Mush Metamorphosis

A careful reading of the various statements made by Pakistan's President GenPervez Musharraf during his current world tour, which has taken him to Brussels,Havana for the non-aligned summit and for his summit with the Indian PrimeMinister Dr Manmohan Singh and to the US for the UN General Assembly session andhis summit with President George Bush indicates two careful evolutions in histhinking.

The first relates to the on-going US-led war against international terrorismand Pakistan's role in it  and the second to Pakistan's stand on jihaditerrorism in Indian territory.

A significant change in Pakistan's perception on the US-led war againstinternational terrorism is discernible. When he agreed to assist the US in itsmilitary action in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, hedid not question the US perception that both Al Qaeda and the Talibanconstituted terrorist organisations and that, therefore, the war againstterrorism had to be directed against both.

He has now started making a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Neo Talibanas it has re-emerged since 2004. While he continues to project Al Qaeda as aterrorist organisation which needs to be combated militarily in theAfghanistan-Pakistan belt, he has begun viewing the Neo Taliban as an Afghanresistance movement, which should not be viewed with the same glasses as AlQaeda and which needs to be combated more politically than militarily.

He avoids giving the impression that he is trying for a reinstatement of theNeo Taliban in power in Afghanistan. Instead, he wants that the Hamid Karzai governmentshould seek a political accommodation with the Neo Taliban, which would give ita place of honour in the new Afghan political landscape. He does not address thequestion as to how the Neo Taliban's advocacy of an Islamic state based on arule according to the Sharia can be made compatible with a modern, liberaldemocratic state, which is the objective of the Karzai government and itsinternational backers.

The projection of the Neo Taliban as a resistance organisation  and nota terrorist organisation also tends to rationalise his inaction against the NeoTaliban elements operating from Pakistani territory. He is trying to hint to theUS that the obligations assumed by him in the US-led war against terrorism inOctober, 2001, will hereafter apply to Al Qaeda only and not to the Neo Taliban.

His sensational claim in a US television interview that during a meeting withLt.Gen  Mahmood Ahmed, the then Chief of Pakistan's Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI), who was in Washington DC in September, 2001, Mr.RichardArmitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened to bomb Pakistanback to the stone age if it did not co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda andthe Taliban, is meant to convey a message to the Americans as well as his ownpeople that the obligations assumed by him under duress before the US startedits military strikes in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, no longer apply andneeded a revision.

While he would continue to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda as before,his co-operation with the US in relation to the Neo Taliban would be morepolitical than military in order to pave the way for an ultimate dialoguebetween the Neo Taliban and the Karzai government.

His sensational claim is also meant to convey a message to his own people—particularlyto the Islamic political parties whose support he will need to retain power atnext year's general elections in Pakistan—that his co-operation with the USagainst the Taliban in 2001 was under duress, which could not be helped then,but which he would change now. The fact that he has openly admitted that heacted under duress indicates his confidence in the stability of his position inPakistan and in its armed forces. He is confident of managing any adversereaction in Pakistan as a result of his admission.

It is unlikely that he would have made such an admission without priorconsultation with his senior military officers before embarking on his foreigntour. It was not an inadvertent admission in passing, but a calculated,pre-planned admission as a prelude to his meeting with Mr.Bush.

There have been reports of simmering unhappiness in Pakistan's Armed Forcesever since Mr.Bush's visit to Islamabad in March last over three aspects of theUS attitude to Pakistan. The first is the continuing  criticism in the US governmentalas well as non-governmental circles over what is perceived in the US asPakistan's less than sincere co-operation in the war against terrorism. Thesecond is the US reluctance to extend to Pakistan the same kind of civiliannuclear co-operation deal as the US has extended to India. The third is the US attempt  to sell to Pakistan what is viewed in Pakistan's GHQ ascastrated F-16s to prevent their lethal use against India.

These are viewed in the GHQ as a failure on the part of the US to fulfill theobligations to support Pakistan assumed by it in return for the obligationsassumed by Pakistan. In Pakistan's view, since the US has not fulfilled its partof the obligations in toto, there is no reason why Pakistan should not have are-look at its obligations. The General's talks in Washington DC and thesubsequent statements by him and Mr Bush might give the impression thateverything remains as before, but it is not so.

There has been an interesting evolution in the General's position relating tojihadi terrorism in Indian territory too. As I had pointed out in my articles inthe past, Musharraf and the ISI make a clear distinction between what Indiacalls cross-border terrorism in J&K which Pakistan views as a freedomstruggle and jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Even in thepast, long before his meeting with Dr Manmohan Singh in Havana, Gen Musharrafand his spokespersons had no problems in condemning  jihadi terrorism inIndian territory outside J&K and in characterising it as terrorism.

In fact, after the written commitment given by him to Mr A.B.Vajpayee, thethen Prime Minister, at Islamabad in January, 2004, to stop the use of allPakistani-controlled territory for acts of terrorism directed against India,there was a significant drop in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian territoryoutside J&K, which continued till July, 2005. The position has been reversedsince July, 2005, and over 300 innocent civilians have been killed  inseven acts of jihadi terrorism since then.

Musharraf is now prepared to revert to the pre-July, 2005 jihadi lull andco-operate with India in the investigation of any acts which have taken placesince July,2005, in return for Indian co-operation in dealing with what thePakistani authorities project as cross-border terrorism in Balochistan. ThePakistani authorities have been consistently projecting the movement of theBaloch nationalists as cross-border terrorism, with alleged Indian support andAfghan complicity.

He wants to project the admission of Dr Manmohan Singh that Pakistan has alsobeen a victim of terrorism as applying to what has been going on in Balochistanand not to the usual Shia-Sunni sectarian terrorism and the activities of AlQaeda and its jihadi associates from Pakistani territory. He feels he does notneed India's co-operation against sectarian and Al Qaeda terrorism. He intendsmaking India's co-operation in putting down the Baloch nationalist movement aquid pro quo for his co-operation against jihadi terrorism in Indian territoryoutside J&K.

While talking of "unease among intelligence agencies" over theproposed joint anti-terrorism co-operation mechanism agreed to during his talkswith  Dr Manmohan Singh at Havana, he is reported to have said at New Yorkon September 21, 2006:"There is also certain apprehension about Indiasharing intelligence on Balochistan." (The Hindu of September22,2006.

What he apparently means is that there is misgiving in Pakistan'sintelligence agencies whether India would share intelligence on Balochistanunder this joint mechanism. As officials of the two countries sit down todiscuss the nuts and bolts of the joint mechanism, Indian co-operation inputting down the nationalist movement in Balochistan is likely to assumeimportance. This is a purely indigenous movement with no external involvementand no Indian government, which has a clear understanding of its nationalinterests and its genuine allies in Pakistan, should even tolerate such an idea.

(B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,Chennai)