Is China Changing?

Does the government know something that people don’t? Otherwise why wouldit participate in joint military exercises with China’s People’s LiberationArmy (PLA) on Indian soil at this point of time? And was there compelling needfor Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to go to Beijing to attend the Asia-Europesummit? Recent events have not inspired confidence in China’s intentionstowards India. China’s stranglehold embrace of Pakistan remains. DuringPresident Zardari’s recent visit to China Beijing commissioned two new nuclearreactors for Pakistan. China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh remain firm.China’s buildup of infrastructure on India’s border continues its freneticpace. Chinese intrusions into Indian territory have not stopped. And yet ourgovernment persists in wooing China. Why?

Possibly, just possibly, the government may be aware of Beijing’s attempts tointroduce desirable change in its policies. One is sure there is no dearth ofintelligence inputs from western nations that might influence the MEA. Readersmight recall that this scribe for over a year has ventured through these columnsthe view that a major policy shift in China could be under way. Unfolding eventshave done nothing to dampen that hope, nor have they in any substantial mannerconfirmed it. The direction of possible change, and the symptoms that providehope that it may occur, are worth recapitulating.

In this scribe’s view the change began with the transfer of power to PresidentHu Jintao from Jiang Zemin. It was during Jiang’s tenure that the negativepolicies pursued by China reached their zenith. Domestically corruptionescalated. Disparity between illegally enriched party cadres and peasants inrural China widened to an alarming degree. Economic imbalance between thesouthern coastland and the north grew. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) wereallowed to deteriorate dangerously close to bankruptcy. Chinese banks were in amess. They were forced to continually give bad loans to keep alive SOEs thatemploy 60 percent of China’s urban population. All this occurred duringChina’s stupendous rate of growth achieved through foreign capital andvirtually enslaved Chinese labour. The Shanghai group loyal to Jiang Zeminaccomplished this. It was during this time that the PLA provided arms aid toIslamist terrorists in Southeast Asia, and through them to India’s Northeastinsurgents, as well as to ISI directed jihaadis. It was during this time thatChina unleashed nuclear proliferation to rogue nations through Pakistan’s DrAQ Khan. It was during this time that China colluded with the Taliban and Osamabin Laden. These facts are confirmed by credible authorities. 

President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao did not belong to this group. Theycame from peasant stock. After Jiang Zemin was forced to resign fromchairmanship of the Central Military Commission which overlooked the PLA, HuJintao tried to root out corruption. He did not hesitate to punish senior partyleaders who were Jiang loyalists. There was a covert power struggle. Thecontours of the struggle were blurred by the role of a third party in thestruggle, the PLA. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, who had participated in the Long March,neither Jiang nor Hu exercised full authority over the PLA. As a result of thisshadowy struggle foreign analysts were confused. They found it difficult tofathom who was winning and who was not. There were mixed signals from Beijing.There were contradictory signals during the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therewere contradictory signals in relation to confidence building measures withIndia. For example, the timing of Beijing’s reiterated claim to Arunachalevaporated the good vibes created by Premier Wen Jiabao’s meetings with thePM. It could not be determined whether this double faced approach reflectedBeijing’s diabolical duplicity, the impediments created by Jiang’s loyalistsstill exercising influence, or by the intervention of the PLA.

Gradually, however, President Hu Jinatao appeared to be consolidating hisposition. North Korea was compelled to toe his line. The most important changeof policy direction, in the view of this scribe, was China’s change ofattitude towards Japan. Is it possible that hard headed self interest will leadChina to substantively alter its attitude to India as well? If it does, thischange would indicate China’s past policies extracting their price. China,which colluded with terrorists in the past, is now itself grappling withterrorism. This is not due to a change of heart but to compelling developmentsof its own making.

Earlier China used the threat of Xingjian separatism as a fig leaf to cover itscovert collusion with terrorists. Some years ago Beijing sought information fromIslamabad about certain Uighurs training in Pakistani camps. This indicated fullawareness of Uighur participation in terrorist activity. Pakistan trained Uighurterrorists eventually were expected to go to Chechnya. Osama had guaranteed thePLA cooperation in Xingjian in exchange for telecom aid to Afghanistan duringTaliban rule. The situation has dramatically altered.

Beijing supplied arms to Iranian backed Shiite jihaadis. This help most likelywas motivated not by the desire to aid terrorism but to please Iran. China’senergy needs were desperate and supplies from Iran were crucial. Alas, theIranian aided Shiite jihaadis were in direct conflict with the Al Qaeda Sunniterrorists who until then had a cozy relationship with China. Pakistan’sjihaadis guided by Al Qaeda’s Zawahiri started targeting Chinese in Islamabadand Baluchistan. The Al Qaeda-Beijing truce over Xingjian seems to havecollapsed. That is why Beijing now has developed new interest against terrorism.That is why it is currently coming down heavily against Islamic mosques inXingjian by interfering even with religious practice. Beijing may have givenPakistan two new nuclear reactors to snub India. It has not provided bailoutmoney. After President Zardari’s recent China visit Beijing officially linkedterrorists on Chinese soil to training camps in Pakistan. China’s forthcomingjoint military exercises with India are related to anti-terrorism. Takingeverything into account should India therefore encourage closer ties withBeijing?

The answer is no, not yet. India must clearly draw the line which China shouldnot cross. Beijing must reconcile itself to eventual emergence of SAARC as aSouth Asian Union minus China. It must stop encouraging our neighbours againstus. It must try to develop economic and trade ties with South Asia as oneentity, and not seek most favoured nation treaties with individual nations. Inother words, it must respect India’s turf. It should instead focus on its owntrouble-spots, especially Tibet and Xingjian.