The fourth round of talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)in Thailand that ended on January 9, 2003 marks a new phase in the peace process. A series of confidencebuilding measures, commencing with a ceasefire almost thirteen months ago, had led to a convivial atmosphereat each round of negotiations. However, where earlier rounds had always ended on a high note of agreement onall issues, the current talks - while marking important milestones on human rights, issues particular to womenand their participation and a focus on humanitarian issues - nevertheless saw the two sides agreeing todisagree for the first time. The important sub-committee on de-escalation & normalisation (SDN) standsfrozen, pointing to the gap between negotiations at the top and realities on the ground. The time has now comefor hard bargaining on the 'messy' nitty gritty that will take the contenders from confidence in each othertowards building consensus, not only between the negotiating parties, but with the various other power centresand stakeholders as well.
The earlier phases of talks in 2002 had taken a pragmatic approach reflecting the ground realities, instead ofpolemical arguments based on a vision for a final settlement around structures and systems. 'Lets start withwhat we have, not what we want' - seemed to be the approach on both sides, and LTTE demands, such as aninterim administration for the North East, which could have led to a constitutional minefield, weresuccessfully sidestepped. It is now quite clear that such an approach, while crucial for the initial stage oftalks, would not suffice as a basis for a durable and lasting peace.
Another connected issue is that the motivation for the momentum that had gathered (on both sides) waseconomic. And not only was a solution being sought on economic imperatives, it is evident that the responsewill also be economic. The effectiveness of a primarily economic response to an identity-based conflict,however, is a highly questionable theory of change in the light of international experience.
The Oslo talks of early December led to a breakthrough in terms of identifying the principles around which afinal solution would be built. For the first time, a Sri Lankan government explicitly committed itself to afederal solution with the LTTE, indicating its willingness to explore such an outcome. But no two federalsystems are alike, and the current discussion will have to be placed in the political realities that areparticular to the Sri Lankan context. The challenges these create include:
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- how the LTTE with an administration, army and navy of its own would be accommodated and integrated intosuch a federal system;
- how the needs and aspirations of local regional minorities will be accommodated and guaranteed;
- and the manner in which power would be shared at the centre while devolving it to the periphery so as toavoid an irreversible separatist tendency.
It is, consequently, natural that many difficult issues would emerge, and that a phase of hard bargainingwould commence immediately after such a framework had been identified.
The issue that raised the present controversy was connected to high security zones (HSZ) of the Sri Lanka Army(SLA) in the Jaffna peninsula, and the resettlement of refugees within these zones.The nature of the SLApresence in Jaffna is problematic even from a military standpoint, since it has no garrisons or barracks, andlarge areas, including houses, schools and places of worship, were occupied to form HSZ's. In fact 18 per centof the land area (some of it densely populated or covering rich agricultural land) of 880 square kilometres(amounting to 160 square kilometres) is occupied by the army. The LTTE wants all refugees resettled, and theSLA had demanded a decommissioning of LTTE arms in return.
The SLA contention that the HSZs involved an issue of military security was, no doubt, valid, since anychanges to the HSZs would affect the military balance that was frozen by the ceasefire agreement. But, giventhe reality of thousands of refugees eager to return home after an year of no war, it is one of human securityas well. The LTTE has conceded the issue of the HSZs, at least for the moment, agreeing to the resettlement ofrefugees whose homes are outside HSZs as a first step. The real underlying issue, however, is that, whilegovernment forces exercise military control in the Jaffna peninsula, it is the LTTE that exerts politicalcontrol.
The LTTE's reluctance to consider, at this stage, any surrender or decommissioning of arms, is a pointer toits dominant psychology of the use of force as a matter of course. It is also, however, a clear response tothe notorious reputation that Sri Lanka has as a reform-resistant state. Not only have earlier deals with theTamil community been reneged upon, but two rebellions led by Sinhala youth in the past were also crushedmilitarily, with no remedial reforms undertaken to deal with the issues that could have redressed the causesof conflict, and thereby ensured non-recurrence. There is a latent feeling in the whole country that a groupcan get noticed and be effective only if and when it takes recourse to arms.
If dual control in the Jaffna peninsula is a major contradiction that could send the peace process into atailspin, the dual power centres in the south [with a Peoples Alliance (PA) Executive President and a UnitedNational Front (UNF) government] would appear to create the opportunity for ensuring a sustainable peace. TheLTTE's agreement to explore a federal solution to the conflict must be seen alongside its deep scepticism ofthe United National Front government's ability to deliver on any such substantive political settlement. Thisis especially so in view of the acrimonious politics of the south, where the UNF and PA continue to undermineeach other, with no hope of significant state reforms securing the required two-thirds majority in Parliament.It has even been suggested that the LTTE agreed to explore a federal option, being fairly sure that theparties in the south would never agree on, and be able to deliver, such a solution.
Political will has taken Sri Lanka out of the mire of war and created an atmosphere where a settlement can beexplored. Will political consensus be given a chance to lead to a sustainable peace?
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The author is Managing Trustee, INPACT (Initiative for Political & Conflict Transformation), Colombo. Courtesy: South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
