 'supreme commander' and chief of the 14-member United JehadCouncil (UJC), a conglomerate of Pakistan-based terrorist organisations.

Abdul Majeed Dar came into prominence when he returned from Pakistan three years ago toannounce a unilateral cease-fire with Indian security forces on July 24, 2000. On August 3, 2000, a high-levelofficial team of the Government of India, headed by the then Union Home Secretary Kamal Pande, visitedSrinagar and conducted a meeting with Dar and his associates at the Nehru Guest House. However, on August 8,2000, Syed Salahuddin 'withdrew' the cease-fire at a Press Conference in Islamabad.

The Dar initiated 'peace talks' led to dissent within the Hizb, with the Pakistani ranksfearing that an effective process of negotiations may actually be established, to the detriment of Pakistaniinterests. Subsequently, a war for supremacy ensued within the HM, and a distinctive 'bimodal' operatingstructure emerged, with separate factions owing allegiance to Dar and Salahuddin.

Since the ill-fated peace talks, followers of Salahuddin - who operates from Pakistan - andMajeed Dar, who remained 'underground' in the Kashmir Valley, have had a series of internecine clashes. InNovember 2002, two Salahuddin loyalists were killed in factional conflict reported at the Mirpur and Tarbelacamps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Hizb leadership in Pakistan has also issued statements claimingDar's alleged alignment with Indian intelligence agencies.

Reports suggest that Dar had been disillusioned with the Pakistani Inter ServicesIntelligence (ISI) and its military leadership. Dar was 'suspended' by the Salahuddin faction and replaced bySaiful Islam as the Hizb 'chief commander of operations' in Kashmir, on May 4, 2002. Two of his closeassociates, Assad Yazdani and Zaffar Abdul Fatah, were also 'removed' from positions of command. Again, on May9, 2002, the Hizb leadership expelled another two 'divisional commanders' in south Kashmir.

Even as Dar and his associates were accused of assisting Indian security forces, many ofhis loyalists were killed by cadres of the Salahuddin group. Faced with Dar's rising popularity within the HMranks, Salahuddin and the ISI had, in the recent months, initiated several moves to marginalize and target Darand his associates in the terrorist ensemble.

The Salahuddin's faction is also widely believed to have carried out the January 31, 2003 killing of theeditor of News and Feature Alliance (NAFA), Parvaz Mohammad Sultan, in Srinagar. NAFA had beenprominently reporting on the internal feud in the HM for the preceding two weeks prior to Sultan's killing.The NAFA reports had mentioned that the Valley-based faction led by Dar had 'overthrown' the Salahuddinfaction.

Within hours of Majeed Dar's murder, sources indicate that clashes broke out at HM camps in PoK between theslain leader's followers and the faction led by Salahuddin. Violent confrontations are believed to have takenplace at camps in Kotli, Mirpur, Oggi, Jungal-Mangal, Haripur and Gadhi-Dupatta. Preliminary reports indicatethat Salahuddin was fidgety over the prospect of an imminent test of strength in the camps. Details ofcasualties and the outcome of these clashes were still not available at the time of this report.

The brief lull in Jehadi violence in J&K over the December - February period was tactical,primarily the result of adverse weather conditions along the passes on the border. However, Chief of ArmyStaff, General N.C. Vij, on March 23, 2003, had stated that there would be a spurt in infiltration intoJ&K from across the border after the snow started melting, and this has been borne out by trends in Marchitself - much earlier than had been usual in preceding years.

Infiltration along the Indo-Pakistan Line of Control (LoC) and border has increased withthe Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)  stepping up their activities in theState. As a result, the entire Jammu region, along with some areas in Srinagar, Anantnag, Budgam, Pulwama,Baramulla and Kupwara districts have been declared 'disturbed areas'. Reports indicate that security forcesare finding some difficulty in countering the renewed threat perception after the Special Operations Group (SOG)of the J&K Police was disbanded by the Mufti Mohammad Sayeed Government.

The massacre of Pandits is a continuation of the process of ethniccleansing launched in January 1990 by Pakistan-backed terrorists. Such incidents are clearlyintended to block the proclaimed State Government policy to facilitate a return of the Pandits to theirhomeland and may, in fact, lead to a further exodus of Pandits from the Valley, as well as from Muslimdominated areas in the Jammu region.

Past incidents have shown that the Hindus who have stayed back in the Valley are a prioritytarget for the terrorists, who lay claims to Kashmir as a 'Muslim land'. The Pulwama massacre is a setback forChief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who had made the 'safe return' of the Pandits a primary plank of hiscampaign during the September-October 2002 elections.

 The State Government had recently drawn up plans to settle the Pandits around theshrine at the holy spring at Tullamullah in Srinagar district and Mattan in the Anantnag district, though thePandits had displayed little enthusiasm for the plan under the prevailing security situation in the Valley.Their reluctance can only multiply manifold after Sunday night's brutal massacre.

There has been much talk of the revival of the 'peaceprocess' by the Union Government, after the appointment of a new interlocutor charged with initiatingnegotiations with various political entities in J&K, as well as the new Chief Minister's enthusiasm for a'political solution' to the violence in the State.

But the mounting violence of the past three weeks demonstrates again - as has beenrepeatedly established in the past - that a search for solutions for the problems of J&K cannot, in fact,be located in J&K. Such a solution will, indeed, remain elusive until the infrastructure of terrorismlocated in Pakistan, and supported by the state structure in Pakistan, is conclusively and irrevocablydismantled and destroyed.

The author is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; AssistantEditor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. Courtesy: South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal