Missing The Bus

Secessionist politicians in Srinagar expect that Kasuri will have placed considerable pressure on MirwaizFarooq to temper his opposition to the Islamist faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) led byGeelani, and backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) - and to reduce the visibility of the pro-dialogue, centristfactions he heads. Hit by the assassination of several close relatives and aides, frightened by the burningdown of his seminary, under threat from both the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), andwithout an heir to carry on his clerical legacy, Mirwaiz Farooq may well choose the second option. Yet, thestakes for the centrists he represents are also high. Should they fail to shape a political agenda in comingweeks, Geelani's position will consolidate - and hopes that centrists will be able to directly negotiate apeace with New Delhi would receive a potentially fatal blow.

In recent weeks, Geelani has had considerable success in drawing in fringe groupings from among J&Ksecessionists into the ranks of his party. On August 30, the People's League chairman Sheikh Abdul Azizformally joined the Geelani faction of the APHC. Mirwaiz Farooq's APHC, he claimed, had "deviated fromthe Hurriyat constitution and entered into talks [with the Indian government]", which he described as"a futile exercise". Aziz said his organisation would only participate in three-way talks betweenIndia, Pakistan and representatives of the people of J&K, a formulation New Delhi has traditionallyrejected. APHC centrists had begun to abandon this formulation in the wake of the Kargil war, instead pushingfor direct dialogue with New Delhi.

Days later, on September 3, the chairman of Mahaz-e-Azadi, Azam Inqilabi, urged non-aligned secessionistgroups, notably Yasin Malik's Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Shabbir Shah's Democratic FreedomParty, to join Geelani. Speaking to journalists in Srinagar on September 3, Inqilabi used a formulationsimilar to that of Aziz, asserting that future dialogue needed to involve not just India and Pakistan, butrepresentatives of Kashmir. Although both Malik and Shah have stayed away from the centrist APHC's dialoguewith New Delhi, and sought for some time to reconcile the warring faction's, these secessionist leaders haveso far resisted being corralled into Geelani's formation.

Geelani, interestingly, has adopted a position of opposition to any dialogue - including the ongoing processbetween India and Pakistan. A recent statement issued by his APHC faction said that confidence buildingmeasures like the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route, "or sticking to the ego for menialinterests" would not help solve the conflict in J&K. The press release had opposed the scheduledmeeting between Kasuri and India's Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh, arguing that that bilateral talks hadhistorically failed to produce workable solutions to the problem. "These talks are doomed to fail untilthe people of Jammu & Kashmir are associated with the process", the statement read. Geelanireiterated this position after speaking to Kasuri, declaring, "bilateral dialogue has no effect on groundsituation in J&K. Until the contentious issue of J&K is resolved, nothing will be achieved. Allefforts are in vain."

This rejectionist polemic was provoked by the killing of the HM's 'intelligence chief', Abdul Rashid Dar, onthe eve of the Kasuri-Singh meeting. Operating under the alias Tariq Aziz, Dar had served over the past eightyears as the HM's 'Deputy District Commander' and 'District Commander' in Pulwama, before assuming charge ofits 'intelligence wing'. Indian forces have not taken responsibility for Dar's killing, but the Geelanifaction of the Hurriyat said he had been "martyred". Representatives of the group later visitedDar's family. Significantly, the HM itself said nothing on Dar's killing - a sign of how similar Geelani'sactivities now are to those of a political wing of the grouping.

At least some believe Geelani's rejectionist position could have Pakistan's tacit support, as a means ofslowing down the dialogue and confidence-building measures until major political concessions by India areforthcoming. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking before the talks began, made it clear that furtherpolitical progress would depend on an end to cross-border terrorism, something Pakistan has repeatedlypromised in the past. Within Pakistan's Kashmir-policy establishment, however, there seems to be considerableconfusion on the issue, with some arguing that an end to violence will strip that country of the sole leverageit has to extract concessions from India.

Desperate for some face-saving measures which would give a resumption of dialogue with New Delhi politicalsaleability among their constituency, the centrist APHC leadership is finding the political climateinhospitable. On August 31, the centrist APHC - like the Islamist APHC - attacked the United ProgressiveAlliance (UPA) Government's handling of J&K, criticising it for placing "conditions andpre-conditions" for dialogue. The grouping, which had held two rounds of dialogue with the earlierNational Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government, said that both India and Pakistan had at that time realised thefutility of rigid positions, and had decided to move ahead. However, it argued, the coming to power of the UPAGovernment had meant that the situation had "returned to square one".

What isn't clear is just what New Delhi can do to bring the centrists back on board. Proposals like a phasedreduction in troop strength in J&K, or a unilateral ceasefire, are simply unworkable as long as terroristviolence continues. Nor can the centrists deliver anything to New Delhi in return, most notably a reduction inlevels of violence. Islamists like Geelani, for their part, have no real reason to allow dialogue to go aheadas long as India is unwilling to make the kinds of significant territorial concessions that would beacceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, has brought about a phased reduction in levels of support to terrorsince 2002, but seems unwilling to go further until Indian concessions are made. India cannot make thoseconcessions, because of their implications for its sovereignty and domestic political opinion.

So what might happen next? Almost unnoticed by observers, Kasuri held out a threat. Kashmiri groups, he saidon September 5, had "complained that human rights violations had increased since November. " Its hardto see just what factual basis Kasuri's claim has - both killings of terrorists and of civilians by Indianforces are at record lows this year - but infiltration had fallen sharply from December 2003, as part of acalibrated Pakistani response to open up the way for talks with New Delhi. Read through this prism, Kasuricould be signalling that in the absence of a breakthrough, or at least a reduction in Indian military presencein J&K, cross-border terrorism will be unleashed at full-scale levels again. With 17 Brigades tied down inWana, the Pakistan Army may be feeling insecure about its eastern flanks and wish to ensure that Indian forcesare occupied.

The fact is, since the peace process began in 2000, the fundamentals of the problem in J&K have notchanged - and seem unlikely to do so any time soon.

Praveen Swami is New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and also writes for its sisterpublication, The Hindu. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia TerrorismPortal