Yet another separatist rebel group in India's Northeast has now confirmed that it is engaged in peacenegotiations with New Delhi. General Secretary of the outlawed Achik National Volunteers' Council (ANVC),Wanding K. Marak, disclosed during a rare interaction with the media last fortnight that his group had ameeting at Bangkok in January with Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director K.P. Singh and Mizoram Chief MinisterZoramthanga, who has emerged as one of the region's key peace brokers. The rebel leader also acknowledged therole played by former Speaker of the Lower House of Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) and a veteran leader of theGaro tribe, P.A. Sangma, in acting as a bridge between the Government and the ANVC, and in preparing theground for the talks.
Formed in December 1995, the ANVC is active in the Garo Hills districts in western Meghalaya, on the borderwith Assam and Bangladesh. The group is engaged in an armed struggle for a separate Garo State (Achik land)comprising the Garo dominated areas in Meghalaya and in adjoining Assam's Kamrup and Goalpara districts. In away, the ANVC is pursuing a 'greater Garoland' dream in much the same way as the Isak-Muivah faction of theNational Socialist Council of Nagalim, which has entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Indian Governmentand is currently holding peace talks, and which harbours plans for a 'greater Nagaland' by merging all Naga-inhabitedareas in the Northeast into a broader Naga homeland.
The Government keeping its doors open for peace negotiations is fine, but it has, of late, been found thatinsurgent groups in the region, many of them no better than ragtag bands of armed men, have been successful inarm-twisting both the Union and State authorities, to lend them the required legitimacy by first declaringthem 'unlawful organizations' and then holding so-called peace talks with them.
Advertisement
On November 16, 2000, within five years of its formation, the ANVC was declared a banned organization bythe Union Government in accordance with the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Till this time, the ANVC'slist of violent activities included killing a dozen policemen and looting cash amounting to about one millionrupees from banks in the area. Till last year, police officials in Meghalaya sought to dismiss the ANVC as anoutfit that had, if anything, no more than a nuisance value, but that did not constitute a significantsecurity threat. But, the group soon stepped up its attack on soft targets, kidnapping people, includingdoctors and engineers, for ransom and keeping up with the odd attacks on policemen on duty. None of this, inany way, increased the ANVC's threat potential. Then comes the confirmation of the IB chief holding talks withleaders of the group in Bangkok.
Arm-twisting as a strategy appears to have been perfected by rebel groups in India's Northeast. The ANVC isnow agitated over the fact that the Union Government has not bothered to take the talks forward after theJanuary interaction in Bangkok, suggesting that the ANVC was in bit of a hurry to clinch some kind of a dealwith New Delhi. What is surprising is the group's stand that it would not enter into any ceasefire agreementwith the Government, even while it was talking peace with it. ANVC leader, Marak, for instance, pointed outthat there was no truce between the Mizo National Front (MNF) of legendary guerrilla leader Laldenga inMizoram, and the Indian Government, when the two sides were engaged in peace negotiations in the mid-eighties.A small group like the ANVC is perhaps aware of the fact that it could disintegrate once it calls a truce withthe authorities.
The question, however, is whether the ANVC is that dangerous a rebel group that it should have been declaredunlawful in the first place within years of its formation, and whether having the 'unlawful' stamp on it was,in fact, one of the ANVC's objectives (or, for that matter, the goal of many other rebel groups in theregion), which could improve its status and linkages with other more powerful rebel groups with internationalconnections, or even to keep its cadres together. It is said that the NSCN-IM had initially backed the ANVCwhile it was still a nascent group. The ANVC then went on to establish links with the National DemocraticFront of Boroland (NDFB), a separatist group fighting for an independent Bodo homeland in westernAssam. Now, however, the ANVC has severed its ties with the NDFB and has slapped a quit notice to the latter,asking its cadres to pull out from the Garo Hills in Meghalaya after a bitter turf war.
Insurgent politics in India's Northeast seems to have fallen into a pattern. Any ethnic group, however smallit might be, begins by encouraging the formation of a rebel group that establishes links with bigger outfits.The group then manages to procure access to weapons, launch a few noticeable attacks, use the media to putacross its so-called political agenda and demands, catch hold of a peace broker and force willing federalofficials to travel to a neighbouring Southeast Asian nation to talk peace. This is happening primarilybecause neither New Delhi nor the state governments address the grievances, fears and apprehensions of theethnic groups unless the demands are raised through the barrel of their guns.
In February, the Indian Government signed an agreement with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), endingthe agitation in Assam's Bodo heartland for a separate State. The Bodos have been given an electivepolitical-administrative structure called the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) with 'maximum autonomy.'However, another Bodo rebel group, the NDFB, remains recalcitrant, and continues with its demand for anindependent Bodo homeland, outside the Indian Union. The NDFB has now also indicated that it is keen to enterinto negotiations with New Delhi. Similarly, two small rebel groups, the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD),active in Southern Assam's North Cachar Hills and a faction of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)in the hills of Karbi Anglong, are in the 'peace mode' and have entered into a truce with the government.Talks with 'big brother' NSCN-IM are already on, and the rival Khaplang faction of the NSCN, too, is on theverge of joining the peace process.
The issue is whether there is enough political space to accommodate these groups and their leaders who have'made a mark' much sooner by their violent activities than most mainstream political leaders can throughyears, if not decades, of service among the masses. What has been created is, in fact, a method that allowsviolent individuals and groups to 'short circuit' the democratic process, putting those who remain committedto the constitution and to lawful politics at a distinct disadvantage.
Advertisement
What is more, the proliferation of groups also creates difficulties of accommodation where rival rebelgroupings seek to occupy and dominate the same political space. Where, for instance, will New Delhiaccommodate the NDFB leaders and cadres in case, like the BLT, this group also agrees to sign a peace deal andcome overground? Where will the NSCN-K fit in a peace agreement signed with the NSCN-IM?
Can New Delhi sign two or more peace accords with rival groups to solve a single problem? And what of theinsidious impact on democratic political parties that the increasing political role of ex-rebel factionsinevitably would have? It is time the Indian government formulated a clear, coherent and internally consistentpolicy to deal with insurgent groups, and put the brakes on the multiplicity of internally conflicting 'peaceprocesses' with all and sundry groups that pass off as insurgent organizations
Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor,The Sentinel, Guwahati. The article appears here courtesy the South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal
